

AMERICA AND THE GERMAN PERIL

HOWARD PITCHER OKIE



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AMERICA AND THE GERMAN PERIL

BY

HOWARD PITCHER OKIE

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AUTHOR OF "CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR OF 1914"

"On helm and harness rings the Saxon hammer,
Through Cimbric forest roars the Norseman's song,
And loud, amid the universal clamour,
O'er distant deserts sounds the Tartar gong."

LONGFELLOW



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“ In silence you have looked on felon blows,
On butcher's work of which the waste lands reek ;
Now, in God's name, from Whom your greatness flows,
Sister, will you not speak ?”

O. S.

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AMERICA AND THE GERMAN PERIL

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

AT the beginning of the war of 1914 the external world commenced to learn phases of German character of which it had been strangely ignorant. The first lesson in this educative process was furnished by the attitude of the German Socialists in the Reichstag, in their Press, and on the street. They had been deemed an insurmountable obstacle to war by nearly every English, French, and American publicist. At the first sound of the bugle the "brotherhood of man" was forgotten. With one solitary and unimportant exception they became militarists. This change in attitude was a violent shock to England. But America, too, was to have her thrills: that country had fondly believed that the attachment professed by Germans of American birth or adoption to free institutions and republican Government would make them at least passively averse to any extension of the dynastic system of government, the evils of which had, presumably, been a factor in their expatriation. Their attitude was a lesson in physiology. Men whose parents had landed penniless

and illiterate in Castle Garden, whose forbears had been traded in like cattle, robbed of the fruits of their industry, sold as slaves or mercenaries, but who themselves had become educated and wealthy under free institutions, with one accord busied themselves in Germany's cause. The interests of America were nothing to them! The leading German paper in America, edited by a German of American birth, immediately attempted to embroil America with Japan. A German lawyer, also of American birth, and who had accumulated great wealth practising his profession in New York, entered into a conspiracy which, in the event of its success, would land a petty score or so of German soldiers in their own country by means of forged passports; its discovery after success would seriously discredit the American Government, and cause much discomfort to *bona fide* citizens with genuine Government credentials. By the same interests a lobby was formed with the purpose of inducing the American Congress to violate international law and neutrality by purchasing German vessels interned in American ports; the result of such purchase would be the addition of thirty or forty millions of dollars to Germany's war fund, and the straining, if not the total severance, of friendly relations between this country and all of the other belligerents. Serious college professors abandoned their traditional attitude of political detachment, and deluged the American public with columns of false statements and transparent sophistry. Thus was the value of the history we had neglected brought home to us. Thus were we taught the utter, the transcendent, folly of attempting to put ourselves in the place of another, and determining his

present or future course by what ours would be in a like case.

German history shows us that there is a cellular, a ganglial, difference between the body and mind of a pure-bred Teuton and those of a varied mixture of liberty-loving Anglo-Saxons, Celts, and Latins. With the German, obedience to his immediate chief is a habit of body and soul. In time of peace it is manifested in wholly unobjectionable ways. He is the most tractable of workmen; he obeys countless sumptuary laws and regulations which the inhabitant of another country would not suffer for a moment. He enjoys rendering this implicit obedience to what is to him and for him no doubt the very best form of government; but this habit is so deep-seated as to become an obsession, paralyzing all powers of reason when the commands of his superior are loud, urgent, or insistent. There has been no respite in the training of countless ages of servitude of the masses to the classes. Of all the peoples on earth, the Germans alone have had no revolution of peasant against prince. The Peasants' War was a short-lived religious revolt; the so-called revolution of 1848 was a mere "tremor" of sympathy with the social earthquake in France. Princes have revolted against the hegemony of one of their own class; but with such revolt or betrayal they have always disposed absolutely of their subject peasants without question or demur upon their part. In the Middle Ages these followers have been seen fighting courageously and with a blind faith under the Papal banner, and a few months later the same men, under the same leadership, were pillaging St. Peter's, and driving the occupant of the Holy See into obscurity and hiding. They fought for the Reformation if a Duke

of Electoral Saxony told them to do so; at the bidding of a Margrave of Ansbach they dug out the eyes of sixty Protestants; they fought against the King of England on the Continent of Europe, or for him in North America, at the bidding of a Hessian prince. This is a structural, a basic, peculiarity of the German; it is probably neither wholly good or bad, but for our safety and for the safety of our children and our cherished institutions let us recognize it, and, avoiding all just grounds of offence, comport ourselves as sane men confronted with a situation which, if fully recognized now, is not fraught with any great danger.

Singularly enough, the very earliest relics of the palæolithic Teuton show that even at that remote period the total submission of one German to another—that other his master—was the recognized order of German affairs. German graves of the Stone Age show that the wives and servants of great personages were immolated with them. "One group has been found consisting of a single upright figure surrounded by eight others in a crouching position."* Loyalty and obedience were in the most remote period inculcated by attaching to any breach of either penalties in this world and the next so horrible that it was inconceivable that a simple and credulous people would purchase life by disobedience or desertion. The measure for the essential bravery of the soldier was simple. He followed his prince or immediate leader.

Tacitus says: "In peace the retinue brings honour, in war protection. It is disgraceful for the chief to be outdone in bravery by the thanes, disgraceful for the retinue not to equal the bravery of the chief. But it

* Henderson's "Short History of the German People."

brings reproach and lifelong infamy to survive the chief after he has fallen in battle." A later historian says: "It is easy to see what an instrument of power such a retinue must have given to an ambitious nobleman; but it is remarkable, we do not hear of a usurpation of government by such help. This old thaneship, moreover, gives the first evidence of that faithfulness and loyalty which form a national ideal of the Germans to-day. 'Die deutsche Treue,' of which we hear again and again in German songs and poems, is a quality which in these olden times is to be understood as voluntary submission of personality, by those who were by nature the proudest of all people, to a superior authority. They gave up to this authority, not only family ties, but even individual judgment of right and wrong. It was a faithfulness that lasted as long as the chief kept his side of the contract, or remained faithful to the ideal. No natural tie was ever stronger than this allegiance."

This habit of personal submission has made for war, not peace. It has prevented revolt against tribal or family authority, but has resulted in the princes themselves, counting absolutely upon the unswerving fidelity of their followers, employing that weapon upon each and every occasion when its use would seem to promise "honour" or profit. In the result, from the dawn of recorded history down to the close of the Franco-German War of 1870-71, German soil has been drenched with the blood of her children.

It will be said with perfect truth that it cannot be that the entire German population of America will ever array itself against the United States. But who may determine the percentages? Against the charge of over-

statement one can only reply that the error is merely one of degree, and the author regrets that he must appear to be unjust to such patriotic *American-Germans* as Professor Kuno Francke (who has voiced his unswerving loyalty to this country) and to very many others—one cannot say how many—who only refrain from expressing their allegiance to America because of a natural reluctance to appear as critics of Germany in her period of trouble and stress. If the reforms proposed are harmless in themselves, the fault of overstatement in mere proportions of the danger they are designed to avert is purely ethical. An understatement, unless the reader could correct it, might be perilous to national safety. It is certain that any attempt to estimate the comparative strength of the divisions in the German ranks in this country would be purely arbitrary, and the author disclaims the possession of any facility for determining it not possessed by the general public. With this apology to the *American-German* one must be content. The political activities of the *German-American* in New York, as represented by the German-American Reform Union, show that, whether alligned with or against the corrupt machine so long dominant in New York municipal politics (and their position in this regard was determined by the degree of German-American representation upon the Democratic ticket), the vote of this organization was delivered in mass. There was no defection. Some of New York's best German citizens disapproved of the purposes of the organization and never joined it. They voted and worked strenuously for good government. Their numerical strength, however, does not encourage the belief that

German organizations will disintegrate through desertions, where their passions are really inflamed, as they now declare them to be, and when they rally to a cry that has compelled obedience from the beginning of recorded time.

It must not be thought that the suggestions made, if carried out to the very limit, would constitute a declaration of war against the German residents in America. They must, as of right they ought, continue in the enjoyment of every right they now possess (including the franchise; an abuse of this right may be corrected at the polls by the American people) except that of bearing arms; this disability to be shared by every other inhabitant, regardless of birth or nationality, unless the arms are placed in their hands by the Government, for whose sole use they should be employed.

CHAPTER II

THE GERMAN PERIL

"If America respects only brute force, then we shall give full play to brute force." — *Cologne Gazette* (official organ), February 4, 1915.

IN order to lull the fears of those who are prone to regard measures designed to protect the United States from the effects of unrestrained militarism abroad, as tending in themselves to reproduce here the conditions which we deprecate in other countries, the author wishes to begin by stating the very modest changes which he suggests be made in our present polity—changes which he deems essential to secure his country against offensive measures, which, if taken by Germany at a time propitious to her, would result in loss of life, property, national dignity, and, perhaps more important, sow the seeds of hatred against a great nation with whom we wish to maintain a peace which, if maintained, will inure to the profit and happiness of ourselves and our descendants.

If this book may teach a lesson, it must be predicated upon one main and all-important truth:

Any war of the United States with Germany will be commenced by a rebellion—perhaps of numerical insignificance—conducted upon United States territory.

Unless this undoubted truth is kept in mind by those who "keepeth the city, the watchman waketh in vain." It is the main, the principal, fact, in the light of which every defensive measure must be appraised. One instance will suffice to show the different conclusions to which reason will lead us (1) if we reject this proposition, or (2) if we accept it.

If a war by Germany against the United States should begin by the bombardment of our ports, and of places of strategic importance, such as the Panama Canal Zone, and by the landing of an invading army upon our coasts, and such attacks were met by the opposition of a thoroughly united America, undisturbed by internal pro-German movement, then the strength of our fortifications, the long range of our guns, will be factors making for national safety. If, on the other hand, war should first find expression from a rebellious and not wholly alien mob apparently assembled in the first instance for the purpose of indulging in the cherished right "to peaceably assemble," but who in reality had been mobilized with a set purpose hostile to America and with that precision and attention to details which has always marked German operations in affairs of this kind, our coast fortifications will, if present conditions continue, be a source of danger, in direct proportion to their strength, to our soldiers and civil population on land and our fleet at sea.

The risk of war is never incurred by Germany unless she deems the hour to be propitious. Witness the long interval of peace that ensued after 1871, during which time Russia was thought to be the dominant military power of Europe, and the German Emperor was credited with being a determined advocate of

European peace. During this period Germany had not abandoned any article of her creed of expansion by conquest. Note the immediate change that took place when Russian military prowess had been crippled by her overwhelming defeat by Japan. The moment that hour struck, Austria, incited by Germany, broke the law of nations by the violent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and for months Europe was suspended by a thread over the abyss of war. Unless Germany's fleet is free, there need be no fear of Germany, even though, through some desperate situation at home, she were to seek war with America, merely as an excuse to make a peace in Europe; but, if a *serious* war against the United States be contemplated, it will not be declared until it suits Germany; our hands are tied by the treaty of August, 1914,* which the author believes will be held to be provisionally binding upon us until—and if—it be rejected by the United States Senate. So Germany, untrammelled by treaty obligations, which from her point of view never deprives the State of "full power of self-determination," need not consult the convenience of the Republic. War will be declared when Germany's fleet is within striking distance of our shores, and that moment will determine to the very minute the shore mobilization of the armed, disciplined, rehearsed German "patriots," who will not have the slightest difficulty in taking possession of the wireless stations at Sayville and Arlington, and the fortifications of New York Harbour, Panama, and San Francisco. Our warships will be menaced upon the sea by a superior fleet; they will, of course, be ignorant of the

* The treaty provides that neither country shall declare war against the other until one year shall have elapsed from the date of the cause of the disagreement.

German operations on shore. One need not enlarge upon the possibilities—nay, the probabilities—of the serious damage that could thus be inflicted upon the United States; this country could, of course, after a short period of agony, regain possession of her coast defences—not including Panama; she would be, as indeed she is now, powerless to prevent the occupation, designed to be permanent, of such of the West Indies as Germany might desire. The permanent occupation of Cuba by Germany would disturb our peace far more than did the endemic revolutions of the period of Spanish ownership.

Remember that Germany will not take one step in the dark; her knowledge of the details of foreign administrations is always meticulously accurate. She is like the man with a microscope perpetually screwed in his eye-socket. Every United States administrative department—War, State, and Navy—is penetrated with Germans occupying positions of trust. If Germany is not to-day in possession of the plans of every fortification, naval vessel, and of every code, belonging to the United States, she has departed from every tradition of her history. During the years when Witte was high in Russian official circles, as Minister of Railways, later as Minister of Finance, every conversation in the St. Petersburg Cabinet was known a few hours later in Berlin. Now the Russians “have changed all that,” and Witte’s present task, which he will probably be unable long to pursue without interruption,* is to foment pro-peace revolutions in the Czar’s dominions, and, attempting to enlist his friends in the bureaucracy to work with him, to induce Russia to make a dishonourable peace.

* Count Witte died while this book was in the press.

We need not regard Germany's perfection of the spy system as evidencing great mental acumen or far-seeing statesmanship. The man with the microscope has his limitations. The offensive wars that Germany plans in pursuance of her right to "a place in the sun," even though that place be already occupied under a good title, will be unprofitable; but that will not save our national dignity, nor will it insure the inviolateness of our women or save the lives of our children. That which Galbus told the Romans in the first century is still true: "The Gods never concern themselves with the protection of the innocent; only with the punishment of the guilty."

By a parity of reasoning, it will be quite unnecessary for Germany to "land" a uniformed force at Panama; 2,000 German-American sightseers, armed with naturalization papers, American birth-certificates, and weapons of precision, acting against an unsuspecting garrison, could put the Canal fortifications into the possession of Germany, who would hold it until we had built and manned a huge navy, or until a regenerated Great Britain had forgiven our "frosty neutrality" and answered our pathetic cries for help. Should it ever seem advisable for Germany to send troops by sea to New York harbour—and, as we shall see, no contingency is less remote—they will disembark under the protection of American heavy guns manned by trained German artillerymen.

There is something inexpressibly naïve in the ignorance that soberly discusses the difficulties which would attend a German invasion of a paltry 20,000 or 50,000 men, when she already has here an army that could not

be carried across the ocean in twelve months if she employed every vessel in her navy and merchant marine combined. According to the latest census reports there were in 1910 in the United States, 1,337,775 *males* of German birth, of whom 40 per cent. (535,000) were between the ages of twenty and forty, and of whom, it is safe to say, an overwhelming proportion have performed their full military service; but *the total German population*, limiting that term to persons German-born and children with *both* parents of that nationality, is variously estimated at from 8,000,000 to 10,000,000, and, as the following pages will show, the mere accident of nativity is a matter of the slightest importance, except so far as it reduces the proportion of male Germans with actual military training.

In New York City there are 57,000 males of German birth between twenty and forty years of age (total male German population, 142,190), a number *nearly double that of our entire standing army*. In addition there is a huge German population, practically of New York, but who dwell and are enumerated in Hoboken and Jersey City.

These aliens are not detached individuals; they are enrolled in German societies; the National German-American League has 5,500,000 enrolled members!*

* In the German view, organization is the first step in the attainment of any purpose. Bismarck says: "Of the examinations, as criminal proceedings in the inquisitorial method of that day were called, the one that has made the most lasting impression upon me related to a widely ramifying association in Berlin for the purpose of unnatural vice. The club arrangements of the accomplices, the agenda books, the levelling effect through all classes of a common pursuit of the forbidden—all this, even in 1835, pointed to a demoralization in no whit less than that evidenced by the

they have their officers ; they have, or can secure at a moment's notice, weapons of precision of a uniform type and standardized ammunition.

Since the preceding paragraphs were written, and as this book went through the press, the following events have happened :

Early in the year 1915 the United States addressed a note to Germany stating, in effect, that any act of that Power which resulted in the sinking of a vessel flying the American flag, without first proving by search the fact that such vessel was carrying contraband to Germany's enemies, would seriously imperil the good relations of the two countries. Early in May, a few weeks after the delivery of the American note to Berlin, the *Gulflight*, an American ship, was torpedoed by a German submarine without any warning or examination of her cargo or manifests, with the resultant destruction of the vessel and of American lives.

Upon the day following the happening of the very contingency upon which the United States had predicated a possible war with Germany, it was announced that an organization of wealthy patriotic (*sic*) German-Americans had been organized for the purpose of purchasing *machine guns* and other munitions of war from American manufacturers to prevent them from being purchased by Britain or her allies !

proceedings against the Heinzes, husband and wife, in October, 1891. The ramifications of this society extended even into the highest circles. It was ascribed to the influence of Prince Wittgenstein that the reports of the case were demanded from the Ministry of Justice, and were never returned—at least, during the time I served on the tribunal" ("Reflections and Reminiscences," vol. i., p. 7).

In spite of the fact that people of the United States have learned that increased consumption increases, disproportionately, production, the German explanation has been accepted as quite *bona fide* !

There is every reason to believe that ready to their hand, in the stores in Hoboken of the two German steamship companies, there is to-day heavy ordnance which could be trained upon property worth untold millions.*

"But," it will be exclaimed, "human nature revolts at such ingratitude !"

Our nature does. The German nature is different—perhaps superior, but different. Let us judge fairly, not seeking to blame him, but to protect ourselves and him from himself. Let us draw our conclusions, not from what we should do, but from what he has done. Let our actions be determined, not by assuming that they are George Washingtons, but that they are eminently respectable German (always German) gentlemen, like Count Witte, who was born in Russia, of only partial German ancestry, and of whom more hereafter ; † like the New York newspaper editor of American birth, but German parentage, who urges his hyphenated "compatriots" to "organize, organize, organize" ; and Carl Dieches, the New York lawyer ; and Carl Ruroede, for

* Upon the first or second day of August, 1914, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* was lying in the Hoboken docks, an innocent passenger vessel. Upon the night of one of those days she left port, loaded to the hatches with coal and thoroughly equipped with heavy guns ; the efficiency of her equipment may be estimated by the great damage she has since done to British shipping. It is extremely unlikely that the *Wilhelm* had the guns on board when she arrived in New York, or that she exhausted the German ordnance stores at Hoboken.

† See p. 121.

eighteen years an official with the Norddeutscher Lloyd Steamship Company*—men who, in any save a German-American crisis, would serve the country of their birth or adoption, but who in such an event are *Germans*, through the operation of forces which they do not put in being, and which they cannot control.

The condition with which we are confronted could never have been contemplated by the fathers of our Constitution.

In 1790 the Englishman, German, or Frenchman, who came to this country, came without intention of returning. His expatriation was final. Trans-ocean voyages were hazardous, tedious, and expensive, to be undertaken on rare occasions and for a definite purpose. Even communication by letter between the voluntary exile and his home was infrequent, and usually ceased entirely except so far as important happenings were concerned. Germany simply did not exist, and Prussia was in a state of "suspended animation."

Our naturalization laws were framed under conditions which resemble existing ones as little as the first years of our national life resemble our own times.

If we act promptly, we need not wound susceptibilities. If we wait until trouble is threatened, and until vehement promises of loyalty to America have been made—promises which would have to yield to the same inexorable necessity that controlled the German Chancellor after he had promised to respect Belgium's neutrality our task will be more painful and difficult.

The following measures suggest themselves as

* Dieches, Ruroede, and others were involved in the forged passport case mentioned in the introductory chapter.

reasonable exercises of the police power of the national government :

1. The manufacture of ordnance, weapons of precision, ammunition, and explosives, should be a monopoly of the Federal Government. Their importation should be generally prohibited.

2. Standard small arms and ammunition should be issued to a Landwehr composed of able-bodied native Americans, whose unalloyed Americanism would be attested by responsible officials. The members of this embryonic national army would not necessarily be bound to military service, but they would be held responsible for the custody of the arms and ammunition entrusted to them, and be afforded facilities for receiving instruction in the manual of arms and for gaining a proficiency in marksmanship and artillery practice. The traffic in rifles and revolvers should be prohibited.

3. All persons, other than those specified in paragraph 2, should be disarmed.

4. The number of army units and officers (not necessarily the number of enlisted men) should be increased.

5. Our garrisons at vulnerable points should be increased. The "counsel of perfection" would be to dismantle our fortifications until the other necessary reforms have been made.

6. Letters of domiciliation, conferring all the rights and obligations of citizenship except the franchises and military service, should be substituted for the present naturalization papers.

7. We should for obvious reasons endeavour to secure rights for the construction and operation of a

longitudinal railway from Texas to the Canal Zone. One consideration moving from us would be permanent and binding guarantees of the present territorial boundaries of each State traversed. Such a railway would ultimately prove financially profitable, and contribute to the immediate development and progress in civilization of the States thus penetrated, the preservation of peace in Central America, and closer pan-American relations.

8. We should continue to improve our navy until that happy hour when the abolition of dynastic government in Europe would make it profitable for us to scuttle every one of our battleships.

These changes, sketched as they are hurriedly and briefly, may be amplified and improved. In view of the constitutional limitations of the Federal Powers, it may be necessary to substitute "the several States" where "Federal Government" has been employed. Although it has never been done, no doubt the States could, if supported in such action by their inhabitants, delegate the necessary powers to the Central Government, just as an individual often "contracts himself out of a statute."

In support of proposals 1 and 2 it may be urged that if they were enacted into law, outrages of "gun-men" and "dynamiters" would become more difficult of achievement and dangerous to their perpetrators; that big-game shooting is a pursuit of the past, and now the only legitimate function of the rifle is national defence, and the selection of the man who employs it, as well as the manner of its employment, are matters of purely federal concern and control.

CHAPTER III

HOW THE GERMANS MAKE WAR

“ The tumult of each sacked and burning village ;
The shout that every prayer for mercy drowns ;
The soldiers’ revels in the midst of pillage ;
The wail of famine in beleaguer’d towns.”

LONGFELLOW.

THE desirability of the maintenance of a peace with Germany is emphasized by the two Reports, respectively, from the Belgian and French Commissions appointed to investigate alleged violations of international law. The Belgian Report was made in November, 1914, and furnishes evidence of the massacre at Tamines, the sack of Dinant, and the outrages in the province of Belgian Luxembourg.

“ Tamines, a rich and populous village situated on the Sambre between Charleroi and Namur, was occupied by detachments of French troops on the 17th, 18th, and 19th of August last. On Thursday, August 20, a German patrol appeared in front of the suburb of Vilaines, which was fired on by French soldiers, and by a party of the Civic Guards of Charleroi. Several Uhlans were killed and wounded, and the rest fled. The people of the village came out of their houses and cried :

‘Vive la Belgique!’ ‘Vive la France!’ In all probability,” says the Report, “it was this incident which caused the subsequent massacre of Tamines.

“Some time afterwards the Germans arrived in force at the hamlet of Alloux. There they burnt two houses and made all the inhabitants prisoners. About five o’clock on August 21 the Germans entered Tamines. The soldiers penetrated into the houses, drove out the inhabitants, set themselves to sack the place, and then burnt it. The unfortunate peasants who stopped in the village were shot; the rest fled from their houses. The greater part of them were arrested, either on the night of August 21, or on the following morning. Pillage and burning continued all next day (22nd).

“On the evening of the 22nd (Saturday) a group of between 400 and 450 men was collected in front of the church, not far from the bank of the Sambre. A German detachment opened fire on them, but, as the shooting was a slow business, the officers ordered a machine-gun, which soon swept off all the unhappy peasants still left standing. Many of them were only wounded, and, hoping to save their lives, got with difficulty on their feet again. They were immediately shot down. Many wounded still lay among the corpses, and some of those were bayoneted.

“All these facts have been established by depositions made by wounded men who succeeded in escaping. About one hundred bodies were found in the river.

“Next day, Sunday, the 23rd, about six o’clock in the morning, another party, consisting of

prisoners made in the village and the neighbourhood, were brought into the square. According to the deposition of one of these men, in the square was a mass of bodies of civilians extending over at least 40 yards by 6 yards. They had evidently been drawn up and shot, and the prisoners thought they were to share the same fate. An officer asked for volunteers to bury the corpses. Those who volunteered were set to work, and dug a trench 15 yards long, 10 broad, and 2 deep. The corpses were carried to the trench on planks. The deposition continues :

“‘I recognized many of the persons whose bodies we were burying. Actually fathers buried the bodies of their sons, and sons the bodies of their fathers.

“‘There were in the square both soldiers and officers. They were drinking champagne. The more the afternoon drew on the more they drank, and the more we were disposed to think that we were probably to be shot too. We buried from 350 to 400 bodies.’ (A list of the names of the victims has been drawn up.)

“This deposition includes a statement that a wounded man was buried alive, a German doctor having apparently ordered his interment. A soldier moved by an impulse of pity was scolded by his officer. After the burial, the prisoners, with their wives and children, were taken through Tamines to Vilaines. They thought they were going to be shot in the presence of their wives and children. The witness says : ‘I saw German soldiers who could not refrain from bursting into tears on

seeing the despair of the women. One of our party was seized with an apoplectic fit from mere terror, and I saw many who fainted.'

"When the cortège arrived at Vilaines an officer told the unhappy people that they were free, but that anyone returning to Tamines would be shot. He obliged the women and children to cry, 'Vive l'Allemagne.' The Germans burnt, after sacking them, 264 houses in Tamines. Many persons, including women and children, were burnt or stifled in their own homes. Many others were shot in the fields. The total number of victims was over 650. The Commission of Inquiry devoted special attention to ascertaining whether the inhabitants of the village had fired on the German troops. Every surviving witness unanimously declared the contrary.

"The town of Dinant was sacked and destroyed by the German army, and its population was decimated on the 22nd, 23rd, 24th, and 25th of August. On Friday, the 21st, about nine o'clock in the evening, German troops coming down the road from Ciney entered the town by the Rue St. Jacques. On entering they began firing into the windows of the houses, and killed a workman, wounded another inhabitant, and forced him to cry, 'Long live the Kaiser!' They bayoneted a third person in the stomach. They entered the cafés, seized the liquor, got drunk, and retired after having set fire to several houses and broken the doors and windows of others. The population was terrorized and stupefied, and shut itself up in its dwellings.

“Saturday, August 22, was a day of relative calm. On Sunday morning next, the 23rd, at 6.30 in the morning, soldiers of the 108th Regiment of Infantry invaded the Church of the Premonstratensian Fathers, drove out the congregation, separated the women from the men, and shot fifty of the latter. Between seven and nine the same morning the soldiers gave themselves up to pillage and arson, going from house to house and driving the inhabitants into the street. Those who tried to escape were shot. About nine in the morning the soldiery, driving before them by blows from the butt-ends of rifles men, women, and children, pushed them all into the Parade Square, where they were kept prisoners till six o'clock in the evening. The guard took pleasure in repeating to them that they would soon be shot. About six o'clock a Captain separated the men from the women and children. The women were placed in front of a rank of infantry soldiers, the men were ranged along a wall. The front rank of them were then told to kneel, the others remaining standing behind them. A platoon of soldiers drew up in face of these unhappy men. It was in vain that the women cried out for mercy for their husbands, sons, and brothers. The officer ordered his men to fire. There had been no inquiry nor any pretence of a trial. About twenty of the inhabitants were only wounded, but fell among the dead. The soldiers, to make sure, fired a new volley into the heap of them. Several citizens escaped this double discharge. They shammed dead for more than two hours, remaining motionless among the

corpses, and when night fell succeeded in saving themselves in the hills. Eighty-four corpses were left on the square and buried in a neighbouring garden.

“The day of August 23 was made bloody by several more massacres. Soldiers discovered some inhabitants of the Faubourg St. Pierre in the cellars of a brewery there and shot them.

“Since the previous evening a crowd of workmen belonging to the factory of M. Himmer had hidden themselves, along with their wives and children, in the cellars of the building. They had been joined there by many neighbours and several members of the family of their employer. About six o'clock in the evening these unhappy people made up their minds to come out of their refuge, and defiled, all trembling, from the cellars with the white flag in front. They were immediately seized and violently attacked by the soldiers. Every man was shot on the spot. Almost all the men of the Faubourg de Leffe were executed *en masse*. In another part of the town twelve civilians were killed in a cellar. In the Rue en Ile a paralytic was shot in his armchair. In the Rue Enfer the soldiers killed a young boy of fourteen.

“In the Faubourg de Neffe the viaduct of the railway was the scene of a bloody massacre. An old woman and all her children were killed in their cellar. A man of sixty-five years, his wife, his son, and his daughter were shot against a wall. Other inhabitants of Neffe were taken in a barge as far as the rock of Bayard and shot there, among them a woman of eighty-three and her husband.

"A certain number of men and women had been locked up in the court of the prison. At six in the evening a German machine-gun, placed on the hill above, opened fire on them with dynamite. Their work of destruction and theft accomplished, the soldiers set fire to the houses, and the town was soon no more than an immense furnace.

"The women and children had all been shut up in a convent, where they were kept prisoners for four days. These unhappy women remained in ignorance of the lot of their male relations. They were expecting themselves to be shot also. All around the town continued to blaze. The first day the monks of the convent had given them a certain supply of food. For the remaining days they had nothing to eat but raw carrots and green fruit.

"To sum up, the town of Dinant is destroyed. It counted 1,400 houses; only 200 remain. The manufactories where the artisan population worked have been systematically destroyed. Rather more than 700 of the inhabitants have been killed; others have been taken off to Germany, and are still retained there as prisoners. The majority are refugees scattered all through Belgium. A few who remained in the town are dying in hunger. It has been proved by our Inquiry that German soldiers, while exposed to the fire of the French entrenched on the opposite bank of the Meuse, in certain cases sheltered themselves behind a line of civilians, women, and children."

"The passage of the German troops through

the province of Luxembourg was marked by the worst excesses.

"In every village occupied the Germans systematically arrested hostages. The treatment of them varied much. In certain places they were not seriously maltreated. In others they were subjected to abominable treatment. For example, at Marche the three principal magistrates of the neighbourhood were, turn by turn for several weeks, kept prisoners in a cell of the gaol commonly allotted to ordinary criminals. Certain hostages were taken off to Germany, and are there in detention at the present hour.

"In almost every locality plunder was systematically complete. The soldiers did not content themselves with seizing food, cattle, horses, for which they had need, and for which they gave no vouchers of requisition, but took away from the houses all that they chose. The number of bottles of wine stolen was innumerable. The first care of the soldiers on arriving in a village was to ask for wine and spirits. Soon they got drunk, and scenes of cruelty, incendiarism, and promiscuous shooting immediately followed. Soldiers cut down with their swords or shot pigs and poultry. They fired wildly, and so killed or wounded unintentionally a certain number of inhabitants. At Lubin a soldier, firing at a hen, shot a child less than a year old through both legs.

"At Arlon the military authorities gave the town four hours to produce a war contribution of 100,000 francs in cash, adding that if the cash was not forthcoming 100 houses would be pillaged. The

money was finally produced, but forty-seven houses had already been sacked by order of the officers.

“The northern parts of the province have been generally respected. On the other hand, two regions in the south of the province have been completely devastated. The first of these regions includes the villages of Porcheresse, Maissan, Anloy, Villance, Framont, Ochamp, Jehonelle, Offagne, Blancheoreille, Assensan, and Glaumont. The other region includes all the communes in the triangle between a line drawn from Florenville to Virton, from Virton to Habay, and from Habay to Florenville. Many villages were wholly or half destroyed, notably Rossignol, Ansart, Houdemont, Rulle, Jamoignes, Les Bulles, Bertrix, Bleid, Signeux, Musson, Baranzy, Semel, and Maissin. The number of houses burnt in the province of Luxembourg is over 3,000.

“In the great number of villages the German troops gave themselves up to veritable executions *en masse*. The number of men shot in the whole province is over 1,000. The following figures, giving numbers of shot, relate to certain villages only: Etalle, 30; Tintigny, 157; Rossignol, 106; Ethe, about 300; and Latour, only 17 men surviving in the village; 111 persons of the communes of Ethe and Rossignol were publicly shot at Arlon. In some places women and even girls were shot. Some days later eight persons from neighbouring communes were executed there. A police officer at Arlon made an appeal to the Emperor, but was shot without trial on a trifling accusation that was afterwards discovered to be unfounded.

“ In the most part of these villages the troops did not even allege that they had been attacked by the civilian population. It seems certain that the inhabitants did not commit any hostile act. In many places German soldiers had been shot by French patrols and sentinels, and it seems certain that the German troops systematically sacked and burnt any village where some of their soldiers had been thus slain, even when they were perfectly aware that this was due to the regular soldiers of the hostile army. In many localities destruction of the villages cannot be explained even on this pretence. The inhabitants say that the crimes of which they were victims can only be explained by the soldiers being drunk, by their pleasure in inflicting suffering, or by their anger at the unexpected resistance of the Belgian Army, or, finally, by their having received orders for systematic destruction from their superiors.”

The French Report appears in the *Journal Officiel* of January 8, 1915, and is fortified with photographs.

The London *Times* says :

“ One cannot do more than attempt to indicate the terrible impression of frightfulness acquired from it. Rape, with every imaginable refinement of cruelty and bestiality, marked the passage of the Huns with ghastly frequency. Irrefutable evidence has been collected as regards a great many cases, but owing to the natural reluctance of the victims to speak of the odious crimes of which they have been the subject, the cases contained in the Report represent a minute portion of the horrible German record.

“ Unless the discipline of the German Army is but a sham, officers, had they wished, could easily have reduced the extent of this crime. On several occasions, when the officers could have intervened, they took no action. But while these outrages may be attributed to the individual savagery and licentiousness of the inflamed soldiery, it is established beyond doubt by the Report that incendiarism, murder, and pillage form part of the German military equipment as definitely as do big guns. For crimes under these three headings the highest officers of the German Army must be held responsible before history.

“ The massacres at Luneville, Gerbeviller, Nomeny, and Senlis, afford terrible proof of this assertion. Villagers have been torn from their homes and marched off into captivity in Germany. Those who by their age or infirmities fell by the roadside were bayoneted or kicked to death. In many instances women and children have been placed as a screen in front of German troops during the fighting or a bombardment. The stories of rape are so horrible in detail that their publication would seem almost impossible were it not for the necessity of showing to the fullest extent the nature of the wild beasts fighting under the German flag for German ideals and civilization.”

The Report says :

“ At Gerbeviller, 20 out of 475 houses remain habitable, and 100 persons have disappeared. Some were taken to the fields and executed, others were assassinated in their homes, or shot down as they

fled from the flames. Here two of the most horrible crimes of the whole series were committed. The Germans entered a house, took away the thirty-six-year-old son, who was wearing a Red Cross brassard, tied his hands behind his back, shot him in the street, and then returned and fetched his seventy-year-old father and mother. They saw their son stretched on the ground. As the body still moved the Germans poured petrol upon it and set it alight in the presence of the terrified mother.

"At the same time the soldiers knocked at the house occupied by a man and his wife and his mother-in-law, aged seventy-eight. The latter opened the door and was immediately shot. She fell back in the arms of her son-in-law, who carried her into the garden, where he covered the corpse, placing a handkerchief over her face. The man was taken and shot, while his wife was sent to join some forty women and children, who were threatened with death by the officer—a threat not executed. At Gerbeviller a woman was murdered and the stomach ripped open. Here, again, the Bavarians were responsible.

"At Luneville there were similar ghastly scenes unwarranted by any act of the inhabitants or military necessity.

"Pillaging everywhere was conducted on wholesale and organized lines, and where there was no time to carry away the contents of the house, following the example of civil thieves, the military bandits gave themselves up to destruction.

"Crimes against non-combatants, attacks upon

doctors and stretcher-bearers, firing upon the Red Cross, and the shooting of the wounded as they lay on the battlefield, are so numerous that they will form the subject of a special report.

“At Coulommiers, on September 6, a woman was raped by a soldier while her husband and two children were kept in an adjoining room. In the neighbourhood of Rebais several mothers were outraged in the presence of their children. One of the women, whose resistance irritated the soldiers, was strung up, but succeeded in cutting the rope and escaping.

“A château near La Ferte-Gaucher, occupied by an old gentleman, his female servant, and a woman refugee, was the scene of terrible deeds on September 9. Germans, including a non-commissioned officer, entered the château. After feeding, the non-commissioned officer, having made a proposal to the refugee, the proprietor, in order to save her from the man's designs, sent her to a neighbouring farm. The German went after her, brought her back, and took her to the loft. The proprietor, wishing to summon assistance, fired a revolver on the staircase, and was immediately shot by the non-commissioned officer, who then made the woman come down from the loft, forced her to step over the body of the old man, and took her into another room, where again, without success, he tried to master her. Finally he abandoned her, threw himself upon the servant, and left the refugee to the mercy of two soldiers, who both violated her in the room where lay the dead body of the proprietor.

"At Montmirail, on September 5, a non-commissioned officer attempted to violate the widow upon whom he was billeted. Her father rushed to her assistance, and immediately fifteen or twenty Germans broke down the door, dragged the man into the street, and shot him. At Esternay, on September 6, soldiers, while pillaging, discovered a widow, her two daughters, and two other women, hiding in a cellar, and ordered the two girls to undress. As the mother intervened, they fired upon the group, wounding one and killing another.

"The troops in the Marne appear to have been completely out of hand. They had no respect even for age, and in two neighbouring places a child of eleven and a woman of eighty-nine served to satisfy their bestiality. It is, however, impossible to distinguish among the German armies, all the places through which they passed having been the scenes of similar horrors."

It is impossible to give all the authenticated cases of deliberate murder contained in the Report. They include the case at Sermaize, where, while an old man was being taken away as a hostage, his maddened wife and daughter-in-law threw themselves into the river. The man, having freed himself, ran to rescue them, but the Germans dragged him away, leaving the women struggling in the water. The bodies were afterwards found with shot-wounds in the head. They include organized battues in burning villages, where women and old men escaping from the burning houses were shot down as they ran.

A municipal councillor of Rebais states that two British cavalrymen, surprised and wounded in that district, were finished off by the Germans, although both had dismounted and were holding their hands up when they were shot. At Champuis a seventy-year-old man was tied to his bed by an officer and kept three days without food, and died in consequence. Of the atrocities at Sommeilles, which was destroyed by fire applied by means of petrol pumps, the Report says :

“At the beginning of the fire Mme. X. took refuge in a cellar with a neighbour and his wife and their four children, aged eleven, five, four, and one and a half years. A few days later the bodies of all these unfortunate people were discovered in a pool of blood. The man had been shot. Mme. X. had her breast and right arm cut off, the eleven-year-old girl one foot cut off, the five-year-old boy his throat cut. Mme. X. and a little child had apparently been violated. At Triaucourt, where the Duke of Würtemberg passed, the village was burnt, and the inhabitants were massacred as they fled from the burning houses.

“Irritated, no doubt, by the remarks made by an officer to a soldier, against whom Mlle. Proses, a young girl of nineteen years of age, had complained on account of his insulting proposals, they burned the village and organized a massacre of the inhabitants. First setting fire to the house of a peaceful proprietor, Jules Gant, and shooting him as he left his home to escape the flames, they then scattered in the houses and streets, firing on all round them. A youth of seventeen years,

Georges Lecourtier, who endeavoured to escape, was killed. Alfred Lallemand met with the same fate. He was chased into the kitchen of a neighbour, Lautelier, where he was killed. Lautelier was shot in three places. Fearing, not without reason, for their lives, Mlle. Proces, her mother, grandmother (seventy-one years old), and an aunt (eighty-one years old), endeavoured to climb from their garden into the next by means of a ladder. Only the young girl succeeded in escaping to the other side, and avoided death by hiding in a cabbage-field. The three others were shot down."

On the following night the Germans played the piano amidst the corpses. When the curé protested, the Duke of Würtemberg replied: "What do you expect? Like you, we have bad soldiers."

"While the 121st and 122nd Würtemberg Regiments were burning and pillaging at Clermont, in the Argonne, some of them invaded the church and danced to the sound of the organ, and then set the edifice on fire. The burning of Clermont was begun by a soldier who, after having made a cup of coffee on a methyated spirit stove, wantonly upset the spirit and gave the signal for the general conflagration, which was spread by all means of incendiarism known to German civilization. General von Durach and Prince Wittgenstein were in command of the troops responsible for this.

"At Nomeny the Germans arrived in a state of terrible ferocity. For a whole day they gave themselves up to pillage, incendiarism, and mas-

sacre, and then set fire to the whole place, of which only a few houses now remain.”

The foregoing are authenticated instances of atrocities by the German military, but they pale before latter crimes committed by the sanction—by the express direction—of the German Government, namely, the use of asphyxiating gases and the practice of poisoning wells in the arid districts of South-West Africa. The former method of murder shows the absolute callousness of the character of the entire German people, who have expressed elation over the success which has attended the introduction of a horrible system of slow poisoning, involving agonizing suffering throughout the life of the victim. Their indifference to the fact that the Allies must be driven through no fault of their own to employ the same methods, and its attendant horrors to their own flesh and blood, is characteristically German. The well-poisoning episodes of South Africa might have been generally discredited in America and Great Britain had not the German commander “excused” his acts over his own signature by saying that he had suspended written notices about the wells (to be perused by black soldiers!), stating that he had poisoned the wells. The British commander, General Botha, stated that no such notices were found. In most cases they would have been useless.

For the purposes of this book it is of grave importance that the people of the United States should know how this German method, as above shown, is viewed by the Germans in America. They have been obliging enough to give us full information in that regard.

German methods of warfare are regarded by them with unqualified approval. These "terrible retaliatory measures" are justified because the barbarous "Belgians do not know what war means."

German opinion in the United States is voiced by a publication called *The Fatherland*. It is edited by George Sylvester Viereck and Frederick F. Schrader.

This organ publishes (February 10, 1915), with approval, an excerpt from an article which had appeared in a New York paper, dealing with the character of the Belgian Walloons :

"And when it comes to the kind of resistance of reprisal—one cannot call it war—which the franc-tireur makes, you, Sir Arthur, know what the Walloons of Eastern Belgium are. Turbulent, truculent, and unschooled, they fight—no, one cannot say fight, but fire—from cellars, from attics, and from behind hedges, using the while the protection civilian garb confers on veritable non-combatants, but not accepting the honourable risks that go with the uniform of a veritable soldier. The adjectives which mankind has applied to the lower orders of this Walloon population, and the facts of their annals, are to be found in any guide-book or school history. Brave, in a lawless way, they certainly are, but often devious, and sometimes treacherous.

"You know the old proverb concerning the inhabitants of the ancient province of Hesbain, now a part of the province of Liège: 'Qui passe dans le Hesbain est combattu lendemain.' And the fact was, and is, that the enemy who passed

that way got his fighting in the back 'on the morrow.'

"The Belgian Government felt a lively apprehension of the suffering of which the Walloons and their compatriots further west would bring upon the kingdom, and throughout the week or ten days of the advance from Liège to Brussels many Burgomasters and the Minister of War issued daily, and sometimes hourly, proclamations in which they pleaded with the people to observe the laws of war as bearing on the obligations of civilians, and gave them the most explicit warning that the participation of civilians in the hostilities would bring the most terrible penalties on whole communities and on innocent women, children, and the aged. Copies of these proclamations, addressed 'Aux Civils,' I have by me. Their language is often passionate in its solicitude.

"I asked an American gentleman who has lived for five years in Belgium, and who loves the country, though he does not love the people (I refer to Lawrence Sterne Stevens, an artist), why these warnings had had so little effect upon the Walloon peasants, miners, and metal-workers. 'Because,' he replied, 'the number of illiterates is so large in Belgium that thousands upon thousands of the people could not read the proclamations.'

"And so, impotent and fruitless, these placards stared the people in the face from hoardings and dead walls, and the firing from behind walls and hedgerows began. It was tragic, but it was not war. And it was so utterly barren of permanent results, and it drew such severe reprisals, that I

could quite understand the point of view of Major Beyer, German Commandant of Brussels, when he said: 'These Belgians do not know what war means.' "

Then follows this luminous editorial comment, which was made after the official reports which have been reproduced in this chapter had been made :

"It is therefore these degenerates" (not the troops—the townspeople) "of the Belgian cities, who caused the terrible retaliatory measures on the part of the German Army. . . . German discipline and police supervision will, we trust, exercise a welcome and salutary restraint on them."

It is rather difficult to conceive how the lessons taught to those who not only had the impiety to object to the Germans entering their territory, but showed unspeakable effrontery in objecting to the rape of their wives, sisters, and mothers, can be "salutary," as the lesson not only took the form of sudden death, but was valueless even as an example, as their fellow-townsmen who had not even voiced a protest were also slain.

We know now what to expect if the German land an expeditionary force, destined for New Brunswick, on the Maine Coast, and, after overcoming a hastily mobilized militia, pass through the villages of that State. It is hardly to be hoped that the descendants of the "minute men" of 1775 will be less "brave" or "treacherous" than the Walloons, or more particular about the fashion of their dress than were their

revolutionary ancestors, when it comes to resenting the ravishment of their women and the pillaging of their towns. Pleasant reading will be afforded them and us when their fellow-citizens (of German origin) write, "The barbarians were ignorant of war, and received a salutary lesson."

CHAPTER IV

THE HOHENZOLLERNS

“Sceptre and crown
Must tumble down,
And in the dust be equal made
With the poor crooked scythe and spade.”
SHIRLEY.

UPON the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1914, the Kaiser's chief officer of State declared that the Emperor would have been powerless to prevent the war even had he been so minded. This, probably, is not literally true; but it may be accepted as a fact that William was bitterly opposed to the war, though he lacked the courage to put his great powers in the State to a decisive test. That the Kaiser is regarded as the real author of the war and a fierce militant is largely his own fault. An innate love of theatricals and a fatal facility in the employment of figurative language, which would earn for individuals less highly placed a reputation for mendacity, has sedulously fostered the erroneous impression that the Hohenzollern type, as definitely moulded and set in the fabric of history by the Great Elector and his successors—Frederick I., Frederick William I. of Prussia, and Frederick the Great—survives in him as the prototype of the last-named, to whom he frequently and inaccurately refers as “my

great ancestor." For all historical purposes Frederick the Great was the fourth and last of the Hohenzollerns.* Had his type persisted, the Germans would certainly not occupy their present important place in civilization, which, by the way, would have been retarded, and very likely, in spite of its homogeneity, fecundity, and hardiness, the German people would be living under two or more different Governments.

In his long reign Frederick did much evil. Incidentally he enlarged his kingdom; but he built upon sand, and he employed blood where he should have used lime. In his lust for aggrandizement he forced the Seven Years' War upon Maria Theresa. During that period, says Henderson,†

"the country had been at the mercy of invading armies; anarchy had taken the place of order; whole cities had been plundered and burned. Frederick himself reckoned that thirteen thousand houses had vanished without leaving a trace. He likens his land to a man covered with wounds and exhausted with loss of blood. The condition of the people was indeed appalling—how appalling may be gathered from the fact that in Berlin, which had scarcely been touched by the enemy, one-third of the inhabitants were forced to live on the charity of the rest."

The tremendous expenditures incurred through this profitless war (the Peace of Hubertzburg, 1763, re-

* "His successor (nephew), Frederick William II., was idle, prejudiced, easily governed, and always the very reverse of his predecessor on the throne" (Mirabeau, "*Histoire Secrète Cour de Berlin*").

† Henderson's "*Short History of Germany*," vol. ii., p. 197.

stored the *status quo ante bellum*) had exhausted the exchequer, and a large foreign debt was only avoided by perpetrating the meanest of frauds upon soldiers and civil servants, who were ruthlessly robbed of their pay by a process of juggling with depreciated currency.

Frederick the Great, by the exercise of his wonderful energy and undoubted talents, was enabled to leave to his successor and nephew, Frederick William II., the great - great - grandfather of William II., an enormously increased territory. But these acquisitions had been secured by violence; his sovereignty had been forced upon some millions of hostile peoples, and no sooner was the hand of the builder taken from this fabric than it commenced to crumble away; though it increased in size for a space, the growth was unhealthy, and led to dissolution. No more striking illustration has ever been afforded of the futility of empire-making by war, and one is at a loss to understand why William II. did not include the name of his distant relative when he delivered himself of this apostrophe to Peace :

“For what has become of the so-called world-empires? Alexander the Great, Napoleon the First, all the great warrior heroes, swam in blood, and left behind them subjugated peoples who at the first opportunity rose and brought their empires to ruin !”

It was in the reign of Frederick that the now much-decried “military caste” was put in an apparently immutable form and inflicted upon his suffering people. This took from the nation’s industrial life a huge percentage of the population, and not only in fact, but by

express statute, deprived them of any participation in the healthy pursuits of peace. There was thus created a race of mischief-breeding parasites, in whom German energy, which could not be stifled in idleness or wholly satisfied by dissolute living, sought an outlet by fomenting war.

Frederick declared openly that commoners had no "sense of honour," and were unfit to be officers. Frederick was probably consciously wrong about this, and merely took this method of surrounding himself with people whose moral code agreed with his own. Bernhardt quotes with approval these words of Treitschke:

"Frederick the Great was all his life long charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance would ever induce him to renounce the right to free self-determination."

At times during the Seven Years' War the nobility could not furnish sufficient officers, and commoners were given commissions temporarily. Those who survived the exigency which gave them employment were dismissed from the service or degraded to the ranks. The sacred caste thus fostered were truckled to in every way. Frederick gave millions of the money he wrested from his unfortunate subjects to pay their debts when non-payment would affect their positions as landowners. They were exempted from Excise taxation and the odious espionage he had instituted to prevent smuggling. With these privileges went certain disabilities. In or out of service a member of this exclusive order was forbidden to engage in any honest business or trade; nor might he marry out of his own

sphere, nor in any event without permission, which was often withheld. Hussar officers were not permitted to marry at all. Although later, in the reign of Frederick William III., the rule against permanent commissioning of commoners was relaxed, the result was only to increase the evil. The parvenus became "more royalist than the King," and to-day the military caste have made their country first a source of amusement through their ridiculous posturings and absurd pretensions in time of peace; and later, when the true menace of their existence was understood, an object of aversion and, it must be confessed, fear.

Here lies the danger to Germany and the world. The money-grubbing Hohenzollerns, virtuous as they now are, and patriotic, beyond most men, are only objectionable so far as they represent a form of government inimical to true progress, and so far as they help to uphold the objectionable system of military caste. It is in connection with the latter, who teach and practise murder, pillage, arson, and territorial robbery, as religious rites, when committed in the service of the State, that the German people should read and carefully ponder the words of their great poet Schiller:

"The soil has been created by ourselves,
By the hard labour of our hands ; we've changed
The giant forest, that was erst the haunt
Of savage beasts, into a home for man.
*We've killed the dragon's brood that wont
To rise distent with venom from the swamps ;
Rent the thick canopy that hung
Its dreary vapours on the dreary waste ;
Blasted the solid rock ; o'er the abyss
Thrown the firm bridge for the wayfaring man."*

Frederick's life, save for a brief interval after his father's death—his youth had been a hell upon earth—was about as unhappy as could be conceived. Apparently he was incapable of love as it exists between the sexes. His neglected wife was childless. In the long peace that ensued after the Seven Years' War, his most congenial occupation was spying upon and punishing his subjects. In his "home" circle he was known as "old sour-face." He distrusted all mankind. He had enjoyed "a moment's mirth" listening to Voltaire's satirical attacks on all the world (but Frederick), only "to wail a week" when the Frenchman's lancinating philippic—which Frederick knew would live throughout all time, and which made him the laughing-stock of every Court of Europe—was made public. Henceforth he was to sit alone "scoffing his state and grinning at his pomp." When he expressed the desire to be entombed with the corpse of his faithful war-horse, much sympathy was felt for the poor old beast, who, it was thought, had deserved a better fate.*

Frederick was too astute not to have learned in his age, at least, that a State the foundations of which do not rest upon the consent of the governed cannot endure. He also knew the character of his successor, and his last days were poisoned by the knowledge that his treachery and bloodshed had been in vain.

It was for another Hohenzollern of a totally different

* "Frederick may have had the same misgivings. A few days before his death, he said to his medical attendant, Zimmerman: '*Je ne suis qu'une vieille carcasse, propre à jeter à la voirie*'" (Lord Dover, "Life of Frederick," vol. ii., p. 451). His will directed that he be buried with his dogs in the garden of Sans Souci. This direction was not observed.

type—William I., the Great—to reunite the fragments of the Teutonic Empire into a great nation held fast together by mutual understanding, good-will, and common interests.

Frederick William II. possessed many of the amiable qualities which have distinguished, and still distinguish, his successors, and which were absent from Frederick's composition. His mental capacity, however, would seem to show that his insane ancestor, John William, Duke of Cleves, had been the prepotent hereditary factor in his life.

He spent a large part of his time in search of an "elixir of youth," and entrusted his affairs to the charlatan Woolner, who not only promised to endow his royal master with perpetual youth, but to relieve the financial stringency, which came as an appanage of Frederick's inheritance, by a process of transmuting base metals into gold. Doses of cantharides which Woolner judiciously administered not only confirmed the King's belief in his favourite's promise as to the elixir, but embarked the unfortunate monarch upon a course of bigamous marriages that even shocked the Berlin of that age, when its morals were that of a poultry-yard. He divorced his first wife, Elizabeth of Brunswick, without cause, and married a second, Louise of Hesse-Darmstadt, only to keep her in seclusion while he lived openly with the wife of his Chamberlain, Rietz; she was raised to the rank of Countess of Lichtenam, and, with Woolner, who was the head of several departments of State, controlled the affairs of the kingdom. He went through a form of marriage with Julie von Voss, and, upon her death, with Sophie Dinhoff. He justified these alliances by

citing Luther's conduct in respect to the bigamy of Philip of Hesse.

The new King's amiability, his sense of justice (where his own pleasures were not concerned), and his interest in the welfare of his people, made for popularity, but could not save his kingdom.

In the period that had elapsed between the death of Frederick the Great, in 1786, and October 17, 1797, his successor had nearly doubled his territory. The acquisitions had come through the two partitions of Poland of 1793 and 1795, and greatly increased the responsibilities of an impoverished and weakened Prussia; the new provinces, which were named South Prussia and New East Prussia, were populated by Roman Catholic Slavs; they furnished a discordant, non-assimilable element, in a chronic state of revolt against the diffused power of the State. By the disgraceful Treaty of Basel, 1795,* whereby she had shamefully betrayed Austria, and the subsequent treaty of August, 1796, Prussia stood upon a bad eminence of broken pledges. She was without a friend in Europe.

The clandestine Peace of Basel led and no doubt justified Austria in entering into the so-called Black Treaty of Campo Formio, which by secret clauses delivered to Napoleon the German provinces upon the left bank of the Rhine, the Princes of those provinces to be compensated by the expropriation of Church lands upon the right bank. At this stage Frederick William II. died. The evil had been sown in his reign

* Von Treitschke said that no defeat in battle could have humbled Prussia as did this treaty; that an open alliance with the enemy would have been preferable to the pusillanimity shown by the treaty.

and that of Frederick the Great; "the fulfilment thereof" came in the reign of Frederick William's son, the third of his father's name. The decade that followed the accession of Frederick William III. were "years of the locust" for Prussia; Prussia lost all the districts west of the Elbe, nearly all of her ill-gotten gains in Poland, as well as isolated provinces like Baireuth and East Friesland.

The King and his noble wife, Louise of Brunswick, had to humble themselves repeatedly before the Corsican adventurer and before Alexander of Russia when he came, Napoleon's coadjutor.* The depths of degradation were reached when Prussia accepted 42,000 as the limit of her army.

It has been necessary for us to venture thus far into history for one purpose only—to show that the acquisitions of conquest did not endure. In the case of Prussia they were regained by regeneration from within, aided by causes from without. Napoleon was not exempt from the inexorable laws that had pursued the successors of Frederick the Great.

No less than to Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Hardenburg, the regeneration of Prussia is due to the establishment of a national army in Spain, England's naval victory at Trafalgar, and Napoleon's disastrous invasion of Russia.

The restoration of Prussia to its proper place in the family of nations was accomplished by such good works as the emancipation of the serfs, and the removal of the disabilities which had prevented any but the nobility

* After Prussia's humiliation had lasted some years, Alexander I. made atonement by redeeming, in part at least, his promise to restore Prussia's *status quo ante* 1797.

from holding land ; and the obliteration of certain caste distinctions which enabled members of the citizen and peasant class to pass from one condition to another. Though these reforms, absolutely necessary for the kingdom's preservation, were largely the work of Frederick William's advisers, he deserves equal credit with them. Reforms, though easy to the Kaiser, have been rare. Still, they must come through him, or not at all. Reforms in Germany always descend, as it were, from the skies—an act of grace. They are granted only to increase the central power, though, as in the case of the so-called "Constitution" of 1848, they may be at the time hailed as "acts of liberation." The modern House of Hohenzollern owes everything to the unfortunate Frederick William III., and to his son William I.; why their successors should claim a spurious descent from the larcenous Frederick passes comprehension.

It will be of aid to us, in weighing the moral values of the actions of the Hohenzollerns—all of which are directly inspired by God (their God)—if we ascertain the circumstances under which this "divine" stewardship began. The time has been definitely fixed by Kaiser William II., who has stated that Frederick VI. of Hohenzollern (in Suabia) was designated by God to lay the foundations for the future greatness of Prussia and the Hohenzollern dynasty. The source and circumstances of the founder's appearance as a ruler of the mark of Brandenburg gives us an adequate idea of the present Kaiser's conception of the character of God.

In A.D. 1411 Brandenburg was a desolate territory with a savage population. Twenty years earlier it had been an appanage of the throne of Hungary, then occu-

pied by King Sigismund. He had pledged the mark to his cousins Jobst and Procot of Moravia for a loan of 500,000 gulden; and having defaulted in payment, the legal title passed to the pledgees. In the year mentioned, Sigismund, in order to further his candidacy as Emperor of Germany, sent the Hohenzollern to the Congress of Electors with instructions to cast the electoral vote of Brandenburg for him, Sigismund. Frederick carried out these instructions, and brought about an invalid "snap" election of his employer. A more regular election was then held at the instance of Jobst, who was duly elected. More efficacious means were then employed in behalf of the disappointed King of Hungary, and Jobst died suddenly from poison, a fatality which has been generally attributed to his rival and that rival's lieutenant, Frederick of Hohenzollern. Sigismund then brought about another election by which his ambition was gratified, and Frederick was repaid by conferring upon him the electorship of Brandenburg (1411). This office was not conferred absolutely nor entirely for services rendered; the provisional appointment was embodied in a mortgage to secure a loan made by the thrifty Frederick to his patron, and his margraveship and electorship were not formally conferred upon him until 1417, after default had been made in the discharge of Sigismund's debt. If the selection of Frederick and Sigismund was the work of the Lord, He chose peculiarly vile instruments to work His will. Sigismund was that monarch who gave assurances of safe-conduct to John Huss (who was the John the Baptist of Martin Luther), and then delivered him into the hands of his murderers.

It is quite true that this Frederick laid the founda-

tions for Prussia's future greatness ; it is also true that the interests of the people and the interests of the Hohenzollern lay in the same direction, and not opposed, as did the interests of Frederick and the unfortunate Jobst. God's inspirations, as expressed by the Hohenzollerns, have always been in the good of the people when the good of the people was necessary for the aggrandizement of the ruler.

CHAPTER V

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN ALLIANCE

IN April, 1792, four months before King Louis and his Austrian consort were taken by the revolutionary mob from the Tuileries, France declared war upon Austria. At that time Frederick William II. and Francis II. were the respective occupants of the Prussian and Austrian thrones.

The King of Prussia at once declared himself as an active ally of Francis, and the Duke of Brunswick entered with his Prussians upon the futile campaign which led to the defeat of the Austro-Germans at Jemappe and the French invasion of the Austrian Netherlands. After the Revolution of August the war languished, the new Republic being fully occupied with its internal troubles, while the attention of Frederick and Francis was absorbed with the second partition of Poland. Upon the fall of the Terrorist Government in France, the King of Prussia negotiated in 1795, without the cognizance of his ally, a separate treaty of peace with the Directoire at Bâle (Basle). This treaty contained a secret article abandoning that part of Austria lying on the left (west) bank of the Rhine, the Netherlands and Holland—both Austrian—to France, while Prussia was permitted to compensate

herself for her betrayal at the expense of the smaller German States of the Empire. This infamous compact of Frederick William III. with the arch-enemy of the Teutonic world (characterized at the time by Lord Malmsbury as a predatory alliance*) left Austria so hampered by the defence of her own possessions on the line of the Upper Rhine that she was unable to come to the assistance of the countries thus left to the mercy of the armies of the Republic.

In 1849, the year following the accession to the throne of the present Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph, the Hungarian Revolution could have been terminated peacefully had the young Emperor recognized the revolutionary constitution the Magyars had formed for themselves; it did not differ in many essentials from the one voluntarily granted by Austria only a few weeks before. Instead of adopting this course of conciliation, Francis maintained that by her rebellion Hungary had forfeited all claim to a separate national existence, and plunged the country into that tremendous conflict which undoubtedly contributed indirectly to Austria's ultimate loss of her Italian and South German possessions. The Hungarian Revolution, though disastrous in every respect to Austria, failed of its purpose. When it seemed that the patriots under the dictatorship of Louis Kossuth were certain of victory, Russia, moved by the entreaties of Francis Joseph and by the natural hatred of any

* In a letter to Gerlach, Bismarck says: "I have the courage not to blame the Peace of Basle; it was impossible to make a lasting alliance with the Austria of that day . . . as it is now (1857)" [Italy please note] ("Reflections and Reminiscences," vol. i., p. 200). On the other hand, Gerlach had said: "Prussia suffered heavily from the Peace of Basle" (*ibid.*, vol. i., p. 182).

despotism toward a people struggling to be free, intervened, and after a desperate and heroic struggle upon the part of the revolutionists, Hungary was at Russia's feet.* Hungary, thus crushed, was delivered in leash to Austria, who, thanks alone to Russia's timely service, was enabled to make a peace at Venice which prolonged, for a time at least, her domination in Italy, and enabled her to checkmate Prussia's threatening movements for predominance in the South German States.

In 1853 Russia called upon Austria to discharge, in part at least, this obligation incurred for a service which had saved the Empire's very existence. Nicholas invoked the young Emperor's assistance at the outbreak of the Crimean War. The Czar had received no compensation whatever for the rôle he had played in Hungary, but had acted, he claimed, as a fatherly benefactor in fulfilment of a promise he had made to the grandfather of Francis Joseph that he would at all times and in all circumstances assist the father of the young Emperor, and he extended this promise to the son of Ferdinand Francis II.

Russia's appeal was without effect.

At the best, Austria was coldly neutral; at times she was on the verge of joining the Allies. Nicholas's disgust and anger at the cynical ingratitude of Francis Joseph, then at a time of life when the flowers of chivalrous impulse and high courage, if an attribute of the plant, are in bloom, have passed into history. Nicholas bitterly denounced himself as a fool for his previous disinterested kindness, and upon his death-

* The Russian General Paskevitch's message to his master after the surrender of Vilagos (August, 1849) was, "La Hongrie git aux pieds de votre majesté."

bed the last human being whom he could be induced to forgive was Francis Joseph of Austria.

So we see that while in the history of Austro-German relations a pretext is afforded Austria to repay Prussia's betrayal of 1795, really, no pretext is necessary. Self-interest was sufficient in 1853 to impel Austria to disregard her obligations to Russia.* A plea of self-interest a thousand times stronger may be addressed to her now (1915). If it does not prevail, it will be because Francis Joseph in his age is not as potent in council as he was in his youth.

* "If, then, changes were to occur in the political situation of Europe of such a kind as to make an anti-German policy appear *salus publica* for Austria, public faith could no more be expected to induce her to make an act of self-sacrifice than we saw gratitude do during the Crimean War" (Bismarck's "Reflections," vol. ii., p. 271).

CHAPTER VI

THE INFLUENCE OF WAR UPON THE HUMAN CHARACTER

"The blessing of war as an indispensable and stimulating law of development must be repeatedly emphasized."—TREITSCHKE.

"War has been the constant handmaiden of tyranny, and the source of more than half the miseries of man."—LORD BRYCE.

"There never was a good war or a bad peace."—BENJAMIN FRANKLIN.

WHEN the Creator made man with a flexible thumb and a brain capable of appreciating the correlation of cause and effect, He endowed him with a potentiality of physical and mental growth which, if developed along the most favourable lines, would eventually eliminate from human life all those attendant evils which we now stupidly associate with some primal curse. Even death itself, in the objectionable form with which it now approaches its unwilling victim, would have been eliminated. This happy culmination of man's destiny could have been attained through the independent operation of many minds working under diverse conditions, but, actuated by a spirit of universal human brotherhood, freely interchanging acquired knowledge, commodities, hope, and ideals. It was not to be. Instead, each family, later each community, tribe, or state, regarded a stranger as an enemy whom they must slay,

or by whom they would be slain; when neutralities were instituted, they were maintained, with difficulty; and when friendly communications were permitted, the industrial secrets of the community were jealously guarded from all others. With the slow, spasmodic growth of civilization, two or more nations might develop side by side, mutual fears might disappear, and be replaced by a confidence born of mutual dependence, interest, and helpfulness; to these ties were sometimes added another: a form of worship would spread from one tribe to the other, leading to a closer union or to a complete amalgamation. On the other hand, evolutions of different religions would disrupt inter-tribal relations, or divide a people against itself, and the development of the units thus separated would be consequently retarded; each being limited by their individual or inherent capacity.

Often two sections of the human family, though separated geographically, would progress almost uniformly in civilization and efficiency. If two such peoples were isolated by physical conditions or separated from each other by savage tribes, their progress would be slow. If these handicaps were eliminated, an immediate acceleration occurred with both. China, isolated by the seas upon the East and by warlike Tartars beyond her walls, withheld for centuries such aids to civilization and human growth as astronomy, the magnetic compass, the arts of weaving and dyeing, gunpowder, which, until other explosives largely displaced it, played as large a part in peace as in war.

In the world's history man's handicaps have always been eliminated by peace. Never by war where war was a main purpose. The Roman movement, known

as the "Gallic Wars," was simply a civilizing progression and a "peace movement," of which war was the merest incident. Even when the entrance of Cæsar's legions was most strenuously opposed, an opposition usually brief, the invaded country became contentedly Roman, and witnessed with regret the departure of their so-called conquerors. Roman occupation resulted in a cessation of inter-tribal wars. Under the Roman rule thus instituted civilization grew apace.

The antithesis to such a factor in human progress is found where rude and savage people wage a war upon a civilized state; or where two or more so-called civilized states of approximately equal "kultur" wage war upon each other. In either of these events civilization is arrested or destroyed.

The Huns undid the work of ages in South Europe, and the "Thirty Years' War" (1618-1648) transformed a world of men and women into one of beasts. When this war, the result of a personal quarrel, was inaugurated, Germany was a rapidly civilizing community. The age of chivalry had, in passing, bestowed upon her the cult of *noblesse oblige*. A courtesy, a politeness, to which they had been strangers—and which is so necessary for a nation desirous of taking a place among the civilized nations of the world—had been grafted upon the people; the fruit was strange to such a tree. Then came the war. With three-quarters of her entire population Germany lost everything which made the other quarter worth saving.* The intense suffering by disease and famine made the survivors worse than the beasts of the field—they, by the way, had disappeared. A typical

* In Saxony 900,000 men had fallen in two years. Augsburg, instead of 80,000 inhabitants, numbered but 18,000.

German at table, even to this day, shows how lasting has been the effect of this devastating war upon German habits. Conventional morality almost entirely disappeared.

At the close of the war, the gentler virtues, kindness to inferiors, a protecting attitude toward women and children, which had been carefully inculcated during that brief period when "knighthood was in flower," were buried beyond hope of resurrection under the ghastly débris of the struggle and beneath the mud and carnage of Germany's untilled, corpse-strewn fields. Of her men, the brave and strong were dead; virtue, too, had departed, though not for ever, from her women. Lord Malmsbury wrote (1772):

"Berlin is a town where, if *fortis* may be construed *honest*, there is neither *vir fortis nec fœmina casta*. A total corruption of morals reigns throughout both sexes in every class of life. The women are harpies debauched through want of modesty rather than from want of anything else. They prostitute their persons to the best payers, and all delicacy of manner or sentiment of affection are unknown to them."*

This was the effect of the most terrible war the world has known upon the character of a people of whom sixteen centuries earlier Tacitus wrote:

"The matrimonial bond is nevertheless strict. . . . The line fenced around with chastity, corrupted

* The moral tone of Frederick's Court and its master may be gathered from the anecdote concerning the cavalryman who had committed a revolting crime, one of bestiality. "The man is a

by no seductive spectacles. . . . Men and women are alike unacquainted with clandestine correspondence. Adultery is extremely rare. . . . None there looks on vice with a smile."

And who were again in A.D. 1914, after forty years of peace, the very patterns and examples of domestic virtue.

Polygamy was openly preached in the churches as a necessity for salvation, because it seemed the indicated remedy for the condition of female surplusage consequent upon the long struggle. In Franconia, which because of its central position had suffered most disastrously during the war, the Franconian estates, with the assent of Roman Catholic Bishops, abolished the celibacy of the clergy, and allowed each layman to marry two women.

Bigamy was common among princes. The morals and manners of the palaces of Frederick William and his son Frederick the Great were in no respect better than those of their subjects.*

pig," exclaimed Frederick, "and should be punished. Degrade him to the infantry."

* Baron von Bielefeld gives the following description of a Court dinner at the Prussian capital in 1739. Certain coarsenesses which appear in the original are necessarily omitted: "No sooner were we at table than the Prince began to propose healths, one after another, to all of which we were obliged to pay honour. Then followed a stream of jokes and jovialities on the part of the Prince and those around him. The most serious brows lightened, merriment prevailed, and the ladies took their share of it. In the space of two hours, however, it became obvious to all that our stomachs were not fathomless abysses into which we might be everlastingly pouring spirits with impunity. I could no longer stand the atmosphere, dense with fumes of all sorts, and I went

Apart from the resultant loss in moral tone to the people involved in a great internal war, such a war has never obtained any good result that would not have been achieved without the employment of war as a remedy. Blood-letting is a failure in statecraft as well as surgery. A war to repel an invader is justifiable—the fact of invasion shows the undesirable character of the visitors—but no offensive war—this includes revolutions—has been productive of commensurable good. Armed intervention, as an exercise of police power, may be beneficial—such was the so-called “war” between the United States and Spain—attended by a trifling loss of life and the happiest results to all concerned. The greatest revolutions have been peaceful. We are apt to fix the revolutionary period in England as that embracing the Cromwellian wars. As a matter of fact it commenced with the reign of George III., and

out to draw a gasp of fresh air. On my return the vapours began to bewilder my brain. I had left before me a glass of water. During my absence the Princess emptied it out, and filled it up with champagne. My senses were somewhat blunted, and not perceiving the joke, I poured my wine into the champagne, supposing it to be water. In order to complete my destruction, the Prince ordered me to sit at his side, and began to converse affably with me, and made me drink glass after glass of Lunelle. . . . Wine makes people susceptible. The ladies were overwhelmed with expressions of love. Presently, by accident or otherwise, the Crown Princess broke her glass. This was the signal for us, in our ungovernable joviality, to follow her example. In a moment the glasses were flying about in every corner of the hall; all the glass, porcelain, mirrors, chandeliers, bottles, dishes—everything was smashed to a thousand pieces. In the midst of this complete havoc the Prince stood, like the brave man in Horace, contemplating the wreck of the world with eyes unmoved. But when at last out of the jollity there grew riot, he fled, assisted by his pages, and took refuge in his own rooms.”

culminated in the enactment of the Reform Bill of 1830.*

The rebellion against Charles I. failed in every purpose save the insignificant one of the dethronement of one tyrant. A military despotism was inaugurated, and after a period of national discomfort, during which the Commons were without even the influence they exercised during the monarchy, the House of Stuart was restored to the British throne.

In France the revolution of 1793 could have been accomplished by the actual employment of a single regiment. It would not be far from the truth to say that it was achieved without force. The horrible massacres of the Reign of Terror were the veriest "surplusage"; they were acts of vengeance and blood-lust, which, of themselves, defeated the purposes of the revolution, and were the causes of a reversion to a monarchical government.

Take our own "American Revolution." In that period of colonial history America possessed sons gifted with great wisdom, which, however, fell short of omniscience. If we (I speak as an American) read

* Parliamentary reform, with the resultant rule and responsibility of the people, may be said to commence with the speech delivered by Chatham in the House of Lords in 1770. He said, in part: "Whoever understands the theory of the English Constitution, and will compare it with the fact, must see at once how widely they differ; we must reconcile them to each other if we wish to save the liberties of this country. The Constitution intended that there should be a permanent relation between the constituent and representative body of the people. As the House of Commons is now formed, that relation is destroyed." Five years earlier Voltaire had written: "Within the last twelve years there has been a marked revolution in the public mind. Light is certainly spreading on all sides."

and think and speak with a single eye to truth, most of us will confess that the revolution was an unmixed evil; but no men then living could have anticipated that in a brief thirty or forty years—say, in 1815—absolute independence, with total separation, or, as in the case of Canada, complete autonomy as a self-governing dominion, as we should elect, would have been ours for the asking. It is, perhaps, not unprofitable to consider, in the light of history, the probable effect upon America's (meaning the United States) first century of life had we endured, with an attitude of passive resistance, the petty acts of a petty German Prince, whose voice was even then daily growing fainter in his own council chamber.

Public opinion in England was growing clamant for colonial liberty; it had such champions as Burke, Pitt, and Fox. That it ultimately prevailed is writ large in English colonial history. It may be urged that acquiescence in the oppressive policy of George III. would have resulted in a lowered standard of manhood and courage. This may well be doubted. The Tory families who left comfortable homes in the New England States, and in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, to exile themselves under British rule upon the inhospitable shore of Nova Scotia, or in the then scarcely more promising fields of Canada, certainly showed a fine courage, and their descendants do not compare unfavourably with ourselves in the love of true liberty. From the view-point of a eugenist, the prolonged struggle for independence, with the inevitable impairment of national physique, was bound to prove a retarding factor in American growth and individual development. Those sacrificed are always the most

valuable. We give always of our best. The cripple, the diseased, and the coward, are kept for breeding purposes.

The people of the United States have committed an unpardonable blunder in their system of education. Our school histories have been written by publishers' hacks. This most important of all branches of training has a direct influence in developing the qualities that fit or disqualify our youth for citizenship. A recital of the wrongs of the colonist, the struggle for independence, the progress of America, each viewed solely in relation to the other two, and unilluminated by a comparative study of the growth of free government in other countries, is as valueless and as apt to be misleading as a map without scale of miles, parallels of latitude, or degrees of longitude. Such a history or such a map might be useful to an advanced scholar versed in the world's history and geography. To the ignorant child they spell a wickedly confusing story. The blessings of peace and material progress after a war seem to him its natural consequence. To teach the true values of revolution, history must be always comparative. If that method be adopted, a measure of values is introduced, and the study of history makes for a rounded development of knowledge instead of a subjective empiricism that ignores all factors not plainly marked as causative.

A study of a stereotyped American school history shows that sanguinary revolution is a remedy for tyranny. As a fact, it is a remedy that should be taught only with a view to explaining its danger and utter futility. It is like lancing an unripe boil, painful, dangerous, and quite unnecessary. See how England,

Canada, Australia, Brazil, the Scandinavian countries and Portugal, have emancipated themselves from dynastic government without bloodshed.* See how one man, Napoleon III., overthrew his own dynastic rule in France.

Freedom has only to be wished for and deserved. It comes in God's good time. The representatives of dynastic government in an objectionable form are working, perhaps intermittently, and always unconsciously, for the overthrow of a system under which they suffer with their subjects. When the majority of the people feel rightly that they can assume responsibility, Reason

"— comes at last, and with a little pin
Bores through his castle wall, and farewell King !"

America has made great strides since the revolution, but who can say how much greater they would have been without the revolution? Who may say that the great civil war of 1861-1865 would not have been avoided had we progressed hand in hand with our kinsfolk, who solved the problem of slavery in British possessions earlier than we did, and without bloodshed?

Who can say that, if the great English-speaking nations had been united by a firm bond of mutual affection and respect for the two generations that succeeded the American revolutionary period—instead of being separated by an abyss of hatred, though the

* The author was in Lisbon upon the day King Manuel was deposed and some days thereafter. There were some hundred or two hundred lives lost; the authorities say only seventy-five. This unfortunate feature was no part of the revolutionary programme. An unfortunate accident precipitated the affair by forty-eight hours, and the fighting took place, for the most part, in the darkness of the night, when the participants did not know whom they were fighting.

hatred was only felt by us—that this war of 1914 would not have been impossible?

To regret America's independence is quite different from regretting the manner of its achievement; one can do the latter in the good company of Franklin, Washington, and Jefferson.

Armed revolutions are rarely successful. If so, success shows that the revolution was unnecessary. We see how rapidly our women are being emancipated in America by peaceful methods, and how it is retarded by "militancy" in England. The cause of Irish Home Rule grew apace after the cessation of agrarian crime and Fenian outrages, until to-day, after a short decade of peaceful effort, the Irishman is about to be the ruler of his own home.

We have only to apply the recent lessons of the science of bodily healing to political ills. To-day our doctors have about discarded drugs. War should be classed as a nostrum. Time and education heal all political ills.

This is our starting-point in divergence from German principles. With them war is a panacea, to be administered, without the patient's consent, to all people who do not care to come under German rule. By war must this great blessing be conferred. Bernhardi, in his now famous "Germany and the Next War," says:

"What we now wish to attain must be fought for and won against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers. . . . Even English attempts at a *rapprochement* must not blind us to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success."

CHAPTER VII

GERMANY'S WARS AND GERMANY'S RELIGION

*"Have ye founted your thrones and allars, then,
On the bodies and souls of living men?
And think ye that buildings can endure
Which shelter the noble and crush the poor?"*

* * * * *

*"I hear the reapers singing go
Into God's harvest; I, that might
With them have chosen here below,
Grove shuddering at the gates of night."*

LOWELL.

AT an early stage in the development of communal life religion was recognized as a valuable aid in the maintenance of the authority of the chief or king. It has been invoked successfully in nearly every war of conquest: it enabled the followers of Mahomet to overrun the West of Europe; in Persia, in the time of Omar Khayyám, it bound the "assassins" in closest allegiance to "the old man of the mountains"; it has been, and still is, invoked not only to secure a living King in his position, but to insure the succession of his profitable office to his successor in the blood, regardless of the personal fitness of the heir to the throne.

No matter what the character of the religions so employed were in their inception, they have always

been adapted to the character of the person invoking them, and to attain the ends to be accomplished.

The Christian world is familiar with the example furnished in the Old Testament. The Hebrews were clever, egotistical, and warlike. Jacob is accepted as a typical Jew of the period when the Hebrew religion was in the making. The lecherous and dishonest Jacob earned the admiration of his neighbours for his cleverness in robbing his benefactor. The God of those neighbours commended Jacob, as a matter of course. The Hebrew God, created by them in their own image, was jealous, revengeful, and cruel. The Hebrew hated all strangers; so did their God—he could not be loved by other than the Hebrews. The Hebrews did not wish him to be; they, too, were jealous.

When a Hebrew king wished to conduct a war of extermination against a neighbouring tribe, the high-priest obligingly produced a “divine” command for the Hebrew hosts to spare neither man, woman, nor child, of the people to be subjugated.

The cruel and pitiless wars in which the Hebrews engaged for generation after generation created in them a kind of blood-lust which was gratified by the recital of such unspeakable horrors as the destruction of the little children by the bears called forth by Elisha, and an excuse for the personal gratification of their own perverted appetites for carnage was found in the favour with which Elisha, Saul, and David, were regarded by the Hebrew God.

The God of Christ was gentle and compassionate, a protector of women and little children, a refuge for the poor and oppressed; and so much good remained in the little world to which Christ spoke during His short

time upon earth that He gathered about Him a following large enough to secure the transmission of His Word to countless millions of humanity.

Christ's message has been perverted and distorted time and again; yet always there has been someone to accept His teachings literally, to expose the fraud of the obscuring dogma, and to cause the beautiful doctrine of peace and good-will to quicken again in the heart of man.

Through all the centuries since the "Passion" there have been in power among Christian nations men who found it inconvenient to accept the Gospel in its entirety, and yet could not reject it openly or completely. Such rejection would have been impolitic from a temporal standpoint. It would have been too dangerous to their own soul's salvation. The compromise has been never-ending, and always disastrous to humanity.

Unless Christ's teachings are accepted in their entirety, His character is bound to be purely subjective and within the limitations of the one accepting Him. Torquemada undoubtedly believed that our Saviour would have burned heretics had He lived in Spain in the seventeenth century. The German Clovis, who became a Christian in A.D. 496, gave his own stamp to his new religion. He made of the Gentle Shepherd a model warrior, swift in anger, implacable in resentment.

The successors of Clovis have been eminently practical people. They have recognized the tremendous usefulness of Christianity as a religion for their subjects. What more easy than to govern a people who were already bound by the Sermon from the Mount? Civil administration was simplified, because crimes dangerous to the State were interdicted by laws with penalties

which, because eternal, were more dire than any which could be imposed by the cruellest human despot.

So Christianity has flourished under the protection of the German kings. Necessarily, its application has been restricted. The German people have been taught that their kings were regents of God, as the present Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany claims to be to-day, and were above the law and above criticism. "The King can do no wrong." Their people were taught to follow Christ; their kings have preferred to tread in the footsteps of the murderous David.

Side by side with the lessons taught by our Saviour, the German people have been taught that it was proper for the State to murder, to lie, to cheat, and to steal. To slay one's brother at the behest of the State is a duty, and the performance of that duty has kept the Germans in a chronic state of war. In other countries epochs are reckoned from important wars. In Germany we read of "the six years of peace" as a period to date from going either backward or forward.

This homogeneous, closely intermarrying people have spent their entire national life in slaughtering men, women, and children, for whom they had only a conventional or political hatred. It has fixed their character. It has endowed them with the slavish obedience born of military despotism. It has afflicted them with a blood-lust which, when not gratified in war, must in many cases overcome even their strong instinct of obedience to authority, and is expressed in carefully planned and extensive campaigns of private murder for individual ends, as substitutes for murderous wars for the aggrandizement of the State. Hence our court records show that the German is the most law-abiding

of all our citizens, if the *number* of offences committed by Germans determine his status in that respect.

He has one criminal weakness—murder. Make a mental picture of the newspaper headlines of the murders committed in the United States for gain during the past quarter of a century; of the “blood-lust murders” (sadism) committed in that period. The criminal history of our German population is confined almost entirely to those two classes of murder. He never murders for revenge—he is not revengeful; seldom for jealousy. When his interest prompts him to kill, he does so carefully, methodically, with a regard for detail and a disregard of human suffering which characterizes the present German campaign in Belgium. No doubt his crimes are often undiscovered. Characteristically German were the murders of the Benders, a family of German emigrants who had settled in a Western State, and whose victims reached a score; Dr. Myer, who was electrocuted for one of a dozen or more murders to secure life insurance funds; Luetgart, the Chicago sausage manufacturer, who turned his wife into his sausage-machines, and who claimed to the end that God was with him; of Hans Schmidt, whose case is at the time of writing still pending in the New York courts.

In the other category—motiveless murders committed through the physical perversity known as “sadism,” or blood-lust—the criminal records of New York show that, of the hundreds of cases recorded, hardly one was committed save by a member of the Teuton race. The ancestors, the dead oppressors of these unfortunates, probably spent most of their lives under the unnatural conditions which prevail in armies on active service.

So numerous is this class of degenerates (not necessarily murderous, but frequently so) in Germany and Germanic Austria that a handbook concerning the subject has been compiled, which is in every German public library and most of ours.*

Shortly after the commencement of this war, an important military command was given to a man of princely lineage who had been actually convicted, dismissed from the service, and imprisoned, for the commission of unnatural crimes. Bismarck, speaking of the period of his youth, says: "Every grade of society in Berlin was permeated with this vice."† The trial of Maximilian Harden, half a century later, showed conditions then to be no better.

To this stage has man's selfish and vicious interpretation of Christianity brought the German people. To restore them to the proper plane of humanity they must accept the teachings of Christ *without the limitations imposed upon it by the State*.

We believe that the German nation has no right to impose upon any State, no matter how small or weak, a civilization or Kultur that has kept their own land constantly embroiled in war. They may achieve a much finer destiny by peaceably expanding in lands governed by their respective inhabitants, a government in which they may participate, in the peaceable and honourable progress of which they may share, than by merely increasing in political bulk, in derogation of the rights of others, and with an inevitable further deterioration of the German character.

* "Psychopathia Sexualis," by Professor Krafft-Ebing, Professor in Vienna University.

† "Reflections and Reminiscences," vol. i., chap. i.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PEASANTS' WAR

IN the Peasants' War, the only revolt of the masses recorded in German history, the leader of the Anabaptists, Thomas Munger, wrote: "Have no mercy . . . be ye not moved by misery of the Godless; upon your swords the blood must not grow cold." In this revolt nearly a thousand castles and monasteries were laid in ashes, and a precedent established to be faithfully followed by the Germans in Belgium, in France, in 1914. Of the Peasants' War the historian wrote:

"No attention was paid to the priceless treasures of the libraries and art collections . . . the peasants waded knee-deep in the torn manuscripts of a monastery."*

This attempted revolution was an anomaly in the German character, and may be only explained as a mental disturbance—a psychic phenomenon—unprecedented then, and never repeated. The normal attitude of the German mind, then and now, found contemporary expression in the words of Luther, who declared that "men and maidservants could be sold at will like other animals," and of the gentle Melancthon, who quoted Scripture to prove that it was

* Henderson's "Short History of Germany," p. 321.

"presumptuous and seditious not to wish to be serfs." Luther was characteristically German, not only in his subservience to social order as he knew it, but in the method by which he proposed to deal with the insurgent peasants. He urged that every man who could, "strike them down, throttle and stab them in secret or in public." He compared them to mad dogs, and said, "A prince can now deserve mercy better by shedding blood than others by prayer." In 1529 he wrote:

"I am very angry at the peasants who cannot see how well off they are, sitting in peace through the help and protection of the princes. You impudent, coarse asses, can you not understand this? May God strike you dead!"

In striking contrast to Luther's intolerance of the proletariat (he himself was the son of a peasant) was his attitude of benevolent indulgence toward the behaviour of the Count of Lutphen, who reduced his peasantry to famine and desperation by compelling them to abandon their fields, during the harvest period, to perform such trivial service as attempting to catch fleas in the castle beds, gathering snail-shells on which the Countess might wind her yarn, and lulling into silence the croaking frogs that disturbed the slumbers of the noble couple.

After the peasants had, for a brief space, occupied all the German provinces, they were engaged in battle near Frankenhauseu by trained troops, who mercilessly slaughtered three-fourths of them, and afterward beheaded 300 peasant prisoners. Thomas Munger was thumbscrewed and racked into a confession, and took the Eucharist in regular Catholic form.

The Peasants' War showed that "vicarious punishment" was a part of the German military system then, as it is to-day. The town of Mulhausen, which had been the scene of part of Munger's activities, and its inhabitants were subjected to bitter punishments and humiliations, not so drastic, however, as those imposed nearly 500 years later upon the towns and inhabitants of the Belgian towns of Dinant and Tamines.

At Zabern, in Alsace, 17,000 or 18,000 were cut down *after* they had surrendered, and the ditch where they were buried is called to this day "heretics' ditch" (*Ketzergrube*). A contemporary, in describing one of the six or seven massacres, says:

"Such a slaying and strangling there was, and with no attempt at resistance, as when a pack of wolves falls upon a flock of geese or a herd of sheep."

Although it is estimated that 100,000 peasants lost their lives in these butcheries, worse scenes were enacted when the survivors, now—and for ever after to be—dumb and submissive. The Margrave of Ansbach had the eyes of sixty persons bored out. The official list, submitted a year after the rebellion had been crushed, showed that 10,000 victims had been tortured to death. With the spirit of revolt went—so far as the inhabitants of the smitten districts were concerned—all faith in the doctrines of the Anabaptists and Martin Luther, who from this time forward had to look elsewhere for supporters; both movements, however, continued to spread.

The adherents of the new sect, even those who had *not* sympathized with or participated in the Peasants' War,

and were loyal to all civic obligations, were bitterly persecuted by the Catholic princes. One thousand were put to death by order of the Archduke Ferdinand in Austria, and a prince of that empire decreed death without form or trial to all the Protestants. One prince only seemed inclined to mercy; he, Duke William of Bavaria, commanded that those who recanted might be beheaded instead of burnt alive.

By these methods Anabaptism was extirpated throughout Germany, except in the north-eastern corner—in Münster and Westphalia. In Münster the orthodox authorities were replaced by Anabaptists. All those who refused the second baptism of the new creed were persecuted and driven from the town; polygamy was instituted, and the women divided among the men. So powerful, within narrow limits, did the new sect become, that before Münster was finally purged of the zealots it had to be besieged by a force contributed to by all the other German States. When captured, its occupants received short shrift. John of Leyden was tortured to death upon the spot where he had erected a throne for himself and one of his women; his tongue was torn out, and red-hot pincers applied to all parts of his body.

Henceforth the Reformation was to be guided by the more politic Luther, who detested political agitation, and by proclaiming the sanctity of caste and property, won toleration and converts from the ruling classes.* His potential usefulness was even recognized by the bigoted Catholic Charles V., who, though he declared

* The pro-Lutheran protest against the edict of the second of Spires (1529) was signed by six Princes, at the head of whom were those of Hesse and Electoral Saxony, and of fourteen cities.

he would give his life and blood to extinguish the new heresy, thought that the advancing Protestantism might be a weapon to be used against Papal encroachments upon his own prerogatives.

Luther was also favoured by opportunity. For eight or nine years after the Edict of Worms against Luther, Charles, by whom it had been signed, and was most interested in its enforcement, was away from German territory, and, by foreign wars, detached from local interests. During this period were the fires of the Reformation so thoroughly kindled that they were never extinguished.

CHAPTER IX

THE GERMAN MENTAL PROCESSES

PRIOR to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, the well-settled belief prevailed in the United States, that the old policy of forcing an alien rule upon a civilized people had proved so unprofitable that it had been permanently discontinued. It is true that a modern instance of the old and practically obsolete practice had been afforded by Austria in 1908, but Austria was distinguished as the most reactionary State in Europe, not excepting Russia.

With England and the United States the new policy which tended to the independent growth, expression, and development of small nations, was well settled. England's colonial policy for the century past, and her acts in aid of the formation of the "United South African States," and our own action in regard to Cuba and the Philippines, and our policy of non-intervention in Mexico, all evidenced the attitude of the two great English-speaking nations.

It was well known that France had no policy in which the recovery of her lost provinces formed a part. Their continued existence under German rule was an irritating reminder of her humiliation in 1870, but their re-inclusion under French rule, even with Germany's

full assent, would have been deemed unwise by any French Cabinet of to-day, unless in response to a plain expression of the will of the inhabitants. Failing such a demonstration, France would have preferred to see her former provinces made into a separate autonomy—such as Switzerland or Luxembourg, where the racial differences would be more or less merged in a common participation in national government. Switzerland, with her German-French-Italian population, leads a most peaceful national existence.

England and America had not taken seriously the teachings of Treitschke, Martin, Bernhardi, and the other militants, or an occasional unguarded utterance of the Kaiser, usually counterpoised with some clear statement of the pacific nature of Germany's civilizing mission. These ran counter to the growing tendency to bring the acts of the State to the bar of each individual conscience, to be judged by a strict code of Christian morals. Probably not a score of Bernhardi's books had reached the United States previous to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. The monumental work of Treitschke, the historian, was unknown in America, except to a small class of students.

After the violation of the neutralities of Belgium and Luxembourg came Bernhardi's book, bringing with it the first introduction of Treitschke's writings to the American public. It was not, however, to the undiluted teachings of Treitschke and his disciples that America owes her present rather widespread feeling of insecurity and *malaise*, but rather to the more conservative German men of letters, who, in limiting and qualifying the attitude and utterances of the extremists,

established an irreducible minimum of a liberty of action claimed by Germany in the pursuit of a policy of expansion.

In the earlier stages of our awakening to the attitude of Germany, such utterances from Americans as "the Germans are men and women like ourselves" showed an abysmal and dangerous ignorance upon our part. We now realize that they are entirely different—so different that the comparative virtues of the Anglo-American and the German may not be determined by comparison. We must be content to say that they are hopelessly and irreconcilably different, and now govern ourselves in the light of this too recently acquired knowledge. This ignorance of national character has not been one-sided. It may exist even now in Germany. It certainly existed among German professors, scientists, men of letters, statesmen, and journalists, up to a short time ago. If the German mind were not essentially different from our own, would they have given as a justification of their breach of Belgium's neutrality, guaranteed by their written treaty and spoken pledge, that Belgium, alarmed by the construction in Germany of a military railway to her (Belgium's) frontier, and Germany's repeated declarations that she was destined to extend her empire from Antwerp to Constantinople, that little country had certain "conversations" with England, in which the latter country made certain tentative promises, which were expressly stated to be "not binding" without ratification, and in no event to be operative "unless Belgium's neutrality had been first invaded by Germany"? Can the Anglo-American mind understand how Germany can further seek to justify her

invasion by stating that Belgium's defence guns all pointed toward Germany? The only possible invader! This sounds to us very much as if a burglar were to justify "breaking and entering" by the fact that the householder had installed a burglar alarm; or, as if Germany expected Belgium to have her guns ready trained on Brussels or Antwerp; or, as if she thought a prudent householder should put his bolt upon the outside instead of upon the inside of his doors.

Now, it is quite beside the question whether or not Germany is right in her view. That she thinks she is right is reasonably certain; that alone shows how deep-seated are our differences. That she is as ignorant of these differences as we once were is proved beyond any doubt. She addresses these arguments to us, and is honestly surprised and disappointed (not to say extremely vexed) that we are not *convinced* by them.

The instance given could be multiplied by the score. Would America, after the commission of a treaty breach such as the invasion of Belgium, soberly ask Germany to enter upon a convention looking to the preservation, or rather declaring for the preservation, of the neutrality of the high seas, and expect Germany to believe that such a convention would be observed for a moment if the treaty-scorning country held the dominating sea-power?

Let us take Germany's case, not as presented by her fire-eaters, but by Dr. William Hirsch, who for his moderate and reserved tone and comparatively truthful statement of fact earned and received a warm tribute to his "lucidity and sincerity" from the *New York Times*. After introductory generalities, in the course

of which he states truly enough, no doubt, that the Kaiser could not have made this war without the enthusiastic support of his people, Dr. Hirsch gives the following interesting statistics :

“Now, then, let us try to diagnose this case. Let us try to get at the bottom of this horrible affair. Let us try to reveal the underlying, real cause of this war, without being satisfied to accept some diplomatic controversies as such. I shall not offer the reader any theories or hypotheses, but will merely ask him to let me recall to his memory a few figures, such as can be verified in any book on this subject.

“Germany has to-day 70,000,000 inhabitants. At the time of the Franco-German War, in 1870, she had a little over 40,000,000. One hundred years ago she had about 22,000,000. This increase of the population, at the rate of doubling itself in about sixty years, corresponds to that of other nations. England has increased even more. She had not quite 9,000,000 people in 1801, and over 36,000,000 in 1911. The only exception is found, for well-known reasons, in France. She had 27,000,000 in 1801, 37,000,000 in 1876, and 39,000,000 in 1912.

“The territory on which those 70,000,000 Germans live to-day is, of course, not larger than it was a hundred years ago. Germany contains 208,780 square miles, which means that this entire country is only about four times as large as the State of New York, whose area is 49,170 square miles. The State of Texas contains 265,780 square miles. The entire German country contains only, therefore, four-fifths of the area of this one State.

“The rapid increase of the population of the European countries during the nineteenth century took place in spite of the enormous outlet formed by the emigration to this country. The increase in the United States during the last century is, therefore, almost fabulous. Think of it! One hundred and thirty years ago—in 1786—the United States had 3,000,000 white inhabitants, which number has risen to 92,000,000 in this comparatively short space of time.

“Now, then, with these figures in mind, look at the situation in which these 70,000,000 Germans find themselves to-day. They cannot, of course, raise the necessities of life on their own territory, and are therefore depending on other nations for their very existence. An expansion of their territory in any direction is, of course, out of the question, being surrounded by other nations on all sides. With their ever-increasing population, the nation resembles an overheated vessel that must necessarily explode unless you can in time relieve the pressure. At the rate mentioned above those 70,000,000 will increase to 140,000,000 in sixty years from now, to 280,000,000 in 120 years. And what is one century in the history of the world?

“Such an explosion would, of course, mean—war. But not a war such as is being fought to-day, where Germany, as we shall see immediately, merely defends herself against her aggressors, but a war to which those people would be driven by sheer despair, by the impulse of self-preservation; a war whose object would be to acquire by force the necessary means for existence. But for the

last forty years the German nation, fully realizing the eventual consequences of this ever-increasing pressure, has looked for means and ways to avoid this terrible explosion by employing safety valves to the boiling vessel, and trying to reduce the pressure by industrious and scientific means."

Dr. Hirsch continues :

" With Germany it certainly was not an idle sport to build a navy and to found colonies. The acquisition of foreign lands was for Germany a matter of existence, and, at the same time, a matter of safety for other nations who, without German colonization, were bound to suffer from the inevitable 'explosion.' The Germans were working on every possible field of human endeavour to make up for what was denied to them by Nature. They developed their commerce and industry, supplying the whole world with their products, and they were trying hard enough, indeed, to cultivate foreign lands as an outlet for their overpopulation."

That colonies are "necessary" to Germany is quite untrue. Germany (Prussia) had colonies 200 years ago, and abandoned them. Her present colonial policy was not inaugurated until 1884. Then it was opposed by Bismarck, who held that they should be merely "business enterprises." The majority of the German people were also opposed to colonization, and the policy received no encouragement until Hohenlohe came into power in 1900.

Even under the present system the Germans refuse to go to German colonies, preferring to go to South

America, English colonies, or, as in the case of Dr. Hirsch, to America.

If Germany had shown a desire to put in practice the policy of the "open door" to all the other white races, England would never have been opposed to her colonial expansion. As it is, Germany's vast possessions in East Africa, the Congo, and the Pacific, have been acquired and peacefully held without a large fleet, and without England's opposition; in spite of British sea-power.

"Now, then, these are all absolute facts. Think about them and say whether you can conscientiously reproach the Germans for any of these conditions. Somebody might say the Germans have no right to go on multiplying the way they do, if their numbers have overreached the capacity of their country. But, they may answer, how about other nations? Do they not all multiply at the same rate, England even at a greater rate? Should the German women be the only ones to be deprived of their natural vocation in life? The only nation which forms an exception to this is France. But she herself characterized the social condition which interferes with her natural process of proliferation as criminal, and she punishes in her courts of law all those whom she can convict of this very crime. The same view is maintained by every other civilized country as well. Can you, therefore, reproach the Germans for not committing this crime?

"Assuming, then, the increase of population to be a normal phenomenon of Nature, can you re-

proach Germany for seeking an outlet for her surplus in foreign lands, especially if you consider the fact that the Germans, in their efforts of colonizing, have never done any harm or injustice to others? They have not invaded small, innocent republics owning large gold mines with a big army and annexed them against every right of nations. They have not made war against the Chinese in order to compel this nation to buy their opium and poison themselves, and then, on top of this act of 'Christian love,' annexed the important island of Hongkong as a 'war indemnity.'

"No, the Germans have done nothing of the kind. They have acquired some uncultivated land in Africa, endeavouring to cultivate it at a great expense of human labour and money. They have 'leased' a piece of land from China, and converted it in those few years into the Eldorado of the Far East. Is there anything to reproach the Germans for all that? Could anybody find any fault with what they were doing? On the contrary, anybody with an unbiased judgment must admit that the actions of the Germans as a nation during the last forty years, during the period when they began to feel that their country was becoming overpopulated, were not only correct and honourable and beneficial to general civilization, but that they constituted the only possible means of relieving the ever-increasing tension, of avoiding that terrible explosion which otherwise appeared inevitable, and which, if not averted, was bound to bring the most frightful catastrophe over the entire world.

"Now, then, what attitude has England taken

toward this difficult problem with which the German nation saw herself confronted? It goes without saying that England fully realized the precarious situation of the German nation, with its subsequent danger to the other nations. Did England approve of the means taken by the Germans to avert the calamity, and did England, as you might perhaps expect, even from purely selfish motives, assist the Germans in their desperate efforts to ward off the terrible catastrophe which must necessarily result from the normal increase of population? No! England did not only not approve, but England did not hesitate to stigmatize those very steps which the Germans took to prevent the evil as pernicious and criminal.

“How can the Germans dare to build a large navy if England is to rule the seas? How can the Germans dare to found colonies in foreign lands, a privilege belonging alone to England? How can the Germans dare to compete in commerce and industry with the English nation, which has a monopoly on those things? The Germans, so say the English, incredible as it sounds, should stay at home and produce poetry and music and indulge in philosophy, but should not mingle with the affairs of the world. The English complain in an almost naïve manner about the crime on the part of the Germans of building a large navy; for the English must, of course, go on and build two ships for every one of the Germans in order to continue to rule the seas. And rule the seas she must—that is her divine right.

“Now, then, if it is a crime on the part of the

Germans to build a navy in order to render it possible for them to found colonies in foreign lands, did England have to suggest any other means and ways to solve the problem of German overpopulation? Could England offer any other device to act as a safety valve on the overheated vessel? Ah, yes! There is another remedy to protect the surrounding countries from this inevitable explosion. Let us smash the whole vessel before its forcible explosion can do any harm. Let us choke the Germans, with their lofty ideals and great aspirations, as a few years ago we choked the Boers, with their lucrative gold mines and diamond fields, as we poisoned the Chinese, as we assassinated the Indians."

As we have pointed out, Germany has, easily enough, acquired much territory peaceably without the aid of a large navy. Dr. Hirsch makes it quite clear that one of the purposes of a large German navy is to take by violence colonies of other Powers. To this the other Powers object.

The "diamond fields" that Dr. Hirsch has in mind are at Kimberley, in Cape Colony. The Kimberley mines were owned or controlled by the house of Wernher, Beit and Co. Julius Wernher and Otto Beit were natives of Germany, and have died within the past ten years. After the Boer War, Beit left his art collection to British galleries; Wernher's wealth, for the major part, went to Oxford University!

The Rand Mines belonged, not to the Boers, but to shareholders scattered the world over. Needless to

say, their ownership has never been disturbed; nor has the British Government imposed any tax upon the output of gold from the mines. The Boer War has resulted simply in all British and Dutch South Africa being turned over to its white inhabitants for self-government. A Boer, formerly a General in the Boer War, is Prime Minister. The laws are made by a Parliament in which the Boers preponderate. No matter how much Dr. Hirsch is annoyed, the Boers, at least, have no grievance.

“This is the cause of this war. This diagnosis is based, not on mere speculation, not on flimsy correspondence, not on any kind of prejudice—no, it is based on absolute facts. Step by step you can follow up the gradual development of conditions as they are described above. The steady and rapid increase of population, confined to a relatively small territory; the strenuous efforts on the part of the German nation to make up for the insufficiency in the products of natural commerce and industry; the attempt to create an outlet for the ever-increasing overpopulation by the foundation of colonies in foreign lands, and the building of a formidable navy as a necessary means to accomplish this object; the emphatic objection on the part of England against all these expansive measures, on the ground that it is England’s exclusive right to rule the seas and govern the world; the subsequent conspiracy, entered into by England with Belgium, France, and Russia, to strike the blow as soon as a suitable opportunity might offer itself.

“ This is the correct diagnosis of the predisposing cause of this war. This is the situation which led up to the great catastrophe. As long as the situation prevailed, the war was its logical result. England, insisting on her divine right to ‘ rule the seas,’ trying to keep those 70,000,000 people plus 50,000,000 Austrians cut off from the sea, maintaining those little ‘ buffer-States’ for this very purpose, trying to keep them cut off from the sea, just as she was all along preventing the 190,000,000 Russians reaching the sea ; England, who had resolved to oppose every legitimate effort on the part of Germany to relieve the continually increasing pressure of her overpopulation ; England, who had actually brought about a conspiracy to strike at Germany before the inevitable explosion would take place—England is at the bottom of this war.

“ Realizing and appreciating these conditions, one must admit that it matters little what the exciting cause of this war has been. It makes very little difference from which side emanated the actual declaration of war, or who delivered the first blow. It is an old trick on the part of clever diplomats to conduct affairs in such a manner as to make the other side appear responsible for those of their transactions which had to shun the criticism of the world. Napoleon always succeeded in throwing the blame for his wars on the other side, and often compelled his enemies, through diplomatic strategy, to take the initiative and declare war against him. What modern historian, however, could be in doubt as to the real cause of

the wars of Napoleon? It is, therefore, the underlying situation, the predisposing cause, which the historian has to analyze in order to form a correct and impartial judgment about the origin of a war like the present one.

"If you once realize the nature of the underlying situation, you cannot remain in doubt as to the interest which the various nations must have had in an eventual war during the last few years. Germany, as long as nobody would interfere with her peaceful pursuits of developing her commerce and industry and her colonization, had certainly no reason whatsoever to wish for war. No war, no matter how gloriously she might come out of it, could ever be an equivalent to her peaceful attainments. She had nothing to gain by a war and everything to lose.

"All that she could possibly desire was to be allowed to pursue, undisturbedly, the natural development of her various enterprises at home and abroad, which were as legitimate as they were beneficial to general civilization. Only if she were wilfully prevented from carrying out these necessary pursuits, only if the natural development of her enterprises were maliciously interfered with, she was compelled to draw the sword and fight for her rights, for her honour, and for her very existence; well aware of the fact, however, that such a war would be a terrific scourge to the entire civilized world, and that with all those enormous sacrifices she could at the best only hope to preserve the fruit of her industrious labour and remove the obstacles which had been

wilfully put in the way of her further development.

"England's attitude toward an eventual war with Germany must have been quite opposite. She saw in Germany a rising competitor. She realized that if she were to continue to 'rule the seas' she could only do so through enormous efforts, and even then her supremacy might be jeopardized by the ever-growing German nation. The only means to rid herself of this danger was a general European war against the competitor.

"One must, however, give England her due. In the art of diplomacy she has outgeneralled Germany right and left. She has not only accomplished this great conspiracy, making even those arch enemies, Russia and Japan, fight hand in hand against her rising rival, but she even succeeded in throwing the whole responsibility for this war on her adversary, making the world believe, as Napoleon did a hundred years ago, that she was forced into this war by her enemy, and that she is fighting for 'humanity and civilization.'

"Future generations, of course, will judge differently. The calm historian will understand which is the nation that forms a constant menace to the world—the one which devotes herself to the development of her own commerce and industry and a peaceful cultivation of foreign lands for the surplus of her population, or the one which claims, as her divine right, that she must 'rule the seas,' and which expects every other nation of the globe to submit to this doctrine."

Now, the foregoing arguments convince Dr. Hirsch that the invasion of Belgium was justified; that Belgium deliberately plotted to turn that hive of industry into a stricken field of desolation; that because Germany had (we think wisely) devoted her energies to industrial progress and allowed the English people and other nationalities to colonize the most desirable "waste places" of the world, England should lag behind in the race for naval supremacy, until Germany's strength should be so overwhelming that she could by "peaceful" means take the colonies now belonging to her and to others otherwise there will be an "explosion"!

Now, consciously or unconsciously, Dr. Hirsch has stated wherein lies "the German peril." Reduced to its simplest terms, it is that Germany believes that no nation of the world has any right to oppose German progress, even where that progress is in opposition to vested rights. In the German view there can be no such rights. To set them up in opposition to what Germany deems to be in her interest is an act of impiety to be punished by God; acting through His regent on the earth, the German Emperor, who has declared—

"Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On me, as German Emperor, the spirit of God has descended. I am His weapon, His sword, and His vicegerent. Woe be to the disobedient! Death to cowards and unbelievers!"

On December 10, 1914, two German cruisers bombarded the unfortified towns of Whitby and Scarborough, the latter a well-known watering-place situated upon

a high promontory jutting into the North Sea ; Hartlepool was included in the raid, but Hartlepool had fortifications of a kind, and soldiery. The bombardment of the two unfortified towns—Scarborough has neither harbour nor shipping—could only be accounted for by sheer blood-lust. Some hundred people—all non-combatants and for the major part women and children—were killed—murdered. Two months after, the following delightful instance of German reasoning appeared in a German paper, the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* :

“It is an established fact that when our airships were, in order to fly up to the fortified place of Great Yarmouth, merely flying over other places or cities, they were shot at from these places. This involves an English franc-tireur attack, ruthlessly carried out in defiance of international law and in the darkness of the night, upon the German airships which, without the smallest hostile action, wanted to fly away over these places.

“This treacherous proceeding on the part of the English civil population is on a level with that of the inhabitants of Belgium, when, from the windows of houses and out of cellars and churches, they opened their murderous fire upon German troops which were marching through. The airship is a recognized weapon of war, and yet people in England seem to demand that it shall regard itself as fair game for the murders performed by a fanatical civil population, and shall not have the right to defend itself. Our airships will continue to defend themselves against franc-tireur attacks, even when they are flying over the sacred soil of England.”

At the end one would look to find the name of some German Lewis Carrol responsible for this example of "Alice in Wonderland" reasoning. No, it bears the signature of the German statesman, Count Reventlow.

Are we not in danger of misunderstanding, and being misunderstood by a people to whom Count Reventlow's logic is satisfying and convincing?

CHAPTER X

THE GERMAN CHARACTER

THE truth is that, as a result of a settled and long-continued policy of the ruling powers of Germany, the German mind is in an extremely low state of development. To establish this proposition, we take the premise as stated by General von Bernhardi; he says:

“Of all peoples, the Germans are least capable of self-government.”

The German militant gives us no reason for this astounding incapacity of a people who have made wonderful progress in all *other* arts of civilization; but Dr. Ralph Waldo Emerson suggests an explanation in his essay upon “Politics.” He says:

“Hence, the less government we have the better—the fewer laws, and the less confided power. The antidote to this abuse of formal government is the influence of private character, the growth of the individual; the appearance of the principal to succeed the proxy; the appearance of the wise man,” etc. “To educate the wise man, the State exists, and with the appearance of the wise man the State ceases to exist. The appearance of the wise man makes the State unnecessary.”

Now, the problem set before the German autocracy was this: Development of the character of our people will be fatal to the continued enjoyment of despotic power. How shall that development be arrested without impairing the productive capacity of the inhabitants, that efficiency of production which makes ruling them a pleasant, profitable, and glorious occupation? By great good fortune or great cunning, the one answer was hit upon—*specialization*. It was born of the system of caste. It *did* and does make for economic efficiency, and as carried on in Germany, rigidly and with governmental compulsion, leads to partial mental atrophy. The productive members of the community must trust their political destinies to the bureaucracy, whose members enter upon their employment by right of birth, as did Bismarck, and with an intense hatred for popular government and its exponents. Bismarck says that as a boy, when he read of Gessler and William Tell, his sympathies were all with the tyrant. He detested Tell's character.*

This German policy of confining the stream of thought of each individual within narrow parallel banks, never broken down, never overflowed, has achieved wonderful results. It has its qualities as well as defects. One commercial chemical product of Germany would seem to be of a simple character that would surely stamp it as the product of a single manufacturing house. Half a dozen more large factories, separate and distinct, have been engaged in its production; each ignorant, presumably, of the methods of the other. Each separate manufacturing firm represented one of the small number of separate pro-

* "Reflections and Reminiscences," vol. i., p. 2.

cesses involved in the production of the commodity. Tremendous economy has resulted from this concentration of ability.

The same policy of specialization in branches of Government has also made for efficiency.

After the overthrow of France in 1871, Bismarck had no fear that Moltke would be a competitor for the former's office.

In America, if one of our citizens gains distinction in one employment, we immediately attempt to "honour" him by forcing him into a position for which he has no qualifications. A successful General is turned into an unsuccessful President; a lawyer, who by the exercise of a strictly partisan mind has performed useful work in criminal investigation, becomes, not the head of a detective agency, but a tyrannical and incompetent judge. This, however, is only bad for the State. Diversity of employment of an individual must tend to a more or less symmetrical development of character. This the German lacks. Hence his desperate protests against anything which may tend to limit the powers of those to whom he has entrusted even the ordering of his household, the employment of his servants, the regulation of his expenditure.

CHAPTER XI

GERMANY'S CASE AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN

AT the head of Germany's indictments of Great Britain she has placed the simple fact that Britain engaged in the War of 1914. It is hardly worth while discussing this feature of the charge-sheet. It is idle to hope to convince any German that her enemy was actuated by any but the basest of motives, such as commercial jealousy, desire for territorial aggrandizement, and the effacement of Northern Germany from the map, the last being obviously opposed to Britain's interests and safety; on the other hand, the consensus of the world's opinion outside of Germany and Austria is that England had intervention forced upon her at an extremely awkward time. As a matter of fact, in the matter of their respective national duties, Germany and Britain had much in common. Germany was bound by her treaty obligations to aid Austria if that Power was attacked by Russia; and, furthermore, even in the absence of any treaty, she would have felt bound to protect the dual monarchy from any pro-Slav expansion in the south at her ally's expense, and which *ipso facto* would make Germany's ambition of a territorial frontage on the Mediterranean more difficult of attainment. Britain was also bound by treaty to intervene

in the event of any violation of Belgium's neutrality *by either France or Germany*, and, in the absence of such a treaty, would have felt bound by laws of self-preservation to oppose with force any westerly extension of Germany's North Sea littoral.

In the German view, that country's regard for her treaty obligation was highly honourable, while England's attempt to discharge hers at a frightful risk and cost is indicative of the "blackest perfidy and hypocrisy."

We are disposed to think that those who attempt to fix the responsibility of this War of 1914 upon Kaiser Wilhelm and his party have expended too much labour upon the debatable points which have arisen since the Sarajevo tragedy. It would have been more just and less laborious to have held Germany responsible for the events that led up to the assassination, and culminated in the war. Upon that point there could be no controversy. The violent incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, 1909, was at the instigation probably, with the consent and connivance certainly, of Germany and the German Emperor. The annexation of the Slav provinces was in direct contravention of the Berlin treaty of 1878, and of the protocol, for a time secret, in which Austria agreed to redeliver them to Turkey. During the months of August and September, when Europe hung upon the brink of war, Germany held a loaded revolver to the head of a subdued and disorganized and impoverished Russia, prostrate after the war with Japan, while Austria made away with the booty, which William II. firmly believed, and no doubt believes, would soon pass as a rich heritage from the decadent Hapsburgs to his own more virile dynasty.

In a recent publication which appeared before Austria's spoliation of the Slav provinces, Dr. Rudolph Martin, a German Privy Councillor, who certainly expresses the sentiments of his country's ruling class, says :

“The future of Germany demands the absorption of Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey, with the North Sea ports; her realms will stretch toward the East from Berlin to Bagdad, and to Antwerp on the West. These changes will happen within our epoch.”

Dr. Martin's limited time for this expansion to twenty or thirty years, and some of his prophecies, have already come perilously near fulfilment. He says that France, the first victim, will not wait to be attacked, and that Germany even then (the time of writing)

“has already decided to annex the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg and Belgium, including of course Antwerp, together with the northern provinces of France, so as to secure Boulogne and Calais.”

It would seem that, if Germany has been “driven into this war,” she is at least fortunate in this: she has been driven in the direction she wished to take.

Subordinated to this main charge are subjoined others which are designed to show general bad character.

1. Britain's continued occupation of Egypt in violation of her promises of evacuation.
2. The South African War.
3. Her oppression of her American colonies.
4. The Indo-Chinese opium trade and the consequent “Chinese War.”

In regard to the first charge, England must interpose the usually rather specious defence that the continued occupation of Egypt was in the interests of the inhabitants of a famine-stricken, often plague-ridden community; but in this case the defence is bulwarked by a marvellous, an unparalleled record of good works. With the reclamation of the Nile, desert famine has departed; sanitation reforms came in with the departure of the iniquitous Turkish tax-gatherer; millions of lives have been saved, and, far more important, those rescued from starvation no longer live upon its verge. The usurer, who in the old days loaned one day's sustenance to a starving family to rob them of food for a month, when the meagre crop was gathered, has been suppressed. Above all, England's continued occupation of Egypt was not in contravention of the wishes of the bulk of the inhabitants, nor was she insistently required by the other party to the occupation treaty (France) to evacuate Egypt; her non-performance of that part of her treaty had the tacit acquiescence of all the world, was expressly approved by France in 1904, and was never a source of danger to the world's peace. Her administration of the Customs, with French officials, showed no favour to British merchants. Egyptian commerce and the exploitation of her resources were, and are, open to the subjects of all countries, upon equal terms. German, French, and Austrian capital enjoy equal protection and facilities of employment with the capital invested by the suzerain's own Nationals.

2. The South African War was believed to be unjust by an important and large (how large one cannot say) element of the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ire-

land. Those who condemned Britain's attitude then—and whose condemnation was, and is, endorsed by Germany—were evidently capable of a detached and unbiassed attitude at a time when human judgment is most apt to be distorted by so-called patriotism. It is not without significance that the Pro-Boers of 1900 are to-day heartily in accord with their country's attitude in the present struggle.

But, if Britain was wrong in waging war against the Kruger oligarchy in 1900, she has made such an atonement that her sin, if committed, must be forgiven; she has silenced every tongue save that of senseless calumny. At the cost of a hundred thousand valuable lives and two hundred million pounds sterling of treasure, she acquired absolute sovereignty over a country larger than all Europe, containing the greatest treasure-houses in the world; the annual output of the Transvaal gold-mines runs to many millions of pounds sterling—from which, by the way, she has never drawn one penny; of her own volition she performed the greatest act of political abnegation the world has ever seen; by a stroke of the pen the subjugated countries, with the adjacent English colonies, were erected into a great nation, free and independent. Its law-makers, Boer and Briton, chosen by universal white suffrage, have the absolute untrammelled independence of adult sons, who still look for guidance and help from the British political mother; she exacts nothing as a matter of right—though much is freely accorded—in return.

3. The charge of oppression “by England” of her American colonies is singularly inapt when coming from German lips. The “English Government” is now the “English people.” They never oppressed the

American colonies. A German Prince, George III., treated his American subjects with a stupid German ferocity, made the more unpleasant by the employment of hired German assassins—the Hessians—who, for a price paid to their own Prince, were pitchforked into a war, to kill and be killed in a quarrel in which they had no interest. Once engaged in the war, the mercenaries were thoroughly German in their methods, and the word “Hessian” still lives in the American vernacular, the synonym of a cold-blooded murderer of women and children, an incendiary or a ravisher. Without the German mercenaries who fought for George, the American War of Independence would have been of short duration, and there would have been no occasion to accept the valuable aid of Von Steuben, who was sent to America by a Frenchman (De Bougainville) to help the cause of liberty against the Teuton oppressor. However, it is as well that America should be reminded of the War of Independence, in order that we should mark, and remember, the different conditions that prevailed then and now. In the colonial period there were no means of rapid communication and mobilization; there was no considerable German male element armed with weapons of precision, forming part of colonial life, and owing, though perhaps not owning, allegiance to a German Prince; there was no enormously preponderating element of helpless, from a military standpoint, adult men, ignorant of arms or of drill, lulled by long years of peace into a fatuous sense of security, and who could only oppose crude, unprepared patriotism to a scientific efficiency, to which must also be added a patriotism quite as sincere as our own, but the obliga-

tion of which was determined by ancestry, not by birth or propinquity. In 1776 the American unfamiliar with firearms, woodcraft, exposure, fatigue, and short rations, was as rare as his antithesis is in the United States of to-day.

If the Hessians were again to occupy New Jersey, our school histories of the next generation might not be as pleasant reading to our children as our school-books were to us.

4. The remaining count in the indictment is apt to disturb the informed Briton's rather smug complacency.

The Indo-Chinese opium trade forms the blackest chapter in modern English history. Opium-smoking is a comparatively modern evil in China. The vice took an immediate hold upon the people, and its evil effects upon them were at once recognized by the Chinese Government, who attempted to combat it by prohibiting the cultivation of the poppy and the preparation and importation of the drug.

Laxity and corruption of local Governors and Customs officials—many of them were themselves victims of the habit—made these measures ineffectual; the plant was cultivated throughout the Celestial Kingdom, and an active smuggling trade in a superior quality of the drug, of Indian origin, prevailed in all Chinese ports.

In India, in the eighteenth century, poppy-growing and the manufacture of opium were a monopoly of the British East India Company, this prerogative having been assumed by the Company (which had legislative powers) in 1773, after its servants had been engaged in the trade for their personal profits for some years.

For a few years after "John Company" had officially

embarked in the opium trade, it was content to farm out its privileges to a concessionaire or to sell the bulk of its products to Dutch merchants in Batavia, who in turn sold to British, Dutch, and Portuguese smugglers, who conveyed it to Chinese ports. From the first the policy of the Company in participating in the drug traffic was assailed, notably by Sir Philip Francis (of "Letters of Junius" fame), then a member of the Indian Council; but Hastings, who directed the affairs of the Company, obtained the consent of his Council to charter a vessel and engage directly in the opium trade with China.

Even then an edict against the importation of the drug into China was, and for some time had been, in force. In 1796 still another prohibition, with severer penalties, was promulgated, but was disregarded or evaded by those engaged in this lucrative, but wholly illicit, business.

The British reply to the protests of the Chinese Government was that, as her own edicts against the internal production of opium were not effectual, the importation of opium of a quality superior to the home product was a benefit, not an evil!

The Chinese Government was at last compelled to take official cognizance of the British Company's continued evasion of its laws, and admonished the Governor of Canton to take active measures to suppress the trade. The efforts of that official only resulted in a partial dispersion of the business. The "supply" or "receiving" ships withdrew a few miles from the port of Canton, and there, within plain view of the port authorities, continued to supply the contraband runners with cargo, which they easily landed with the con-

nivance of the corrupt officials of minor ports. This condition of affairs existed when the Indian Company's monopoly terminated, and the throwing open of the ports to all British traders aggravated a bad state of affairs to such an extent that renewed activity upon the part of China resulted, and smuggling was actually checked to such an extent that the receiving ships off Canton Harbour found themselves overloaded with valuable cargoes of the drug, and no facilities for its disposal. The continued presence of these ships had become an affront to a proud and arrogant people, who were conscious of the impeccable morality of their position and the shameless effrontery of those who flaunted their willingness to disregard the decretal orders of a friendly State, and, for a pecuniary profit, to inflict a grievous evil upon an inoffensive people. After persuasive measures had failed, the port authorities temporarily "interned" the foreign merchants in Canton, and compelled them to witness the complete destruction of the opium cargoes. This destruction was open and complete. An eye-witness said: "The degree of fidelity and care with which the work of destruction was carried out far exceeded our expectations." The business "was faithfully executed." The opium thus destroyed, and valued at three millions of pounds sterling, had been delivered by the merchants to the authorities at their request, and after the British "Commercial Superintendent" had guaranteed full compensation from the British Government. For the merchants it was a quick and easy method of disposing of an embarrassing surplus of goods.

In the ensuing "Chinese War" the Imperial Government was mulcted in huge indemnities, and compelled

to make important concessions to the British. The Chinese, however, steadily refused to legalize the traffic, and continued to protest against it, though they no longer dared to enforce their protests, of which the following is an example: The Chinese Commissioner, in writing to the Governor of Hong Kong, said:

“It would indeed be to the advantage of the Chinese revenues if, as you observe, opium paid duties like all legal articles, whereby smuggling would likewise be avoided. But whilst looking to benefit the Customs, and allowing foolish and ignorant people to use this injurious article, so injurious to man, we should thus certainly put a value on riches and slight men’s lives.”

After this striking illustration of the differences between Christian and pagan methods, the English still persisted in sending missionaries to China!

Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, it is from events such as this upon which the American will rest his preference for British over German World Empire.

The voices raised against the British part in the Chinese opium trade were loud and insistent. They were heard at the Council-table, in the halls of Parliament, and, after the Reform Bill, candidates for the Commons were defeated because of indifference as to this shameful subject. The columns of the Press were open to those who advocated the course of honour and good morals, and at length, after many years, the collective conscience, always sound, was effective.

A solution satisfactory to China was not reached until 1906, though in 1884 one of Her Majesty’s Judges (Right Hon. Lord Justice Fry) had written:

“We are still year by year doing a grievous wrong to China: a wrong which, I believe, some day—perhaps before very long—will cause to our nation trouble and sorrow.”

Where in this does one find material for a comparison with German methods, unfavourable to that country?

The answer is simply that for many years Germany, after having ruthlessly robbed Poland of her territory, has oppressed the people of that unfortunate nation, who through no fault of their own have become German subjects. They have been stripped of language, arts, nationality, free intercourse with each other, and opportunity of Polish education; they have been spied upon and imprisoned without due cause; they have been compelled to go to war under a flag they loathe, and for a master whom they hate and despise. Not one German voice has ever been raised in protest in the street or in the Reichstag. Not one Judge in Berlin has ever arisen from the seat of judgment and rebuked the autocracy.

Not any member of the Prussian Government has resigned his portfolio because of the massacres of Tamines, the sack of Dinant, or the outrages in Belgian Luxembourg.

Has there ever been any chance of reforming any evil Germany policy, or will there be while the present form of government endures?

No line of public conduct involving moral turpitude in England can go unrebuked. Reformation may be swift or slow, but it is inevitable. The collective conscience in democracies is always sound.

Westminster is often wrong. Potsdam, alas! is always "right"! Thus Germany's praises "are always exploding from within from loud civic mouths," instead of coming to her from without, as all worthy praise must, from alliances she has fostered and from the populations she has saved.

CHAPTER XII

DYNASTIC WARS

WHEN an individual in private life talks of the deeds of his "illustrious ancestor" or the future of his "house," he is apt to be a nuisance and a bore. Such a man at the head of a State is a public danger.

Louis Napoleon, President of the French Republic, had as such an eye only for his country's weal. As Napoleon III., the husband of the ambitious Empress Eugénie and the father of the Prince Imperial, he involved his country in a "successful" war that brought about its downfall. This war was the one known as the Austro-Italian-Franco War of 1859.

Through the humiliation of Austria, Napoleon III. hoped to accomplish that which his gifted uncle had attempted to do and failed—to found a dynasty with an empire such as Charlemagne's. The age that produced Thomas Paine, Benjamin Franklin, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, was hardly propitious to such an attempt—even for a colossus like Napoleon the Great. They were more unfavourable half a century later, and Louis Napoleon was a pigmy; yet his attempt to "astride the world" caused trouble enough.

A comparatively obscure individual was responsible

for Sedan, the siege of Paris, France's humiliation, and the deadly hatred engendered in 1870 between Germany and France.

Charles, afterward the Count de Morny, later the Duke de Morny, was the illegitimate son of Hortensia, Queen of Holland, the sister of Napoleon I. Born during her widowhood, this half-brother of Louis Napoleon was provided with a patronym by the Count de Morny, a penniless hanger-on of the Dutch Court, who, for a pecuniary consideration, adopted him as his son, and now disappears from the story. Upon the elevation of Louis Napoleon to the French Presidency, De Morny became a person of influence; he was brilliant, and entirely without moral sense; he was the object of a sincere affection upon the part of his brother, who fell completely under his influence.

De Morny, capable and adroit in intrigue, by the discriminating use of promises, money, and offices, brought about the *coup d'état* of 1859. The Republic became an Empire, with its former President as Emperor. De Morny was immediately created Duke, and sat at the receipt of customs, dispensing contracts, honours, and offices for cash. He died of general debility in 1868.

Louis Napoleon had strong family pride and family affection, and a wife as ambitious as himself, to be one of the originators of a great dynastic family. His first step in the direction of dynastic aggrandizement was to aid in the restoration, as petty States, of Austria's Italian provinces, who had been striving, often with a temporary success, for centuries past for emancipation from the yoke of the Holy Roman Empire. The time was now propitious.

In the spring of 1857 Austria had some controversy with the Sardinian Government because of the attacks of the Piedmontese press upon the Austrian régime in Italy. At that period Sardinia's bold attitude, which led to a brief rupture of diplomatic relations, was attributed to secret promises of support given by Napoleon III. to Cavour, the Sardinian Premier.

In 1859 the ties between the independent Italian States and France had been strengthened by the marriage in January of that year of Prince Napoleon Jerome, cousin of the Emperor, to Princess Clotilde of Savoy, daughter of King Victor Emanuel II.

In the winter of 1858-59 Louis Napoleon was noticeably preparing for war—to such an extent, in fact, that alarm was felt in England, not for herself, but because recognizing then the incipient symptoms of megalomania, which led to the Emperor's utter downfall a dozen years later, she feared that he might, if he entered upon a war of conquest, after conquering Austria, turn against Germany, with which country England was now closely associated through the marriage of the Crown Prince Frederick (afterwards Emperor) with the daughter of Queen Victoria.

War trembled in the balance all through the spring of 1859. Naturally enough, Francis Joseph was tenacious in his hold upon the splendid Italian States, which had been not only held by his dynasty for over a century, but which had been guaranteed to him by the Treaty of Vienna. On the other hand, Sardinia—secure of the support of France if necessity arose—was working strenuously for the liberation of her sister States. The seat of the revolutionary movement was in Piedmont; that of the Austrian Government in Turin.

It is apparent now that Austria made a double error. She failed to appreciate the strength and the opportunity of the sub-Alpine States, and she thought that, in the event of France attacking her, Prussia would come to her assistance. The last was an inexcusable blunder. A Franco-Austrian war was very apt to weaken the latter country, whereby Prussia's designs upon the South German States would be materially furthered, while it was certain that France would not be strengthened by the war even if the Italian States gained their independence.

In April war became imminent. A mission of Archduke Albert to Berlin failed to enlist Prussia's aid in a war against France, and on May 3 France declared a war that of necessity had to be fought in an Italian theatre, where for some days a conflict between the Italian and Austrian forces had been carried on.

The war has a lesson of present-day interest. Magenta, one of the two principal battles of the conflict, was lost to Austria, through the disaffection of the Hungarian regiments constituting the Austrian right wing.

Solferino was fought and lost by Austria twenty days later. In this battle, as at Magenta, Louis Kossuth's appeal to the Magyar soldier within the Austrian ranks would seem to have been a potent factor in determining the issue, long in doubt, against the enemy of Hungarian liberty.

In July—the 11th—conditions were agreed to by the two Emperors; subsequently those conditions were embodied in a treaty of peace between Napoleon and Francis Joseph (November 10, 1859), but its terms are unimportant for the reason that the Italians refused to give effect to any of its provisions. They simply

proceeded to form a united Italy, in spite of Austria's protests and the annoyance of the French Emperor. Thus France had by her own initiative, and without profit to herself, by weakened Austria, worked for the aggrandizement of Prussia and her own downfall.

Prussia's defeat of Austria a few years later resulted in the united Germany which terminated the second Napoleonic dynasty and inflicted upon France her greatest humiliation. She of all countries should understand that a war once started in a congeries of civilized nations travels in a vicious circle.

CHAPTER XIII

RUSSIA REGENERATED

“ Winter arousing from its frozen sleep
Wears on its dreaming face a smile of Spring.”

MILTON.

ONE country is already the gainer by the war of 1914, and the regeneration of Russia may be the greatest moral impulse the world has received in the past eighteen hundred years ; perhaps not the event itself, but certainly the time of its happening was determined by the calamitous war, which in every respect, save in the result of the abolition of alcoholic beverages in Russia, has been a curse, not only to the nations now involved, but to all mankind.

Temperance reform has, the world now learns for the first time, long been a cherished project of the Czar. To enable Russia to mobilize her troops it was expedient to temporarily forbid the sale and consumption of the national drink—vodka.* In the result the troops were delivered at the frontier happy, alert, and in fighting trim. The significance of the reform measure is apparent when one peruses the following descrip-

* Originally “during mobilization only,” by a later decree the term of the prohibition was extended over the entire period of the war, then it was made perpetual !

tion of scenes during the mobilization for the Russo-Japanese War from the pen of Mary Isabel Brush :

“The soldiers then were carried, dead with intoxication, to the trains. When they came to stations, those who could walk tore wildly out of the coaches for the saloons, and if barkeepers refused to sell, they broke bottles over their heads. In terror the drilled troops in charge of recruits telegraphed ahead to stations to have two hundred or more soldiers on hand when the train went through. Even under such surveillance the men sometimes broke open the doors of the trains and tore up the railroad stations. Several commanders in one quarter were terrified at getting three hundred men without convoy, and all drunk.”

An article referring to the same period was printed recently in a paper called *The Voice of Moscow*, which stated :

“The reservists searched every man as he entered the barracks. All had vodka. The searchers always threw it into the street. In one peasant’s rags eleven bottles were found. His eyes ran with tears when he saw them broken. The heap of shattered glass grew. A dirty stream of vodka flowed through the courtyard. Many threw themselves on their knees and, in spite of the dirt, tried to drink from the pools. They were kicked back. Three truckloads of broken glass were transported.”

We may dismiss the past with the brief word that if the Czar’s recent ukase had preceded the Japanese

War, the result might have been so different that Austria would not have dared to break the peace in 1914. Let us consider the present results: Success in war, as in team athletics, rests upon the physical condition of the fighting unit and the mental acumen of the directing minds. The entirely unexpected, unhopcd-for prowess exhibited by the Russian in the present conflict may be attributed solely to the elimination of alcohol with its paralyzing influence upon the body, the mind, and the morals of the army. If similar reforms were instantly inaugurated in France and England, the result would be no longer in doubt, nor long deferred; if put in operation in comparatively temperate Germany, the cause of the Allies might be seriously and adversely affected.

The immediate effect of the reform in Russia is to add tremendously to the food resources of the empire; the supply of bread is more than doubled by the prohibition. Vodka is—or rather was—made of rye, the source of Russia's bread. The land reforms instituted by the Czar Alexander, the liberator of the serfs, were rendered nugatory by the universal drunkenness of the Russian peasantry. It was drunkenness unspeakable, and carried to the *n*th power. Any scheme of popular education would have been futile for a country in which the children of drunken parents were practically weaned on one of the strongest and most demoralizing of strong drinks. I quote again from Miss Brush:

“Parents gave it to their children as some mistaken women feed their babies on beer and coffee. In August, 1913, inquiries by the National Temperance Society in fifteen of the larger village

schools of the Empire discovered that out of thirteen hundred and fifty boys and six hundred girls in Saratoff, seventy-nine per cent. of the boys and forty-eight and a half per cent. of the girls had already tried vodka. Among children of five years in one village two and eighth-tenths per cent. had taken the drink. Among those of six years, four and sixty-three-hundredths per cent. had sampled it. Among those of seven years the percentage was eighteen and thirty-seven-hundredths per cent.; and of eight years, twenty-four per cent.

“Five hundred and fifty-one boys and girls drank on the initiative of their parents. Four hundred and eighty did so on the invitation of other relatives. Two hundred and nine children did so on their own account. Three hundred and forty of the youngsters of that one town were once quite drunk. In Oposhnia reports were even worse. There were two thousand one hundred and seventeen cases of drunkenness among the population under the age of fifteen years, and sixty-five per cent. of them were traceable to the influence of parents. In the first six months of 1914 intoxication among minors had increased twelve and fifty-three-hundredths per cent. The country was falling more and more under the influence of liquor.”

Altogether, apart from its effect upon this war, the political consequences to Russia are stupendous.

The consensus of the world's opinion has been, that within a generation, or at most two, the growing forces

of discontent in Russia would find expression in a revolution which in magnitude and horrors would transcend any in history. To-day nothing seems more remote. The abolition of alcoholism in Russia will bring individual and national prosperity and universal education to a happy, mirth-loving, liberty-seeking people, who may be trusted to avoid those evils which have made German civilization and progress a menace to the peace of the world—a menace, by the way, which a reformed Russia will speedily remove, if this war fails to render Germany harmless.

Political freedom, which may not be withheld from a deserving Russia, will bring the reigning family into normal relation with her vast population. Already the Czar is regarded as the saviour of his people; his memory will be a blessed heritage to his children; the story of Russia's regeneration will be written upon a palimpsest, upon which the original written characters, telling of wrongs, oppression, and cruelty, will appear but faintly between the lines of the happier story of to-day and to-morrow.

This great and sober nation will be a dominant factor for peace in the world of this and future generations.

A word as to the accomplishment of this work.

The manufacture of liquor by private interests has always resulted in the creation within the State of powerful interests which usually have been successful in opposing any remedial legislation which might be adverse to its liquor interests. France, England, and the United States are familiar instances.

Consciously or not, Russia took the first step in the direction of national prohibition when the vodka was

made a State monopoly. This was done at the instance of the German-Russian, Count Witte, the then Minister of Finance, some six years ago. Since then it has been the principal source of State revenue.

Count Witte, probably because the intimate nature of his dealings with Potsdam were discovered, was dismissed from office a few years ago; nevertheless, the reasons for his political fall made friends for him in a Court with a German Czarina and German Arch-Duchesses. It is said that it did not meet Count Witte's approval that a Government which had dismissed him from office should continue to profit from a financial scheme which he had originated, and which seemed destined to supply the sinews of a war against his beloved Fatherland; so, through the Czarina and her religious adviser, the priest Vespucian, he induced the Czar to put in operation his long-cherished plan for Russia-wide prohibition. This, thought Witte, would spell bankruptcy for Russia, and inure to the benefit of Germany. If the story be true—and circumstances seem to show that it is—here we have, in the sharp mode of its accomplishment, a striking instance of German cleverness, and in its result a characteristic instance of German folly—a wonderful command of methods, with a total incapacity to estimate results.

The money the peasant would have spent for vodka has been deposited direct in the State savings institutions. For all immediate purposes it is the unqualified property of the State, and Russia feels less financial strain to-day than any nation engaged in this great struggle. A year or so ago the author wrote :

“The argument that a policy conducive to drunkenness, crime, and disease, is necessary for

the financial prosperity of the State has been advanced, sometimes successfully, in opposition to State and municipal prohibition. Where the argument has not been successful, its unsoundness has been subsequently established by the inexorable logic of events. In the last analysis the cost of government falls upon the individual member of society. Any policy that will inure to the benefit of the citizen will increase the revenue-raising capacity of the State."

CHAPTER XIV

GERMANY'S AMBITIONS AS EXPRESSED BY VON BERNHARDI

THIS volume would be incomplete without some reference to the views expressed by General Von Bernhardi,* and echoed upon a rather more subdued note by conservative non-military writers, who furnish an abundance of cumulative evidence to the effect that the more blatant teachings of Bernhardi give a fairly accurate expression of German policy and the manner by which its ends are to be achieved.

Bernhardi's knowledge of affairs is by no means confined to Germany; he has been a careful student of contemporary history, and realizes that his views will not find support except among the supporters of dynastic rule. He is fully aware of the fact that the trend of public opinion throughout the world during the last century has been in favour of the right of small nations to exist under autonomous government, even though their continuance conflict with the ambitions of a neighbouring and larger State. His book, therefore, is written with a full knowledge that any expansion by Germany in violation of the right of smaller States to conduct their own affairs in their

* "Germany and the Next War."

own way would find but small support in the Congress of Nations. Any step in that direction would free Italy, to all intents and purposes a Republic, from the obligations of the Triple Alliance, while the support of Russia could only be had if the Czar were to tear up his treaty with France, the territories of which would be bound to suffer, perhaps sooner rather than later, from any territorial aggrandizement of Germany.

General Bernhardi knew, therefore, that Germany would have to face a numerical preponderance upon land, and, in all probability, a superiority of sea-power.

He states that Germany's population is increasing at the rate of 1,000,000 per year. The pressure thus created may only be relieved by emigration. That these emigrants should become parts, even though they be the controlling parts, of autonomous governments does not meet his approval. To satisfy his ambitions, and, presumably, the ambitions of his master and friend, the Kaiser, the emigrants must not be thus allowed to escape direct imperial taxation or the obligations of military service so essential if Bernhardi's expressed hope of ultimate world-domination is ever to become an accomplished fact. He says:

"We need to enlarge our colonial possessions, so as to afford a home and work for our surplus population, unless we wish to run the risk of seeing again the strength and productive power of our rivals increased by German emigration, as in former days.

"Partitioned as the surface of the globe is among nations at the present time, such territorial acquisitions we can only realize at the cost of

other States or in conjunction with them; and such results are possible only if we succeed in securing our power in the centre of Europe better than hitherto. With every move of our foreign policy to-day we have to face a European war against superior enemies.

"This sort of thing is becoming intolerable. The freedom of action of our people is thereby hampered to an extraordinary degree. Such a state of affairs is highly dangerous, not only for the peace of Europe—which, after all, is only a secondary matter for us—but, above all, is most dangerous to ourselves. It is we whose economical, national, and political development is being obstructed and injured; it is we whose position in the world is being threatened after we have purchased it so dearly with the blood of our best.

"We must, therefore, strive to find out by all means who is for or who is against us. On this depends not only the possibility of carrying into execution the political aims befitting the greatness and the wants of our country, but also the very existence of our people as a civilized nation.

". . . It is impossible to change the partition of the earth as it now exists in our favour by diplomatic artifices. If we wish to gain the position in the world that is due to us, we must rely on our sword, renounce all weakly visions of peace, and eye the dangers surrounding us with resolute and unflinching courage."

Now, the reader is asked to take a pencil and strike out the words "or in conjunction with them," which

occur in the fourth line of the second paragraph of the above quotation—their presence is only confusing. All that matters either to Germany or to us is that the present possession, presumably valid, by some other power of territory desired by Germany must be disturbed, not as a punitive consequence of any war, but as a causative consequence. It is the gospel of Treitschke; the matter of the individual prosperity of the German emigrant in a free country is unimportant; his political emancipation is not only important but calamitous, as being destructive of the “economical, national, and political development” of the German State. It is necessary, Bernhardi says, to ascertain who will oppose this German scheme of world conquest. The answer was obvious enough to Bernhardi, and we may safely assume that he knew that every nation in the world is opposed to it except Germany and Austria, though the expression of this opposition may be greatly hampered or even defeated by the presence among other nations of large, cohesive, well-organized, non-assimilable bodies of Germans who have carried with them to the land of their adoption the German flag, even though it has been discreet hitherto to have kept it furled. Therefore, he says :

“It is possible that in case of war we will have to face all these enemies single-handed. At least, we must be prepared for this. The Triple Alliance is purely defensive. Neither Austria nor Italy is bound by treaty to support us in all cases of war or under all circumstances. In so far as their own advantage is not touched, they take no interest in Germany’s world politics; and it must at any rate

be left an open question whether their statesmen will always be far-sighted enough to make the lasting advantage of their States the pole of their policy even at the risk of war. We are thus, in all that is essential, dependent on our own strength, and must plainly see that on the power of our defensive forces alone depends, not only our future development, but our very existence as one of the great Powers of Europe."

The above quotation embodies the psychic cause of this war.

According to Bernhardi—and Bernhardi knew—Austria would have refused to participate in an aggressive war initiated by Germany. Yet Austria's assistance was indispensable in any policy of German aggression. This assistance could only be obtained by inciting Austria to a policy provocative of war, and then coming to Austria's assistance and making it appear that measures, the real and ultimate purpose of which was the acquisition of additional territory in Europe, were really measures of defence taken in the joint interest of Germany's ally and herself. Hence we have Austria's seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the instigation of Germany, a resultant war and the invasion and annexation of Belgium, although such action militated greatly against the success of both allies, and in the event of success could only be profitable to one of them—Germany. It would be very interesting to hear Austria's frank opinion of the Belgian invasion, six months after it had taken place.

Von Bernhardi says that he is opposed to arbitration. This statement was made unnecessary by his previous

statement, that the only question to be arbitrated would be the right of Germany to take territory from unoffending and unwilling Powers. The result of such arbitration would hardly be profitable to Germany. By the same process of reasoning, inasmuch as war is the only method by which Germany can despoil her neighbours, love of peace, if it exists in Germany, is a source of danger to the State, and must be eradicated. This is to be done by an application of Treitschke's teachings, that the law as delivered by Moses was applicable only to a simple pastoral people, and has no binding force upon a highly civilized State—the only highly civilized State—Germany. He does not say that this doctrine, which supersedes the Ten Commandments, is only to prevail until Germany has taken all she wished for, and then is to again come into full force and effect, but that may be fairly implied.

“It is true the world is dominated to-day by the idea of war being an antiquated means of policy, unworthy of a civilized nation. The dream of eternal peace has got a hold on vast sections of the community in the Old and particularly in the New World. Whereas formerly, in addition to Emanuel Kant, only enthusiasts and visionaries were the champions of universal brotherhood, the governments of great and powerful States have now seized this idea as well, and are cloaking themselves with the mantle of a superior humanity. The arbitration courts, which the contracting Powers engage to obey, are meant not only to lessen the dangers of war, but to remove them altogether. This is the publicly avowed object

of such politics. In reality, it is hardly caused by an ideal love of peace, but is evidently meant to serve quite different political purposes.

"It is obvious that, above all, all those States are interested in such treaties who wish to cover their rear, so as to be able to pursue the more undisturbed and ruthlessly their advantages on other parts of the world's stage; and from this argument at once follows that such treaties, where not confined to some distinctly limited spheres of right, are only a disguise to conceal other political aims, and are apt to promote just that war, perhaps, which they pretend it is their intention to prevent.

"We Germans, therefore, must not be deceived by such official reports to maintain the peace. Arbitration courts must evidently always consider the existing judicial and territorial rights. For a rising State, which has not yet attained the position due to it, which is in urgent need of colonial expansion, and can only accomplish it chiefly at the cost of others, these treaties therefore augur ill at once, as being apt to prevent a rearrangement of power. In the face of this widespread peace propaganda, and in opposition to it, we must firmly keep in view the fact that no arbitration court in the world can remove and settle any really great tension that exists and is due to deep-seated, national, economical, and political antagonism. . . ."

Bernhardi's book does something more than preach the gospel of theft and pillage. From his standpoint,

and from the standpoint of his teacher, Treitschke, any act committed by a State in the furtherance of its own interests is not only allowed, but enjoined, by the moral law. It is well that other States should faithfully keep treaties entered into with Germany; in fact, honour obliges them to do so. If two States enter into an alliance, and the keeping of such a treaty is injurious to Germany's interests, honour requires that such a treaty should be broken. As long as other nations have the absurd idea that they must discharge their treaty obligations, it is advisable for Germany to make as many treaties as possible, as she may be benefited, and cannot be hampered by them. After all, it can hardly be urged against Germany now that her course in entering into a treaty under such conditions is in any way dishonourable. If by words spoken and acts committed she has told the world over and over again that she is above all treaty obligations, other nations who enter into a treaty relation with her can hardly be heard to say that they were deceived.

It is characteristic of the German mind that it is quite unable to realize that a policy which involves the disregard of solemn pledges and the rights of others, in order to be successful, must be kept secret until its purposes shall have been accomplished.

CHAPTER XV

CAUSES OF THE WAR OF 1914

"God with us" on the soldiers' belts the Belgian women read
("The soldiers plotted a crown of thorns and put it on His head"),
And for each ravished woman and Belgian child who died,
Again on earth—by Christian hands—our Christ was crucified.
The mother's voice too weak, perchance, or Heaven's dome too
high,

Unanswered Belgian Hagers still see their Ishmaels die !
Just for a strip of North Sea coast and a league of Calais sands,
Where the snake may stretch and coil again to strike at other
lands !

That is the truth, my brother, but this is the strangest thing :
The children whom He loved must die, yet God still saves that
King !

HOWARD PITCHER OKIE.

INTERNATIONAL law is written in treaties and "conventions." They embody provisions which in their multiplicity, in the Old World at least, provide a rule of conduct for almost every condition arising in inter-State relations. Among the most important of these sources of the organic law of Europe is that known as the Treaty of Berlin. That treaty was promulgated in 1878, at the close of the Austro-Turkish War. The provisions directly related to this war of 1914 were :

1. The creation of a vassal State within the territorial limits now known as Bulgaria, with the right to the inhabitants to "freely elect" their own "Prince."

The suzerain Power was Turkey, who was empowered to collect a yearly tribute and an annual contribution to the Ottoman national debt. Neither of these obligations were ever met in any degree.

2. The two Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were taken from Turkish control and put in the custody of Austria, with a right in the Dual Monarchy of "military occupancy and administration."

The latter clause of the treaty turned over to Austrian stewardship the domestic affairs of nearly two million people of Servian stock, for the major part adherents of the Orthodox Greek Church. The State religion of Austria is Roman Catholic.

Contemporaneously with the Berlin Treaty, Austria executed and delivered to Turkey a secret protocol, wherein she declared that her occupation of the two surrendered provinces would be transient, and that sooner or later full Turkish sovereignty would be restored. The Berlin Treaty made no change in the status of the individual citizen of the two provinces, and conferred none of the rights or obligations of personal sovereignty upon the Austrian Emperor, and the degree of that monarch's suzerainty was jealously watched by Russia, acting as the chief protector of the adherents of the State Church of Russia.

In spite of the fact that Austria's administration of Bosnian affairs was immeasurably better than that which had been inflicted upon the inhabitants by Turkey, the population have never acquiesced in the Austrian domination. Their political hopes looked to a complete political and social amalgamation of all the Balkan Serbs—those of Southern Austria (where, previous to the last Balkan War, there were more Serbs

than in Servia), Montenegro, Roumelia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Servia proper. The Servian ambition has been to erect from these peoples in the south-east of Europe a mighty Slavonic Empire under the benevolent tutelage and protection of Russia. This project was made rather more difficult of realization by the transfer of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the cruel but uncertain grasp of Turkey to the firmer clutch of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with its implacable opposition to the construction of another empire which would overshadow its northern neighbour in importance and power.

Austria's opposition to a scheme of a Slav Empire was expressed in several ways. Within her own dominion she relentlessly pursued the political plotters working for Austrian dismemberment. When opportunity seemed present she acquired absolute sovereignty over additional Slav territory, and by the well-known methods of diplomacy sought to keep the petty Balkan States divided, and one or more of them in friendly relationship with herself. It is apparent that Turkey was in this behalf an important ally of Austria, and this will account for the extraordinary interest in the material welfare of old Turkey shown by Germany, who very recently has openly declared that the Teutonic civilization of Western Europe is menaced by the growing strength of the Slav States of Southern Europe, due to the organization and extraneous alliances of the Slavonic peoples.

The term "Slav" etymologically means a member of an ethnological division. In its popular use it means an adherent of the Greek or "Orthodox" Church.

Russia may justly be called the protector of the orthodox, but to give her the title of protector of the

Slavs is only partly true. The Poles are Slavs, and they exceed in number the entire population of the Balkan Peninsula, yet Russia has consistently oppressed them. The Bohemians are also Slavs, but do not interest Russia, and she would not interfere in their behalf should Austria treat them harshly or unjustly. The bond between Russia and Servia is religious rather than racial. For Catholic or Protestant Slavs Russia cares nothing.

The influence of rigid, formal, and non-ethical religions is a far greater political force than is generally believed. Of such religions the Greek Church is an extreme type, teaching that all beyond its pale are anathema. That Church strengthens the bond of affection between its communicants by the simple process of narrowing, and thus intensifying it. How strong this tie is may hardly be realized by one who has been taught the broader humanity, which naturally develops through the emancipation from rigid formalism in worship. The tie of brotherhood between adherents of the Greek Church is intensely strong, because intensely narrow and concentrated. It has not been weakened by diffusion.

For many years this struggle between Teuton and Slav has persisted. It has been marked by plot and counter-plot, by assassination (the Serb's natural weapon), and by irritating, but not always effectual, reprisals by Austria.

In 1908 the time seemed opportune for Austria to strike another blow to the pan-Slav project. In flagrant disregard of her treaty obligations she proclaimed her absolute sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the month of October of that year Europe hung upon the brink of war. A cry for help went up from the Balkans. England officially characterized Austria's

action as an outrage upon the law of nations and the peace of the world. Montenegro issued a proclamation of national sorrow. But Austria had counted upon two factors working for the toleration of her action, and she created a third. Turkey was in the throes of revolution, and Russia was prostrate after her war with Japan. Austria incited Prince Ferdinand to disregard the treaty by which Bulgaria had been created a State, and to proclaim himself "Czar," free and independent of Turkey. His new status was instantly recognized by Austria, and at this price unanimity of action by the Balkan States was avoided. While the windows of the Austrian Embassy were being broken in Belgrade by an angry Servian mob clamouring for war, Ferdinand, the new "Emperor" in Sofia, was arranging for a fraternal visit to Franz Josef in Vienna. At the last moment Serbia gave way, so the "coup" by which Austria made her 7,000,000 Servian subjects into 9,000,000 was successful.

The imminent danger of an Austro-Servian outbreak kept the world on tenterhooks of suspense throughout the long and dangerous period of the first Balkan War. Austria, which had reckoned on Turkey's victory over the Balkan League, witnessed, without intervening, the occupation by Servian troops of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, a strip of land ninety miles long by forty wide, lying between Serbia and Montenegro, and linking Turkey to Bosnia. The Sandjak had been evacuated by Austria on the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. It was not until Serbia began agitating for a port on the Adriatic that Austria-Hungary put her foot down, and her resolve to keep the Servians from the sea-coast brought about the creation of an independent Albania.

The violent incorporation of an additional hostile element within the Austrian Empire had not made for the security and peace of that State. More active than ever became those agitators who preached and worked for a great union of "orthodox" Slav people. The persistence and the importance of this agitation were more than realized by Germany. It became an obsession to her, and the Teutonic State, wholly missing the religious element in the "pan-Slav" movement, firmly believed that it had for its ultimate purpose the subjugation of the alien peoples of Europe, whereas in truth and in fact separation, political and social, was the mainspring of the pact binding the Balkan States together, and which had the warm approval of Russia.

Up to the present this projected union of States has been known as "Greater Serbia." If it ever materializes, it will be composed of three elements—Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—distinguishable from each other only by dialects and customs.

This proposed Slav nation will number 12,365,000, exclusive of possible accessions from Russia, Poland, and Germany. In Southern Germany there are half a million Serbs!

Servia found herself with immensely increased territory and immensely increased prestige as the outcome of the two Balkan Wars. But the knowledge that these results had been achieved in spite of Austria only increased the bitterness of feeling between the two countries.

At last the Slav conspirators dealt a blow to the succession of the House of Hapsburg. In a particularly brutal and characteristically Servian fashion, the Archduke Ferdinand, heir presumptive to the

Austrian throne, and his wife (remember Alexander and Draga) were brutally murdered on July 5, 1914. It is accepted generally that the crime was Servian in origin, and was part of a plot to establish a "Greater Serbia" through the partial dismemberment of Austria. It obviously decided Austria-Hungary to clear up finally the perpetual menace of this small but expanding Slav State growing up at her very gates.

The causes of the war have been stated truthfully and succinctly by the belligerents. There has been no conflict of testimony, though the deductions have varied with the interests of those making them. Austria was impelled to send her drastic ultimatum to Servia because of the protracted series of Servian outrages upon Austrian territory, culminating in the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand and his consort. This is Austria's official statement. Why should we dispute it?

When Servia refused—or, rather, hesitated in accepting—Austria's conditions, Austria declared war upon Servia, which, without Russian intervention, meant the destruction of the little Slavonic kingdom. Russia claimed, no doubt truthfully, that she was compelled to intervene.

The terms of the Austro-German Alliance were known to all the world. Russia knew that her intervention in behalf of Servia would mean war with Germany. Germany's Army is always upon the point of mobilization, and she has abundant facilities for the rapid transit of troops and material; Russia says she knew this, and took an early start. Quite true! Germany says that Russia mobilized on her frontier. Well, she did! Germany says that, according to her

belief, this was an act of war. Who can dispute that? Furthermore, the belief was probably well founded.

France was absolutely bound by her treaty alliance with Russia. Germany knew this, and has always admitted it.

This brings us to August 3, when a state of war existed in which those four great Powers and one small Power were involved. Upon that day the German Foreign Secretary (Von Jagow) said that Germany would not respect the neutrality of Belgium. This was all he said as a "statement of fact." His opinions, though important, are not traversable. Incidentally, they have been shown by subsequent events to have been erroneous; in the light of past history, they did not seem to rest upon a solid basis; but they may have been honestly held. Von Jagow told the British Ambassador that the Germans

"had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations, and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible.

"It was a matter of life or death for them, as, if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition, entailing great loss of time.

"This loss of time would mean time gained by the Russians for the bringing up of their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was the inexhaustible supply of troops."

The first five months have shown that Von Jagow was wrong—not necessarily that he lied. Time has shown that the route via Belgium was the slowest, the most fraught with danger and possible disaster of any route which presented itself. Past history shows that a much less efficient Germany had marched without interruption through a France hardly less capable of resistance than was the France of August, 1914, and occupied Paris. So we have a right to say, after the event, that the German judgment was defective. Nor was it happier in accuracy, at least, in the belief that delay spelt swift and irretrievable disaster for Germany.

Just as we have had the truth from the chancelleries of the Continental combatants, we have had it from the British Foreign Office. Britain has perhaps put undue emphasis upon her treaty obligations with Belgium, but to say that she would not have gone to war in the (hypothetical) case of (say) Italy having been invaded in contravention of a treaty identical in terms with that by which France, Germany, and Belgium endeavoured to secure the neutrality of the last named, and, respectively, agreed to wage war against the violator or violators, would be ill-mannered, possibly unjust, and wholly unnecessary. Britain has said over and over again that any German encroachment westerly upon the North Sea littoral would imperil her national safety and compel her to make war. German publicists had stated time and again that Germany would sooner or later, but not at any remote period, take Antwerp, Ostend, and Calais—from the last-named port shells may be dropped in Dover Harbour.

When Von Jagow declared upon August 3 that the

German troops would take the Belgian route to France—a route that seemed undesirable in the light of the history of the Franco-German War of 1870, and in the light of the then expressed determination of the Belgian people to fight to the last to protect their country from invasion, whether such invaders were French or German, and which the march of events has shown was indeed a ghastly blunder *if no permanent occupation of Belgium were intended or desired by Germany*—Britain assumed, and with good reason, that the Belgian invasion was not a mere error of strategy, but a well-thought-out plan for the realization of her oft-expressed ambition to secure harbours in the North Sea at or near the entrance to the English Channel; that is plainly stated by the British to be one of the causes that impelled her to go to war. Why not accept it as truthful, as we accept the equally frank statements of Russia, Austria, France, and Germany? Surely the reason last given was sufficient to explain her declaration of war; why should we seek any other?

Yet someone, fool or liar, has stated, and some hundreds of thousands of parrots have repeated, that commercial and industrial jealousy caused the war between Germany and Britain.

Commercial or industrial jealousy never has existed between two nations, and never can exist, until two or more nations engage in commerce or manufacture.

Theoretically, an individual British or German manufacturer might be jealous of a foreign competitor. He never is, or very rarely is, in actual practice. His jealousy is for his neighbour, who competes not only for his markets, but for his labour. But, before dis-

cussing that feature, let us take the concrete charge that Britain was jealous of Germany's industrial progress.

In 1905 there was a General Election in Great Britain; a principal issue was Tariff Reform. The literature distributed by the Conservative party showed that the hats worn by the British people were made principally in Germany, and not by the two score hat manufacturers in England and Scotland.

The Conservative party did not stop with German hats. American boots were worn in England, and there had been unemployment among English boot-makers. It was shown that nearly every article used in the British household or worn on the British body was, as to a large numerical proportion of the total of each article, made abroad.

The Conservative party, who had thus educated Britain, was beaten at the polls by a larger majority than was ever recorded at a normal (non-war-time) election.

Forty million people wore German hats because they preferred them, at the price sold, to English hats. This, we are now told, filled them, the wearers, the British people, with a fierce, ungovernable jealous rage against the German nation and the German manufacturer who had supplied them with an article they desired at a price they approved. This bitter hatred was vented—how? Not by a refusal to purchase the hats, or by an enactment of a tariff which would bar or render more difficult the entrance of German hats into Britain, but by this war!—a war which can only affect the German hat manufacturer disastrously in so far as it reduces the purchasing capacity of his customers, German and British, by impoverishing them.

We are asked seriously to believe that the English

people believed that if the German fleet were destroyed, Alsace-Lorraine returned to the French, the Germans driven out of Belgium, then the wicked German hat-makers would cease competing with the two score British hat manufacturers, to the great joy of the British people who had previously gladly bought German hats.

Yet it is alleged that commercial jealousy caused Britain to make war on Germany. As if Germany's position as a manufacturer would be adversely affected if she were compelled, as a vassal nation, to build factories instead of cannon, merchant vessels instead of battleships.

Could Britain have hoped to inflict a defeat on Germany more complete than the one France suffered forty-five years ago? Have France's industries advanced or been retarded since her war with Prussia?

But let us go back a few paragraphs, to the less obvious contention that locality, not nationality, is the cause of mutual fears and jealousies among manufacturers.

The British manufacturer is a Free Trader first, last, and all the time. Birmingham alone among the manufacturing centres returned one Protectionist member to the Parliament of 1906—Joseph Chamberlain, Birmingham's favourite son, former Mayor, and an object of personal pride and affection upon the part of everyone in Birmingham. So "our Joe" Chamberlain was saved from the wreck. Arthur J. Balfour (on the same ticket with Chamberlain), statesman, philosopher, patriot, man of letters, was beaten hollow by an unknown youth in the great manufacturing town of Manchester.

This attitude of a class, who in America depend

largely upon a protective tariff, was puzzling to the author then, as it must be even now to most Americans. The explanation, however, is simple.

A friend of the author happened to be in England in 1905-06, and during the election referred to "stumped the country" for the Conservatives. The Central Office at St. Stephen's, Westminster, sent him to Northampton, the seat of the boot and shoe industry. His candidate, the Protectionist, was a popular young member of the country gentry with an historic name. His rival, the Free Trader, was the largest shoe manufacturer in Northampton; he has hundreds of boot shops throughout the kingdom.

It appeared to my friend that the jockeys had the wrong mounts. The manufacturer certainly had no business "in this gallery." He explained his attitude, rather pathetically, by saying that he knew his business would be benefited by a protective tariff which would check the enormous importation of American-made boots; "but," he said, "I will not consent to be benefited at the expense of the poorer people of England, who now receive the benefit of a world-wide competition in our markets." Without actually impugning his truthfulness, here it seemed was an undue emphasis upon a philanthropic motive.

As the audience the orator had to address was to be made up, as to a considerable part at least, of working people, his task would have been rather difficult, had he not learned, an hour or so before the hour fixed for the meeting, that the American Shoe Company upon first learning of the Conservative platform, and in the belief that it had a good chance of becoming the fiscal policy of Britain, had, in anticipa-

tion of such success, purchased a factory site adjoining the candidate's own, and, in the case of Liberal defeat, instead of abandoning the English market, would compete in the English market under conditions far more unfavourable to the local manufacturer, who would no longer have the "pull in the weights" afforded by a handicap of 3,000 miles of ocean transport-cum-two extra handlings of freight which the American company had endured, and profited under, while manufacturing only in Massachusetts.

The new-comers would carry on business with a better knowledge of local requirements; they would bring in improved machinery, and with their extravagant ideas as to wages, etc., might tempt some of the best—only the best—employés away from Manfield. So the Liberal candidate's solicitude was uncalled for; more work and more boots for Northampton would have resulted if a tariff had been put on the foreign manufactured article.

Germany and England reflected each other's prosperity or stagnation. They were customers of each other. Razors and scissors went through one course of manufacture in each country before being marketed as "made in Germany" or of "British manufacture." Even a high tariff upon German goods, let alone the destruction of the German manufacturer and his plant—and nothing less drastic would have checked this competition—would have hampered or destroyed many British industries.

The mercantile marine competition is upon a slightly different basis; German merchant vessels are now out of commission—but only during the war. Even this temporary suspension of a part of the ocean traffic

facilities bears hardly upon Britain without any commensurate profit to the British shipowner. The growth of the German ocean-carrying trade never did, or could, create "a hatred in the British people against Germany," or even against the competing lines. When the Woerman family put their steamers in the West African trade, the Liverpool house of Elder, Dempster and Co., who hitherto had enjoyed almost a monopoly for many years, were annoyed; but not because the competing line was German-owned, nor were they more vexed than were the Pacific Steam Navigation Company or the R.M.S.P. when one or other first embarked as a competitor in the South American trade.

It is no doubt true that had a cumulative reason for Britain entering the war been needed, it might have been supplied by the naval rivalry of the two countries.

In 1912 Mr. Winston Churchill offered to enter into a truce, during which the struggle between the two countries for superiority of naval armament would be suspended.* This offer was rejected by Germany.

* Addressing the House of Commons upon the Naval Estimates, March 18, 1912, Mr. Churchill said: "It is clear that this principle could be varied to suit the circumstances. Let me make it clear, however, that any retardation or reduction in German construction, within certain limits, will be promptly followed here, as soon as it is apparent, by large and fully proportionate reduction. For instance, if Germany likes to drop out any one, or even two, of these dreadnoughts (battleships) from her annual quotas, and keep her money in her own pocket for the enjoyment of her own people and for the development of her own prosperity, we will at once, in the absence of any dangerous development elsewhere and not now foreseen, drop out our corresponding quota. All slowing down by Germany will be accompanied, naturally, on a larger scale by us."

The strain upon the two countries was, undoubtedly, severe. The steadily increasing burden fell upon all, and was not made the less wearisome by the slightest prospect of relief. Heavy land and income taxes were evolved in England, and the German Chancellor was compelled to make a direct levy, not only upon income, but upon the capital of each individual.

Naval and military rivalry may have been the real and underlying cause of the Anglo-German conflict, but, if so, it was a determining cause with Germany, not with Great Britain. With the latter, the proximate, or immediate, causes of the war were acts by Germany which threatened Great Britain's existence, and were violations of treaty obligations between the countries involved.

CHAPTER XVI

CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR OF 1914

SHOULD the Great War terminate with Germany in command of the seas, an immediate consequence will be a tardy realization, in the United States, of the fact that France and England have been fighting for the American republics as well as for themselves.

In the middle of February, 1915, the American Congress, in a burst of almost human intelligence, discovered that our eleven hundred forts are all open on the land side, and that only three of them are mounted with guns capable of being fired in any direction. With this start in the acquisition of knowledge, it is perhaps not too much to hope that those charged with the responsibilities of our national defences may grasp the fact that, while existing conditions prevail, our coast defences will not in a German-American war fire a single gun seaward except against an American vessel.

The first step taken by an untrammelled Germany, in the direction of her God-appointed destiny, will, in all likelihood, be a demand for participation in the control of the Panama Canal. Failing our slavish submission to such a request, she will take the Canal and the greater part of the Isthmus. Then, according to Mr.

William Jennings Bryan, "a million men will spring to arms," only to find that the arms are already in the hands of the Germans resident here, who, animated no doubt by a sincere love for their adopted country, will firmly insist upon the aforesaid arms remaining in their custody, and counsel their fellow-citizens the while to adopt a course of patient and "watchful waiting."

It seems plain that such counsel will be that of true wisdom, as, with Germany in command of the seas, our only method of regaining Panama would be by sending expeditionary forces through the neutral States of Mexico and Central America, a large part of which is trackless so far as longitudinal progress is concerned, to attack fortified positions held by the enemy. The political affairs of the countries our forces would have to traverse are apt to be controlled by men peculiarly susceptible to the crude methods of German diplomacy, which is based upon a firm belief in the venality of all save German officials. Napoleon's invasion of Russia would be highly practicable and successful compared to the conception and the result of such a relief measure.

We shall also have learned that our attitude of frozen neutrality, if it has not rendered France and England incapable of helping us, will certainly not have made them enthusiastic about coming to our assistance, although failure to do so would involve the loss of their West Indian possessions, if, indeed, they have not by that time been already taken over by Germany.

It is probably idle to speculate as to the fate of our seaports. Everything will depend upon the attitude of our German population. That attitude has, within the period this work has been in preparation for the press,*

* February, 1915.

undergone an apparent change. Those who have been calling upon the German-Americans to organize and prepare for any emergency that might threaten the Fatherland have made a *volte-face*, and now proclaim, almost too loudly, that America is first in their affections. One explanation of this sudden conversion may be that their pro-German work is finished for the present. The Germans *have organized*; and it is a platitude that the would-be passenger stops running when he has caught the bus.

In the event of German success, absolute or comparative, or of a "draw" between the Allies and the Teutons, and failing the cementing of a firm defensive and offensive alliance between America, England, and France, the Munroe doctrine will become an obsolete curiosity of a political period of the past.

The Brazilian state of San Paulo, with her 400,000 German colonists,* will become a German dependency. Commercial development of the neighbouring republics—Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, and Northern Brazil—will be retarded by the constant fear of aggressive wars, a fear from which they are now, at this moment, happily free, because a republican government simply cannot at this stage of civilization impose her rule upon an unwilling people. It is absolutely certain that the spoliations of Chile in regard to the Bolivian sea-coast, and of the United States in regard to Mexican territory, will never again be perpetrated by any country having a republican government. Paraguay nestles in security touching such powerful neighbours as Brazil and Argentina, without fear of external danger. Her security rests, not upon any international "balance of

* Monograph of Pan-American Commission, "Brazil."

power," but upon the collective conscience of the inhabitants of the neighbouring States. She might, if she wished, amalgamate with either without offending any of her other neighbours; but her inclusion could only be attained by showing, to the country with whom she wished to merge her individuality as a State, that such a change was the earnest desire of the entire population. The citizens of republics are too earnestly occupied with the struggle for prosperity and happiness against natural forces to accept any conditions which might tend to distract them from, or handicap them in, their laudable and legitimate purposes.

Other likely consequences of German success are that Austria will be incorporated with the German Empire; England, as the political centre of the British dominions, will disappear; the bond of British unity will be severed; petty English-speaking States, uncertain as to existence, will remain in the places of Australia and Canada; German militarism will overrun Europe.

Compared to the frightful consequences to human civilization, human morals, free government, and ethical and material progress flowing from Germany's successful emergence from this war, the misfortunes to that country attendant upon her defeat—the most crushing defeat—are grotesquely disproportionate. If the Austro-German combination is beaten by the Allies, the genius of the German people will not be repressed. The individual will not share in the misfortune of a government which is not his. The policy of England, which has been to offer equal opportunities to every white man, irrespective of political allegiance, within any portion of her vast Empire, will not nor cannot

be changed. That policy is a fundamental part of the British Constitution. The individual German prospector can still demand and receive without question his "free miner's right" in New South Wales, Canada, or the Gold Coast. The manufacturer of toy soldiers in Bavaria will still be able to market his wares abroad or to establish a factory under the British flag, and compete on even terms abroad with the native for local markets and for local labour. No matter to what cause is due this policy of the "open door" to all Caucasian races, it has been profitable to England and to civilization. It has made for the development of natural resources. No other colonizing Power has emulated England in this respect, and no other Power has been a successful colonizer. The American, with abundant employment for capital and energy in his own country, does not realize that the broad avenues which invite him to the wheat-fields of Canada have no counterpart in German or French colonies.* Even the German has a hard time in a protectorate of his own country, and wisely seeks a better market for his youth and energy under the English or American flag. An amusing instance of this policy of repression was afforded when diamonds were discovered in German South-West Africa. Such a development in an English colony would have meant, probably, wealth for the discoverer (in the adjacent English territory he could have staked out free fifty claims), and a "boom," with attendant prosperity, for the neighbourhood in which

* When the American insurance companies were expelled from Germany, after some millions of American money had been expended in the "spade work" of establishing them, it taught nothing except to the few men officially interested.

the discovery was made. What happened when this "good fortune" visited German territory? The diamonds were declared "imperial property," a score or so of persons, including the discoverer, were arrested, searched, and, in at least one case, a trial upon a criminal charge of misappropriation under an *ex post facto* law followed in Germany. Naturally enough, little has since been heard of the diamond-mines of German South-West Africa. The German is one of the best of colonists; he is a valuable acquisition to any country; but he is found in his highest value under an alien flag. He should not be condemned for administrative faults for which he often suffers, and for which he is not responsible. If Germany loses her colonies, he, with the rest of mankind, will be the gainer.

Germany is an inefficient colonizer. Mr. Francis Gribble, in his book entitled "Francis Joseph," published in 1913, said:

"The one permanent peril to European peace arises out of the hatred invariably felt for persons of German nationality by races subjected to their rule.

"The trouble with the German, whether north or south, is always this: that he regards himself as the Heaven-sent ruler of men, but can, as a matter of fact, only govern in a state of siege. He can win battles and organize a civil service, but he can neither assimilate or conciliate his subjects. The German Empire is sometimes compared (by Germans) to the Roman Empire, but the difference between the two is wide. The Romans, when they

conquered the world, made it contentedly Roman. The French similarly, when they took over Savoy, made it contentedly French. But no German dependency is ever contentedly German. Alsace is not; nor is Schleswig-Holstein nor Russian Poland. In all these places the German, in his jack-boots, strides about among a people who find his language barbarous, his 'culture' ridiculous, and himself an odious interloper."

If the Allies win, Belgium's autonomy and territory will be restored to her; France will regain the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, provided that the inhabitants desire, with a practical unanimity, to live under the tricolour.* It is much more likely that a

* German Alsace-Lorraine is made up of what were formerly two of the richest provinces in France, in area 5,501 square miles; it is in its present form slightly larger than the State of Connecticut, and is more thickly populated. Books of general reference assign vague periods during which these provinces were acquired by France. A brief sketch of the history may save the reader some rather tedious research. In 1552 Alsace and Lorraine had been German for a thousand years or more—since the days of Clovis. In that year occurred a revolt of the Protestant German States, headed by Maurice of Saxony, against the Emperor Charles V. Francis II. of France intervened in this quarrel to the extent of issuing a manifesto in which he described himself as "vindicator of the liberties of Germany, and avenger of captive Princes." In return for this moral (?) support, the rebel Princes signed a document at Chambord surrendering to the French King the towns of Metz, Toul, and Verdun—all in Lorraine; although in terms this transfer only conveyed to the monarch as "Vicar of the Holy Roman Empire," Verdun and Toul have ever since—until the War of 1914, at least—been in French occupancy, and Metz was only surrendered in the Franco-Prussian War. Alsace was not acquired by France until a century later (1648). The Peace of Westphalia of that year transferred

plebiscite will be taken, and in the result a new republic, modelled upon Switzerland, will be formed, and that racial animosities will be as successfully stifled as have those of the Italian, French, and German inhabitants of the little Alpine State.

Russia's ambition to possess a Mediterranean port may be gratified by the erection of Greater Armenia into an autonomous state under Russian suzerainty, with complete control vested in that power of the port Alessandra and its environments. The Armenians would welcome such an emancipation from their Turkish oppressors.

If the Allies prevail over the Teutons, England's attitude in the matter of Germany's future territorial limits will depend largely upon the disposition to be made of Germany's fleet; if her battleships are sold to other Powers, or dismantled, England will contend

"full sovereignty" of that province from Ferdinand III. of Austria to Louis XIV., reserving, however, the "full allegiance" of the inhabitants to the (Holy Roman) Emperor. Forty years later Louis declared that the transfer of the town of Lorraine in 1552 carried with it "all their dependencies," and that the restriction in the Peace of Westphalia meant nothing. Alsace and Lorraine were then completely subjugated, and the inhabitants, for the good of their souls, handed over to the Jesuits for reclamation from Protestantism. At this period Frederick William (the Great Elector) of Prussia was an ally of Louis, and by the terms of the alliance expressly precluded from questioning any acts of Louis. The Elector was made further complaisant by having the pension he then received from the French King raised from 100,000 to 400,000 thalers a year. An intense, an overweening love of money has always been a characteristic of the Hohenzollerns, an attribute which no doubt is largely responsible for that family's place in history, secured at a period when electoral votes and military services were purchasable by the possessor of great wealth.

strenuously for the retention by Germany of her Baltic and North Sea ports. In fact, even without naval disarmament, England will be very sensitive about the impairment of Germany's territorial limits upon the Continent.

The Austria-Hungary dual monarchy will cease to exist in its present form. Galicia will form part of the New Poland. Hungary may at last realize her national aspirations, and live in the future as a republic. Teutonic Austria will become one of the confederated German States. The major portion of Slavonic Austria, south of the River Drave and east of the fifteenth degree of longitude (this includes all of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia), will be apportioned, in the first instance at least, to Serbia and Montenegro. Trieste and the Italian-speaking districts of Istria and Dalmatia will fall to Italy's share. The inhabitants of the Trentino will also be allowed to follow their own wishes, which will lead them to the inclusion within a united Italy.

The Czar of Russia has pledged himself, in the event of German defeat, to reconstitute the kingdom of Poland. He promises to restore her ancient territorial integrity, and to grant her, under his sceptre, complete autonomy, religious freedom, and the use of her national tongue. The partakers of the spoils of Poland have regarded the repression of Polish aspirations as their common interest. Within the past few years the Czar has been desirous of granting a larger measure of local self-government to his Polish subjects, but refrained at the earnest, insistent request of Germany, who contended that such a course upon the part of Russia would incite the Prussian Poles to revolt. Russia, Germany, and Austria, notwithstanding the solemn undertakings

which they gave at the Congress of Vienna, have denied that the fate of the kingdom and of its people concerned any but themselves. In 1846, when they delivered up to Austria the last shred of independent Poland in the tiny republic of Krakau, they treated the remonstrances of England and France with arrogant disdain. The Polish question was theirs, and theirs only, and they consulted together and acted together upon it. Russia has now thrown this entire system to the winds. The Czar appeals not only to the Poles of Russia, but to the Poles of Prussia and of Austria-Hungary as well. He invites the Polish subjects of Austria and Germany to transfer their allegiance to him, and he promises them reunion with their brethren in Russia, and national autonomy under the Russian sceptre as their reward. He calls upon them to undo the work of Frederick the Great and Catherine, and to reconstitute their ancient kingdom in its integrity, with the Emperor of Russia as its King. The integrity of Poland, if it were fully realized, would mean the dismemberment of Prussia and the separation of Galicia from the Hapsburg lands. It would mean the annexation of the Prussian province of Posen, the thrusting back of the Prussian border to the mark of Brandenburg and to Pomerania. To Austria-Hungary it would mean the loss of all her territory beyond the Carpathians from Silesia to the Bukovina, and probably to the Roumanian frontier.

Whether the creation of a new Poland will be a blessing or a curse is problematical, though there is no doubt upon the subject in the minds of those whose knowledge of Polish history is derived solely from such valuable sources as "Thaddeus of Warsaw" and Mrs. Hemans' poetry.

Without seeking to extenuate Catherine of Russia, Frederick the Great and his successor, or even the reluctant Maria Theresa of Austria, it must be admitted that, when the inevitable happened, as it frequently does, Poland got about what she deserved. Her nobles were pusillanimous and corrupt, her elected Kings were, with one or two exceptions, incompetent, cruel, and evil-livers. They have been a liberty-loving people in the sense that they loved liberty so intensely that they did not wish anyone but Poles to enjoy it. Freedom shrieked when Kosciusko fell; since then millions of inoffensive Jews have been ruthlessly murdered in the course of Polish pogroms, and the glorious bird has never even "cheeped." The antisemitic persecutions have been more pronounced in Russian Poland than in Prussian Poland, simply because the Russians, who are of the same race as the Poles, but of a different religion, have had a larger share in the local government. In Prussian Poland the Christian Pole has not had the same facilities for murdering his Jewish fellow-bondsman and firing his house. The moments when he was not dodging the Prussian oppressor have been too few and precious to afford much opportunity for indulgence in a sport which would no doubt appeal to him as it does to his Russian co-religionist.

It is to be hoped that, if the Czar has an opportunity to redeem his promise to re-create Poland, he will do so by giving them a Constitution and reserving power to enforce it, which will confer equal rights upon all the inhabitants. It will be the less difficult as from the standpoint of the Greek Church the Roman Catholic is quite as much a heretic as the Jew.

If Germany triumph, Turkey becomes a German

State. If the Allies win, Turkey is just as surely doomed. In the latter case, Constantinople will probably be controlled by an international commission. In either event the individual non-office-holding Turk will be the gainer by the extinction of his Government, a Government from which so much good was anticipated, and from which nothing but evil has proceeded. In the words of Mr. Asquith, even the vices of the Young Turk lack the vigour and versatility of Abdul Hamid, the deposed and damned.

CHAPTER XVII

THE NATIONAL DEFENCES OF THE UNITED STATES

THE immense sale and popularity of Mr. Norman Angell's extremely clever book, "The Great Illusion," were no doubt in a large measure attributable to the fact that he proved with exactitude the truth of a belief already entertained by the majority of mankind—that war is ruinous to both victor and vanquished. A score of years earlier Bismarck had said, "Even a victorious war is an unmitigated misfortune."

Mr. Angell was wise enough to see the danger of his teachings, if the British peoples were to draw the natural inferences from the premises he established. He conscientiously warned them that, though it is manifestly against the interest of Germany to crush or even injure England, that country must still be prepared to meet a war which he deemed quite probable in the immediate future. The *caveat* was ignored, and August, 1914, found Great Britain hopelessly unready so far as her land forces were concerned. This fact, by the way, may help us to answer the question, "Who started the war?"

Governments, like persons, have the defects of their qualities, and as a simple act of justice we, of the United States, should remember that the policy pursued

by the representatives of the American people has been consonant with the will of the individual in private life. Let us remember this when, in a time of trouble, our public servants come up for judgment and sentence.

This policy finds us, in the year of grace 1915, quite naked to any attack by a first-class Power, even assuming, as every naval and military authority in America has, that we are an absolutely homogeneous and united people, which we are not.

We have—(1) Ample food supplies. (2) Good transport facilities. (3) A large population composed of a people of unequalled physique, and endowed with exactly that courage which all other nations possess and exhibit in time of stress.

We have not—(1) Adequate armament (this includes ammunition). (2) Adequate coast defences. (3) An army, either sufficient as at present constituted or capable of rapid expansion in view of the present-day conditions, which have brought Europe to our doorstep. (4) A navy sufficient either in ships, munitions of war, or men. (5) An air fleet.

Furthermore, we have allowed a large percentage of our population who would sympathize more or less actively with Germany, in the event of the United States having a war with that country, to arm themselves, and to learn every detail of our national defence. To take one instance: A large proportion of the clerical force of the draughting officers (naval architecture) in the United States Navy Department is composed of Germans.

Let us consider these deficiencies in detail.

Our lack of armament makes it of extreme interest to us to consider how we would be affected if we were

to acquiesce in the German demand (made in April, 1915) that we discontinue supplying munitions of war to England, Russia, and France.

Ultimately there is no distinction between a doctrine of ethics and one of expediency. Good morals and good policy are identical. But there may be an immediate or temporary difference.

Former President William Howard Taft has given his views upon the ethical side of this question. He has stated, wisely and well, that if it were settled international policy or law that neutral nations should not supply arms to belligerents, peace-loving nations would be compelled to engage to an enormous extent in the manufacture of armaments and ammunition, with a resultant waste of money, labour, and national energy, and he believes, as most of us do, that this increased armament would make the preservation of peace more difficult. This is his answer to the German charge that we are a nation of hypocrites, because we profess an abhorrence of war, and yet "prolong" it for profit. As this book goes to press, a German publicist has said:

"Were America to stop supplying shells to England and France, peace would soon come; we could overrun both countries in a short time, as we have overrun Belgium. England, however, will not escape with the humane treatment we have exhibited in Belgium."

No matter how attractive this picture of murdered men, women, and children among our British kindred may be to the Germans, the course suggested for us to follow is quite impossible. Suppose we did accede to

Germany's proposals, and thus were to establish a precedent to be followed by other neutrals, in the event of this war terminating in a *status quo ante bellum*, save the loss of Germany's colonies. What would be our position then, if Germany should wish to recoup herself at our expense, and to gratify the hatred for Americans now so loudly voiced in Berlin?

In November, 1914, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army made his annual report to the Secretary of War. It comprised these details:

	Munitions required as a Reserve in Anticipation of War.	Munitions on Hand or in Process of Manufacture.
Rifles	642,541	698,374
Rifle cartridges	646,000,000	241,000,000
Field guns (exclusive of giant guns)	2,834	852
Field-gun ammunition (rounds) ...	11,790,850	580,098

This indicates a shortage of 400,000,000 rifle cartridges, 11,000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 2,000 field guns.

The figures in the right-hand column convey the gravest menace. But 580,000 rounds of field-gun ammunition are in course of manufacture!

Consider that one item in the light of the testimony of Major-General Leonard Wood (then Chief of Staff), submitted to Congress upon the hearings in the Fortifications Bill, December 9, 1913. He said:

"In the Russo-Japanese War the Russians expended during the war, exclusive of the action around Port Arthur, 954,000 rounds.

"At Mukden in nine days they expended 250,000 rounds.

"One battery of 8 guns at Mukden fired 11,159 rounds, or 1,395 rounds per gun.

"At Liaoyang 8 Russian guns fired in three hours 2,500 rounds, or 312 per gun.

"During August 30 and 31 the 1st and 3rd Siberians, with 16 batteries of 8 guns each, fired 108,000 rounds, or 844 rounds per gun.

"At Schaho, in a four days' fight, the artillery of the 1st Infantry Division—48 guns—fired 602 rounds per gun.

"At this same battle in 45 minutes, 20 minutes of which were not occupied by firing, 42 guns fired 8,000 rounds, or 190 rounds per gun in 25 minutes of actual firing.

"The War Department believes, after extended study, that, in case of war with a first-class Power, an army of 500,000 men will be needed to give this country any chance of success against invasion, and that this force will be needed at once. To make it efficient it must be given its proper quota of field artillery. To do this, this artillery must be on hand, for it cannot be supplied after war is started. A municipality might as well talk about buying its fire-hose after the conflagration has started. A fire department without its proper equipment is worthless, irrespective of the number of men it has; and so would your armies, unless you provide in peace the material which will make them effective in war.

* * * * *

"I invite the attention of the Committee to the

fact that, to October 1, 1913, total appropriations have been made by your Committee and the Military Committee for only 245,098 rounds of ammunition for our modern field guns. All of this ammunition will not be manufactured until June 30, 1914.

“Of this ammunition for modern guns we have at present in this country—with troops, in depots, or under manufacture—186,508 rounds; and for the 2.95 mountain gun 15,106 rounds; a total of 201,614 rounds, and this is all we have.

“At Mukden in nine days the 1,204 Russian guns expended 250,000 rounds.

“The present daily output of the ordnance factories is, for three shifts running night and day, not above 1,600 rounds. It is at present manufacturing about 600 rounds of assorted sizes per day with one shift.”

In the event of Germany invading America in force, it might conduce to a speedy “peace” if we were to run short of ammunition in a week and be debarred from receiving further supplies, say, from Canada. Such a peace would be distasteful to us.

Our coast defences are inadequate. A battleship of the type of the *Queen Elizabeth*, or the latest German super-dreadnought, could lie off New York harbour in perfect safety, so far as the harbour forts were concerned, even assuming that they were not occupied by German reservists from New York, Jersey City, and Hoboken, and throw shells into the business section of our largest and wealthiest city. Here are extracts from the reports of the military authorities :

[*Extract from the Report of Brigadier-General E. M. Weaver, Chief of Coast Artillery, United States Army, 1914.*]

"From the foregoing it will be seen that the present authorized strength of the regular Coast Artillery Corps is short 564 officers and 10,988 enlisted men of the strength required to man our coast defences under the adopted policy outlined above.

"The defences outside the Continental United States are practically ready for their garrisons, and when these are provided there will remain for home gun defences 176 officers and 7,543 enlisted men, which is about one-third of one relief.

"In order to provide for our primary home defences—to wit, coast defences of Portland, Boston, Narragansett Bay, Long Island Sound, eastern New York, southern New York, Chesapeake Bay, Pensacola, San Francisco, and Puget Sound, there are required 662 officers and 16,251 enlisted men.

"It will thus be seen that there are now provided about one-fourth of the officers and one-half of the enlisted men necessary for this purpose. Unless provision is made in the near future for additional Coast Artillery personnel, it will be necessary to reduce the garrisons to mere caretaker detachments at some of the defences of lesser importance, including Portsmouth, Delaware, Charleston, Savannah, Key West, New Bedford, Potomac, Tampa, Columbia, Baltimore, Cape Fear, and Mobile" (p. 15).

[Extract from the Report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1914.]

“There is a serious deficiency, however, in ammunition for these coast defences, the supply which the department has been attempting to maintain being on the basis of approximately an hour’s full and active operation of the guns in the United States proper, and a two hours’ full and active operation of the guns in overseas fortifications. According to the Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, the amount of ammunition now available and provided for by appropriations is equal to about 73 per cent. of this requirement for the guns and 50 per cent. for the mortars. . . . The deficiencies in the matter of fire control and searchlights are of the most serious character. As a matter of fact, proper fire control and searchlight installation is only maintained in a limited number of first-class defence areas, the remainder of the fire-control systems and searchlight equipment being deficient or improvised” (p. 6).

Extract from the Report of the United States National Coast Defence Board, February 1, 1906.

“Commercially and strategically, Chesapeake Bay is to-day, as it always has been, of the very first importance. With the entrance, as it is now, unfortified, a hostile fleet, should it gain control of the sea, can establish, without coming under the fire of a single gun, a base on its shores, pass in and out at pleasure, have access to large quantities

of valuable supplies of all kinds, and paralyze the great trunk railway lines crossing the head of the bay."

Chesapeake Bay is the entrance to the Potomac River, upon the bank of which is the city of Washington. In the war of 1812-1814 Americans expressed some regret that the Chesapeake could not then be fortified. Its fortification is practicable in 1915, but it is defenceless!

Extract from the Evidence of Rear-Admiral Frank F. Fletcher before Congress, December 9, 1914.

"REPRESENTATIVE WITHERSPOON: How many unharboured places are there on the coast where they (the enemy) could land?

"ADMIRAL FLETCHER: In smooth water and fine weather they could land almost any place, as we did from the open sea at Santiago" (p. 536, official printed hearings of House Committee on Naval Affairs).

There is overwhelming evidence of the inadequacy of our Army. Below are some excerpts from the Report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, submitted to the Secretary of War November 15, 1914:

"According to the latest returns, the actual strength of the Army, exclusive of the Philippine Scouts, is 4,572 officers and 88,444 enlisted men. The authorized strength of the Army is 4,726 officers and 95,977 enlisted men. The Army is therefore 154 officers and 7,533 enlisted men below its authorized strength.

“Of the total present enlisted strength of the Army, 22.50 per cent., including recruits and recruiting parties, belongs to the non-combatant and non-effective class, and is not with the colours; 19.45 per cent. is in that branch whose special function is coast defence; and 58.05 per cent. belongs to the mobile forces (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry).

“Of the actual strength of the Army from the latest returns, 1,067 officers and 19,899 enlisted men (including recruits and men engaged in recruiting) belong to the staff, technical, and non-combatant branches of the Army.

“Seven hundred and forty-six officers and 17,201 enlisted men belong to the Coast Artillery, and 2,738 officers and 51,344 enlisted men belong to the mobile army (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry).

“MOBILE ARMY.

“The total strength of the field or mobile forces in our Army is therefore less than 52,000 enlisted men. If from this strength the non-combatants and non-effectives, belonging to the regimental, troop, battery, and company organizations, such as the non-commissioned staff, musicians, cooks, scouts, etc., which aggregate 5,376, are deducted, the actual fighting strength of the Army with the colours, and without deductions for officers and men sick, on furlough, detached service, etc., would be 2,738 officers and 45,968 enlisted men.

“There are in the line of the United States Regular Army (including Coast Artillery), not in-

cluding the two battalions of the Porto Rican Regiment, 65 regiments and 758 troop, battery, and company organizations. Under existing laws there belong to these organizations 322 regimental field officers and 2,358 company officers. Of these officers, according to the latest returns, 93 field and 675 company officers are at present absent from their commands on detached service, on leave, or sick. This important branch of the Army is therefore at the present time 28·656 per cent. short of the officers who are deemed necessary under existing laws for its instruction, training, and discipline. As the department draws mainly upon the units of the forces in the United States proper for officers for detached service, maintaining as far as possible the full complement of officers with the organizations on foreign service, the percentage of regimental and company officers absent from their organizations is far higher for those organizations in the United States than the above percentage would indicate.

“ The enlisted men of the mobile army are distributed as follows :

In the United States proper	30,481
In our foreign possessions	20,863

Distributed as follows :

In the Philippines	7,212
In the Hawaiian Islands	6,832
In the Panama Canal Zone	1,681
In China	690
In Alaska	431
In Vera Cruz	3,434
In Porto Rican Regiment	583

“Of the enlisted men of the mobile army in the United States, 18,954 are in the field in Texas and on the Mexican border, 1,665 are in the field in Colorado, 245 are temporarily in Montana, 300 are in Arkansas, and only 9,317 are at their home or permanent stations. It may be added that the department is under the necessity of despatching in the near future at least one additional regiment of Infantry to Panama, and that this action will still further reduce by at least 1,200 the number of troops of the mobile army remaining within our Continental limits.

“MATÉRIEL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE
MOBILE ARMY.

“A fairly adequate supply of ammunition and other matériel to maintain the mobile army in the field for a period of six months is now on hand and available.

“As to the Coast Artillery branch of the Army, the strength of that corps must necessarily depend on the number and character of the coast defences which it is required to man. Its strength has no relation to the strength of the mobile army other than that the strength of the latter must be adequate to protect the fortified positions from attack from the rear.

“Under the present approved policy of the War Department the Coast Artillery defences in our foreign possessions are to be manned entirely by organizations belonging to the regular service. The Coast Artillery defences in the United States proper are to be manned at the rate of 50 per cent. of the

gun and mortar defences by the Coast Artillery Corps of the Organized Militia.

“The strength of the Coast Artillery of the Regular Army, from latest returns, is 746 officers and 17,201 enlisted men. The estimate of the Chief of Coast Artillery shows that 1,312 officers and 30,309 enlisted men of the Regular Army, in addition to the 740 officers and 18,531 enlisted men of the Organized Militia required to man 50 per cent. of the gun and mortar defences in the United States, are necessary to man the seacoast defences now existing at home and in our foreign possessions. As the authorized strength of that corps of the Regular Army is 748 officers and 19,019 enlisted men, it is at present 2 officers and 1,818 enlisted men below its authorized strength, and 566 officers and 13,108 enlisted men below the necessities as estimated by the Chief of Coast Artillery, in addition to the deficiencies in the Coast Artillery Corps of the Organized Militia. The total deficiencies in the Coast Artillery Corps of the Regular Army and the Organized Militia are, therefore, 856 officers and 24,489 enlisted men.

“The companies of the Coast Artillery Corps are distributed as follows :

	Companies.		
On the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts of the United States proper	140
In Texas (equipped and acting as infantry)	5
In our foreign possessions	25
That is—			
In the Philippine Islands	11
In the Hawaiian Islands	8
In the Panama Canal Zone	6

“The aggregate enlisted strength of the Coast Artillery Corps required to man the coast defences in the United States is reported by the Chief of Coast Artillery to be 24,075; the actual number available is 14,633. The aggregate enlisted strength required to man the coast defences in foreign possessions now completed, or to be completed in the near future, as reported by the Chief of Coast Artillery, is 6,234; the actual number now in those possessions is 2,568. It therefore appears that there is a deficiency of 9,442 enlisted men for the home coast defences and 3,666 for those in our foreign possessions.

“Naval armament in the last few years has rapidly developed, particularly in respect to the calibre of the guns, their ranges, and the rapidity with which fire from these guns can be delivered. At the present time the tendency is to place on the higher type of battleships guns as large as 15 inches in calibre. These guns, whilst carrying a projectile of less weight than those used with our direct-fire type of seacoast guns, have, owing to the greater length of the guns and the higher powder pressures used, a very distinct advantage in range, their range exceeding that of our 14-inch guns from 2,000 to 3,000 yards. Whilst this advantage in range is to a degree offset by the instability of the naval platforms and the less accurate methods of obtaining ranges from ships than from land defences, there still appears to remain a distinct advantage in this respect, which, coupled with the number of these calibre guns now being carried on the stronger type of naval ships, makes it necessary to give careful

consideration to the question whether there should not be a change, not only in the length, calibre, and powder pressures of our heavier type of guns, but whether there should not be a change in the emplacements so as to give overhead protection to the crews operating the guns. In other words, it is my opinion that careful consideration should be given, at least in the establishment of new defence districts, to the question of the calibre, length, and range of the seacoast guns, as well as to the question whether the turret system for the protection of the gun and its crew should not be adopted in order to put the land defences somewhat nearer on a parity with the naval guns which are liable to attack them. As a fleet of eight battle-ships of the most modern type can throw against a single target 118 projectiles per minute, the danger that must arise from the possibility of fragments of these shells and the débris thrown up from their impact against the concrete parapets which protect the guns, to the crews as well as to the delicate and complicated machinery which operates the guns, would indicate that overhead protection against such fragments should be provided in order to insure the most effective operation of the coast armament.

“MATÉRIEL FOR THE COAST ARTILLERY DEFENCES.

“Matériel for the coast artillery defences as at present established and under construction is fairly adequate in the matter of guns, mortars, and mine matériel. There is a serious deficiency, however,

in ammunition for these defences, the supply which the department has been attempting to maintain being on the basis of approximately an hour's full and active operation of the guns in the United States proper, and a two hours' full and active operation of the guns in oversea fortifications. According to the report of the Chief of Coast Artillery, the amount of ammunition now available and provided for by appropriations is equal to about 73 per cent. of this requirement for the guns and 50 per cent. for the mortars. The amount of explosive necessary to load and operate the mines now provided at our various coast defences for one charge is complete. The deficiencies in the matter of fire control and searchlights are of the most serious character. As a matter of fact, proper fire control and searchlight installation is only maintained in a limited number of first-class defence areas, the remainder of the fire-control systems and searchlight equipment being deficient or improvised.

“According to the latest returns, the total reported strength of the ORGANIZED MILITIA is 8,323 officers and 119,087 enlisted men. Of this force, 855 officers and 5,026 enlisted men belong to the staff and non-combatant branches, 450 officers and 7,150 enlisted men belong to the Coast Artillery, and 7,018 officers and 106,911 enlisted men to the mobile forces (Engineers, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Infantry). Of this force there were present at the annual inspection 692 officers and 4,090 enlisted men of the staff corps, 439 officers and 5,989 enlisted men of the Coast Artillery, and

6,553 officers and 85,541 enlisted men of the mobile forces, a total absenteeism from inspection of 639 officers and 23,467 enlisted men. Reports as to the attendance at camps of instruction show that 568 officers and 3,744 enlisted men of the staff corps, 423 officers and 6,135 enlisted men of the Coast Artillery, and 5,904 officers and 77,353 enlisted men of the mobile forces attended these camps of instruction, showing a total absenteeism of 1,428 officers and 31,855 enlisted men from these camps.

“As regards practice with the rifle, there were 111,140 officers and men in organizations armed with the rifle. The total number who fired the rifle during the range-practice season 1913 (the last report available) was 66,974. The total number who fired the rifle during the range-practice season 1913, and qualified as second-class men or better, was 42,599 officers and men.

“From the above figures it will be seen that only 81.07 per cent. of the total reported strength of officers and men of the Organized Militia attended the annual inspections; that only 73.87 per cent. of officers and men attended the camps of instruction; that the number of men who had any practice with the rifle during the target season 1913 was 52.56 per cent.; and that the number who qualified as second-class men or better was 33.43 per cent.

“The requirements of the regulations are that units of the Organized Militia shall have at least twenty-four drills of one hour each per annum. Reports indicate that whilst in a majority of States these requirements were fully met as regards the

organizations, yet in a majority of organizations there were a number of enlisted men who failed to attend twenty-four times for drill and instruction during the calendar year 1913. The total number so failing to attend during the year 1913 was 37,874 men out of a total of 119,087.

"There is no indication of the number of practice marches held by the units of the Organized Militia during the year, and it is believed to be a safe conclusion that not a single unit at its maximum strength marched a distance of ten miles fully equipped and armed.

"The above figures, taken in conjunction with the fact that the number of companies, troops, batteries, etc., is 2,000, and that of this number 1,120 organizations are below the prescribed minimum strength, would indicate to a degree the dependence to be placed upon this force.

"As organized the Militia is deficient in the following units to make it a properly balanced and efficient field force :

Cavalry (number of troops)	54
Field Artillery (number of batteries) ...	79
Engineers (number of companies)	14
Ambulance companies	34
Field hospitals	12

"The deficiency in its Coast Artillery branch is 290 officers and 11,381 enlisted men.

"As to the matériel necessary to put this force into the field and maintain it there for a period of six months, there is a very decided deficiency in many important respects. For instance, there are

but 550 horses available for the use in drill and instruction of the Cavalry, which aggregates 4,940 officers and enlisted men. The deficiency in horses for the Field Artillery is even greater than that of the Cavalry. There are no animals for the signal or sanitary troops. As regards waggon transportation, the Militia as now organized is deficient 1,934 waggons. Should the Militia be assembled into divisions and separate brigades, the deficit would be 5,836 waggons. There are no draught animals available. These deficiencies in matériel are very important, inasmuch as they must be supplied before the Organized Militia forces can be made available for field operations.

“As regards Field Artillery matériel for the Organized Militia, should this force be called into service with its present number of batteries, the total amount of ammunition necessary therefore would be 1,300,000 rounds of 3-inch ammunition, based on an average of 5,000 rounds per gun, which is equivalent to the best standards of supply of this character of ammunition in foreign armies. To completely equip the proper number of batteries for the twelve Militia divisions, including the auxiliary divisions, there would be required, in addition to matériel now in the hands of the Organized Militia, 316 field guns and 1,322,384 rounds of ammunition.

“If it is deemed that the condition and strength of our military establishment (including the Organized Militia) as above set forth is satisfactory and adequate to our needs at home and in our foreign possessions under modern conditions and existing

circumstances, there appears to be no necessity for special action beyond maintaining that establishment at its present strength and in about its present condition. To make even this force effective, however, by proper training and instruction, a number of additional officers and non-commissioned officers of the Regular Army are urgently needed—first, in order that a full complement of these instructors may be kept with the units of the Regular Army; second, that we may have available an adequate corps of trained instructors for the Militia.

“In case, however, the strength and condition of that establishment as set forth is deemed inadequate and unsatisfactory, it is pertinent to make suggestions as to what should be done to correct this condition and provide a military establishment adequate to our needs and responsibilities. These suggestions, in my opinion, should be based upon study of conditions as they are in our country and in our foreign possessions, including home needs and the needs which might arise in our relations with other countries.

“In looking over the strength of our garrisons in foreign possessions, it becomes at once manifest that the garrisons we are maintaining there, or propose to maintain there under the scheme of distribution of our Army as it exists at present, are entirely inadequate to the needs of those possessions. That an effective defence against an enterprising enemy in the Philippines could be made with a deficiency of 33 per cent. of the manning details of the coast defences of Manila and Subig

Bay, and with a mobile force of a little over 7,000 American troops, supplemented by less than 6,000 Philippine Scouts, is manifestly impossible; that the great waterway of the Panama Canal cannot be protected against the operations of a first-class military Power by the present or proposed garrison we contemplate placing there without the power and ability to reinforce it rapidly by troops from the United States is equally manifest; that we can retain our valuable territory of Alaska in its isolated position against an enemy with any military power by placing there a garrison of less than 500 men verges on the ridiculous, unless we have ample forces at home to occupy that territory in the very earliest stages of an impending conflict. As regards the Hawaiian Islands, all military persons will recognize that the proposed garrison in this possession is far below what it should be to meet a serious attack unless, in this case again, we have an adequate force on the Pacific coast ready to despatch to the islands when trouble is impending. It must therefore be frankly admitted that the present garrisons of these outlying possessions are entirely inadequate for the purpose for which they have been sent there, and that without a material change in conditions at home we have no available resources from which to reinforce them, even should time be given to us to do so. As the Philippines are too distant from the United States to be reinforced when war is impending, it would seem necessary that the garrison of those islands should be at least a full manning detail for the Coast Artillery defences, and one complete division at

full war strength plus the necessary administrative staff. As to our other outlying possessions, it may be said that the garrisons proposed for those possessions, with the exception of Alaska, may be considered adequate only under the contingency that we have available in the United States sufficient thoroughly trained troops in excess of our home needs to warrant us in heavily reinforcing the peace garrisons.

“As to the necessities within the Continental limits of the United States, whilst our isolation by water from the other great Powers is an undoubted protection, that protection is limited by two main factors:

“1. The power of our fleet to protect the country from invasion over those seas.

“2. Our ability to assemble rapidly at the points of debarkation selected by an enemy an adequate force to delay, if not prevent, his effecting a lodgment on our shores.

“Whether or not our Navy is adequate for the purpose indicated—*i.e.*, to protect our country from overseas—is a question beyond the scope of this Report. That we cannot, with our present strength, rapidly assemble a sufficient force, fully equipped for field operations, to meet such an expedition as might be despatched against our shores is evident. The very fact that an enemy traversing the seas would have a wide choice of landing-points, or points of attack, at once evidences the difficulties attending the assembly of organizations of sufficient strength to meet him at the point he may select. It therefore appears to be necessary

that the general distribution of forces to meet such a situation would be on a very wide front if prompt opposition to a landing is to be effected.

“ Fortunately there is no apparent need for garrisons of any great strength on our northern frontier. This, however, is not true as regards our southern frontier, where for the greater part of the last three years we have been compelled gradually to increase the number of troops, until at the present time over two-thirds of the mobile forces of our Army in the United States are concentrated.

“ Careful consideration of our needs would indicate the advisability and necessity for having at all times available at home and, in addition to the necessities in our foreign possessions, in the first line of our military establishment a mobile force of at least 500,000 thoroughly trained and thoroughly equipped fighting men, with adequate supplies for the operation of this force for a period of at least six months. This is a conclusion that seems to have been reached by all those who have given careful consideration to this question. It is also agreed that we should have, as a second line, a thoroughly equipped and trained force of Organized Militia of not less than 300,000 men, properly proportioned as to its staff and several arms, with stores and supplies necessary for its operation in the field for a like period. The smaller units of the standing Army and the corresponding units of the Organized Militia must manifestly be organized into the higher units of brigades and divisions and be susceptible of assembly for drill and field exercises, for without such organization and power of

assembly the troops themselves, not to speak of the higher commanders, would be without that experience which is essential to effective operation in war.

“As stated elsewhere in this Report, the strength of the Coast Artillery Corps bears no relation to the strength of these mobile forces; that corps is charged with the manning and the operation of the seacoast defences. The mobile army, on the other hand, must not only be prepared to meet the forces of the enemy after they have effected a lodgment on our coast, but must be prepared, at least in the initial stages of war, to guard all the fortified positions on our coasts from attack from the rear by landing parties from naval vessels and such transports as they may be able to convoy. While the strength of the Coast Artillery Corps therefore depends upon the number of fortified positions it has to operate, the strength of the mobile forces will depend upon the number of fortified positions it must defend from attack from the rear or turning-point, plus the necessities which may arise to meet and oppose the landing of an expeditionary force in a region beyond the range of our seacoast guns.

“In any scheme to create such a force of mobile troops, as is above contemplated, we cannot do better than to follow the example of the master minds in military organization for national defence. The policies developed in this direction all include, amongst others, the primary plan of using the standing Army as a school for the training of men who, on graduation from that school, pass into the reserve, and constitute the real national military

strength. Experience has shown that from two to three years of active service in the standing Army is the lowest possible limit of time within which the average man can be converted into a disciplined, trained, and effective soldier. After passing through the school and gaining experience, the men under this plan are separated from the active Army and go into the reserve for periods varying from five to a greater number of years, being held at all times, whilst allowed during peace to pursue with the utmost freedom such civil occupations as they may select, under obligation to respond to a call to the colours in case of national need. This system is economical in the highest degree, as the officers and men receive pay only during their active service and on being called to the colours, the period spent in the reserves involving no expense in the way of emoluments.

“In arriving at a conclusion as to what the size of the regular mobile Army should be, in order that the country may eventually and within a reasonable time have a military establishment adequate to its needs, it is necessary to decide what the size of the Regular, or standing, Army should be in order to provide the 500,000 men believed to be necessary with the colours and in the reserves. Assuming the adoption of a short term of enlistment—say three years—for the passage of the men thoroughly trained in the school of the Regular, or standing, Army into the reserve, and that men so trained should not be held in the first reserve for a longer period than five years, it would appear that the size of the Regular, or standing,

Army to be used as a school for the training of reservists should be about 205,000 enlisted men. If from such an army, organized on a basis of three years' training, we discharge yearly that increment below the grade of sergeant which had completed its three years' training, we would have, with due allowance for deaths, etc., in the first year of its complete operation an army of 263,700 (205,000 plus 58,700 reserves); in the second year an army of 322,400 (205,000 plus 117,400 reserves); in the third year an army of 381,100 (205,000 plus 176,100 reserves); in the fourth year an army of 439,800 (205,000 plus 234,800 reserves); in the fifth year an army of 498,500 (205,000 plus 293,500 reserves). After this the Army would be maintained at the last figure, and in addition we would be accumulating trained men in the second reserve at the rate of about 55,000 each year.

"The rule as to the accumulation of reserves for the operation of the Coast Artillery Corps does not seem to have the same force as when that principle is applied to the mobile army, inasmuch as it is necessary for the Coast Artillery at all times to man their defences with practically the full complement, and that corps, as it is not charged with any greater requirements as to strength in war than in peace, does not require expansion in war. However, the principle applies to a degree, at least, to this corps in order that its ranks may at all times be readily filled with experienced men when war is imminent.

"Whether our country could adopt the principle of creating a reserve without compensation to the

reservists whilst not actively serving with the colours is doubtful, but it would seem that a small remuneration might be given for the retention of their services.

“No reason is seen why the same principle as to reserves should not be applied to the Organized Militia, and the men trained in its units be bound for service for a period corresponding to that of the reservists for the Regular Army. It must, however, be admitted that unless there be a material change in the laws governing the Organized Militia which will bring about a greater reliance upon and an increased control by the General Government, that branch of our military establishment cannot be regarded and depended upon as a reliable force. Such a modification in the law to meet this end might be brought about by placing the Organized Militia under pay by the General Government, and under a binding obligation to serve at its call. This, it is thought, would produce a state of affairs where the Organized Militia will be much more thoroughly trained than it possibly can be under existing laws, and to that extent can be more surely depended upon. In any regulations or modifications of law looking to the better organization of the Militia as a national force it naturally follows that the United States should have the power to create in the Organized Militia that parity of the several arms of the service and staff which is essential for effective operations in war. It should also have the power to detach from the Regular Army such numbers of officers and non-commissioned officers as it may find necessary to

place on duty with the Organized Militia to aid and assist the officers of that branch of the national defence in a thorough training of the units.

“The question of supplies and equipment necessary to make such forces as we may organize effective is of primary importance. No matter what size force we may have, it will be ineffective without proper and adequate supplies and equipment. It would therefore appear that we should establish depots in which should be deposited all those supplies necessary to the effective operation of our Army which cannot be readily and rapidly procured in the first stages of war.

“No attempt will be made to enter into particulars as to the character of supplies it will be necessary to accumulate and store for the use of such forces as are contemplated in the above scheme—that is, a regular mobile army, including its reserves of 500,000 men, and a force of 300,000 mobile Organized Militia troops, including its reserves. One illustration will be sufficient, and that will be taken from the munitions most necessary in war, as rifles and field artillery. The proper proportion of rifles in a force of this character, including the Cavalry, which is armed with the rifle, would be 642,541. The minimum accumulated supply of rifle ammunition, based on 1,000 rounds per rifle, should be 646,000,000 rounds. The proper proportion of field and heavy guns of the mobile type, and exclusive of the gigantic engines of war of more recent introduction, drawn by tractors, no types of which have as yet been developed in this country, would be 2,834. The ammunition for

this type of gun, based upon a supply of 5,000 rounds per light field gun, with a corresponding proportion for the heavier field guns, a conservative estimate, if we regard the examples of the great military nations, would be 11,790,850 rounds. It is sufficient to point out that at the present time we have on hand and being manufactured 698,374 United States rifles (model 1903) and 241,000,000 rounds of ammunition for these rifles, 852 field guns and 580,098 rounds of ammunition for these guns. The number of guns per thousand men used in the calculation as to the total number required in the above estimate as to force, is five, that number being considerably below the average in European armies. It should also be remembered that large numbers of guns and large masses of ammunition are, in an active war, liable to capture and destruction, and that to start into field operations with the expectation that the proportions given will be maintained without large sources of manufacture, would be fallacious. AS THE FACTORIES AND WORKS IN THIS COUNTRY WHICH CAN PRODUCE MUNITIONS OF WAR OF THE ABOVE CHARACTER ARE EXCEEDINGLY LIMITED, IT IS EVIDENT THAT A FULL SUPPLY OF THIS TYPE OF MATÉRIEL MUST BE STORED AND READY FOR USE BEFORE WAR IS UNDERTAKEN.

“ DEPOTS.

“ As regards the depots in which supplies for the military establishment should be stored, their distribution should be in the immediate vicinity of the troops, both of the Regular Army and the Organized

Militia, which are to be equipped from them. The distances in this great country between the present limited number of depots and the stations of the troops, or the areas from which the troops will mainly be drawn, are so great that an effective distribution from them to troops organized under the general scheme here contemplated would be ineffective, in that it would consume a great amount of the limited time which modern warfare indicates would be at the disposal of a country subject to attack whose plans contemplate the mobilization of its forces only after war is imminent or has been declared."

In considering, before the conclusion of the existing war, the relative strengths of the American and German navies, an important factor is apt to be overlooked. Should Germany be driven from the foreign territory she occupies now (April, 1915), and peace be then concluded without a restoration of Germany's colonies and without the loss to Germany of her navy, her sea-power will be far greater both in numbers and in capacity than at the time the following table was compiled.

Her losses in battleships, cruisers, and submarines have been trifling compared to the output of her ship-yards (during hostilities) in destroyers and submersible vessels, the latter of a type far in advance of anything produced before the outbreak of the war, both in radius of action and capacity for offensive while on the surface of the water. Disappearing turret guns of heavy calibre are mounted on the most recent German creations of this type of commerce destroyer.

Her greatest superiority over the United States would lie, however, in the freedom of action afforded her fleet by lack of necessity to guard any colonial possessions. Given a firm peace in Europe, her fleet could be sent as an entirety in any direction, while America must ever have her inferior fleet scattered over the waters in defence of Panama, Porto Rico, Honolulu, Guam, and the Philippines, to say nothing of the additional weakness created by our vast littoral, practically undefended, upon both the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the continent.

Under such conditions, German and American sea-power could only be equalized by a huge numerical preponderance in favour of the latter power.

FROM BULLETINS OF OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES NAVY DEPARTMENT,
JULY 1, 1914.

VESSELS BUILT.

	Battleships (Dreadnought Type).	Battleships.	Battle- Cruisers.	Armoured Cruisers.	Cruisers.	Destroyers.	Torpedo- Boats.	Submarines.	Coast-Defence Vessels.
England	20	40	9	34	74	167	49	75	0
Germany... ..	13	20	4	9	41	130	0	27	2
United States ...	8	22	0	11	14	51	13	30	4
France	4	18	0	20	9	84	135	64	1
Japan	2	13	2	13	13	50	27	13	2
Russia	0	7	0	6	9	91	14	30	2
Italy	3	8	0	9	6	32	68	19	0
Austria-Hungary	3	6	0	2	5	18	39	6	6

VESSELS BUILDING OR AUTHORIZED.

	Battle-ships (Dread-nought Type).	Battle-Cruisers.	Cruisers.	De- stroyers.	Torpedo- Boats.	Sub- marines.
England	16	1	17	21	0	22
Germany	7	4	5	24	0	18
United States	4	0	0	11	0	19
France	8	0	0	3	0	22
Japan	4	2	0	2	0	2
Russia	7	4	8	44	0	19
Italy	7	0	2	15	2	8
Austria-Hungary ...	4	0	5	1	24	6

NOTE.—Attention is invited to the following testimony of Assistant Secretary of Navy, F. D. Roosevelt ("Hearings before Committee on Naval Affairs," p. 980, December 16, 1914):—Mr. Roosevelt: I think I can say this, that from confidential reports, the source of which I could not make public, I am led to believe that certain other nations have very greatly increased their submarine strength over the strength as shown in this table.

RELATIVE ORDER OF WARSHIP TONNAGE.

Present Order (Tonnage completed).		As would be the Case if Vessels now building were completed.	
Nation.	Tonnage.	Nation.	Tonnage.
Great Britain	2,157,850	Great Britain	2,714,106
Germany	951,713	Germany	1,306,577
United States	765,133	France	899,915
France	688,840	United States	894,889
Japan... ..	519,640	Japan... ..	699,916
Italy	285,460	Russia	678,818
Russia	270,861	Italy	497,815
Austria-Hungary ...	221,526	Austria-Hungary ...	347,508

ACTIVE PERSONNEL.

	Eng- land.	Ger- many.	United States.	France.	Japan.	Russia.	Italy.	Austria- Hun- gary.
Total (officers and men)	150,609	79,197	66,273	63,846	55,736	52,463	39,913	19,531

An Assistant Secretary of the Navy recently testified before the United States Congress that there is a shortage in that arm of our defences of between 40,000 and 50,000 enlisted men.

Upon this subject of the naval weakness of the United States the testimony of Rear-Admiral Bradley H. Fiske before the House Committee on Naval Affairs (1914) is most instructive. He said :

“ I think, of course, it is very well known we are behind other nations—for instance, the two great naval nations in Europe—in the matter of mines and aircraft. I think that in case of an attack on our coasts by one of those Powers our inadequacy would be very keenly felt. (P. 1007.)

* * * * *

“ As to scout ships, the policy of the General Board is to cut down what we think we really ought to have, because if we told Congress what we really think we ought to have, they would say we are crazy. (P. 1017.)

* * * * *

“ I would say it would take about five years to get ready with our Navy to fight successfully and effectively against an effective navy. (P. 1023.) I am not thinking so much of the material of the ships as of the operations. What I have in mind all the time is what I would do if we were to have war to-morrow or next month. When I think of the number of things that we would have to do in order to get the Navy into really effective shape—by which I mean having plans, plans of preparation and plans of conduct of the war, and properly

drilled mine-layers and mine-sweepers, and the aeronautical branch—when I think of all that has to be done in preparing general plans and detail plans of war, in getting the personnel enlisted and trained, ready to fight our battleships that are now in reserve and in ordinary, and figure it all out, I conclude that it will take at least five years. (P. 1024.) I doubt if in five years we could get the Navy up to a state of efficiency, for instance, such as that of one of the navies of Europe now. I doubt it very much. (P. 1024.)

* * * * *

“We lack a general staff, which shall arrange the plans; that is fundamental. We have not enough personnel to man all the ships. We have not any mining equipment to speak of or any aeronautical equipment or personnel. Besides the battleships we need small auxiliaries in the fleet, such as have been proposed by the General Board. (P. 1047.)

* * * * *

“MR. GRAY: Has it not been said, Admiral, that to make effective even the ships we have, we need more scout cruisers? I believe you testified to that this morning. I believe, even to make more effective the ships we already have, we need an increase in scout cruisers.

“ADMIRAL FISKE: To make the Navy more effective—yes.

“MR. GRAY: And we need more aircraft, you say, to make effective the Navy we have now?

“ADMIRAL FISKE: Yes.

“MR. GRAY: And we need more submarines,

you say, to make effective the ships we now have?

"ADMIRAL FISKE: I do not think I said submarines. I said mines.

"MR. GRAY: It also has been said here that we need submarines.

"ADMIRAL FISKE: Yes; I agree with that; but I think I spoke of mines.

"MR. GRAY: And we need more destroyers to make more effective the ships we now have. Is not that true?

"ADMIRAL FISKE: Yes.

"MR. GRAY: And also we require more officers, do we not, to make effective the ships that we now have?

"ADMIRAL FISKE: Yes.

"MR. GRAY: And we require more training for those men to make more effective the ships that we now have?

"ADMIRAL FISKE: Yes. (P. 1050.)

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"It would be necessary to supply submarines for only a few individual harbours. That is a small part of the problem. Most all of them should go with the fleet. But in the Canal Zone, which is the most vulnerable part of our entire possessions, anybody can go there and take it that wants to. I think we should have a few submarines." (P. 1053.)

Extract from the Report of the General Board of the Navy, 1913.

"The absence of any definite naval policy on our part, except in the General Board, and the

failure of the people, the Congress, and the Executive Government, to recognize the necessity for such a policy, has already placed us in a position of inferiority which may lead to war; and this inferiority is progressive, and will continue to increase until the necessity for a definite policy is recognized and that policy put into operation."

Extracts from the Report of the General Board of the Navy, November 17, 1914.

"This shows that we are now deficient ten battleships, built, building, and authorized, from that contemplated in the 1903 programme. (P. 56.)

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"The General Board believes the policy it has consistently advocated for the production of an adequate Navy is to the best interests of the country, and that any Navy less than adequate is an expense to the nation without being a protection." (P. 56.)

Our reprehensible policy of neglecting aerial navigation, and failing to provide adequate flying corps both for our land and sea forces, has been emphasized by the important part aviation has played in the Great War.

"The General Board of the United States Navy, in its indorsement, No. 449, of August 30, 1913, and accompanying memorandum, brought to the attention of the department the dangerous situation of the country in the lack of aircraft and air-men in both the naval and military services. (P. 58.)

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“At the present time, more than a year later, the total number of aircraft of any kind owned by the Navy consists of twelve aeroplanes, not more than two of which are of the same type, and all reported to have too little speed and carrying capacity for service work. (P. 59.)

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“In view of the advance that has been made in aeronautics during the past year, and the demonstration now being made of the vital importance of a proper service to both land and sea warfare, our present situation can be described as nothing less than deplorable. As now developed aircraft are the eyes of both armies and navies, and it is difficult to place any limit to their offensive possibilities. (P. 59.)

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“In our present condition of unpreparedness, in contact with any foe possessing a proper air-service, our scouting would be blind.” (P. 59.)

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Our submarine flotilla is also sadly inadequate and obsolete. Their total number, according to the reports submitted to the United States Congress in January, 1915, was seventeen. At that time most were “out of repair.” Since that time one has been sunk (permanently) at Honolulu.

One (!) is under construction, and it is believed that it will be the premier boat of this description. It may be completed by midsummer, 1916.

CHAPTER XVIII

CONCLUSION

WE have gathered from the best evidence available that our defences are hopelessly inadequate in the event of a sudden attack by any Power of the first class.

This deficiency is due, not to criminal neglect, but to an earnest belief pervading all classes of the community, that feelings of humanity, gratitude, and self-interest, would combine to keep the United States inviolate.

We have had a rude awakening.

In the beginning of the Great War some uneasiness was caused amongst the American people by the German element of the population, who apparently sought to embroil the United States first with Japan, and later with Great Britain. To accomplish the latter purpose various crimes were committed, involving forgery, and one serious offence against life and property—the destruction of a railway bridge upon the American side of the Canadian boundary.

Again, evidence was obtruded upon the public that a league of Germans was formed, or in process of formation, to the purposes of which it might be necessary for them to subordinate their allegiance to the United States.

Later, when the first two objects had failed and the last had in all probability been accomplished, protestations of loyalty to the United States were published with such a unanimity as to suggest some central source of inspiration.

These professions were welcomed by the critics of those who had been engaged in the pro-German campaign, by the Press of all shades of opinion, and by the general public.

An editor, of American birth, of a German paper said:

“I sympathize with Germany, but, in the remote contingency of trouble arising between the United States and Germany, I am an American first and all the time.”

Well, the trouble has arisen. Early in May, by the sinking of the *Gulflight*, a direct act of war was committed by Germany against the United States. No word of condemnation appeared in the *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung* anent this flagrant violation of neutral rights. This editor was willing to go far farther even than the German Government in acts of aggression against the land of his birth. He justified Germany's action; Germany has not attempted to do so.

Then came the culminating outrage—the foul and unnatural murder of 1,500 non-combatants, who were passengers upon the *Lusitania*, on May 7, 1915. Among the lost were 100 of the editor's countrymen and countrywomen. In this sympathetic way he commented upon the cry of grief that went up from stricken, bereaved relatives who cried out from his very doorstep:

“They will have many opportunities during the next few months to swell the chorus.”

We know now that these protestations of loyalty to the land which had nurtured them and endowed them with liberty were lies, uttered as were German promises made forty-eight hours before the Belgian invasion to lull their victims into a false sense of security.

It is proved now that one born in a stable is not necessarily a horse, and that a German is a *German* no matter what the accident of place of birth may have been; no matter what environments may have encompassed his youth; no matter what factors may have entered into his education. His answer to a cry for mercy is a shout of glee. He is without pity, honour, or gratitude. He has one quality which he deems a virtue—unswerving loyalty to a country which stands for all that our revolutionary fathers fought, in order that we, their children, might enjoy the blessings of liberty and peace.

On May 16, 1915, Herr von Rath, the official spokesman of the Wilhelmstrasse, said in *Der Tag*:

“And how about our Germanic brethren in the United States—the half-million German and Austro-Hungarian reservists who are not permitted to take part in the defence of their homelands? Will they stand with folded arms and see their fatherlands attacked?”

We have had our warning; if we fail to heed it, as sure as that God, to whom our fathers prayed not in vain, still lives, we or our children shall pay, pay, pay!

THE END

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